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Foreword
U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s: Selected Documents, edited by John Hattendorf, is the
thirtieth in the Newport Paper monograph series and the second in a projected four-
volume set of authoritative documents on U.S. Navy strategy and strategic planning.
The first volume in this series, U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s: Selected Documents,
Newport Paper 27, also edited by Professor Hattendorf, appeared in September 2006.
The current volume was originally intended to include documents relating to the
development of the Navy’s “Maritime Strategy” during the 1980s, but the bulk of rele-
vant material has made it advisable to dedicate a separate volume to that period; this is
due to appear shortly. A final volume will then cover documents from the 1950s and
1960s. When combined with Professor Hattendorf ’s authoritative narrative of the gen-
esis and development of the “Maritime Strategy,” The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Mari-
time Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper 19, these volumes will provide for the first
time a comprehensive picture of the evolution of high-level U.S. Navy (and to some
extent U.S. Marine Corps) strategic thinking over the half-century following the end of
World War II.
Many of the documents reprinted here were—and were intended to be—public state-
ments. In all cases, however, these documents remain little known and mostly inacces-
sible, certainly outside the Navy itself. It is important to emphasize that they need to be
read with careful attention to their historical and institutional contexts. They are in any
case not always easy to interpret, and they differ substantially in the weight they carried
at the time or later. For these reasons, we have felt it essential to present the documents
accompanied by a general introductory essay that locates them in their appropriate
contexts, as well as by brief commentaries on each providing additional pertinent
information and attempting to assess their wider significances.
This project, it is hoped, will contribute importantly not just to our understanding of
our recent naval history but also to the serious study of military institutions, strategy,
and planning more generally. Also, it is worth noting that this material is of more than
merely historical interest. The U.S. Navy (with its sister sea services, the Marine Corps
and the Coast Guard) is currently on the verge of completing a major review of its
naval and maritime strategy in a new era of protracted low-intensity warfare and grow-
ing global economic interdependence. This exercise, whatever the immediate result
may prove to be, has unquestionably served the valuable purpose of stimulating serious
thought about fundamental strategic issues at many levels throughout the Navy. These
volumes can be expected to be an important resource in a continuing process of strate-
gic assessment and education as the Navy continues to adjust to a rapidly evolving
security environment.
C A R N E S L O R D
Director, Naval War College Press
Newport, Rhode Island
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Introduction
This work is part of a four-volume set of studies within the Naval War College Press’s
Newport Paper monograph series. A broad introduction to the history of strategic and
doctrinal thinking within the U.S. Navy in the period between 1970 and 2000 is found
in these Newport Papers; it may be useful to read them in the order in which they
appeared rather than in the chronological order of the periods that they cover. Thus,
the basis of this series begins with The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy,
1977–1986.1 That work is followed by the three separate volumes of documents, includ-
ing this one, each devoted to one of three decades of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.2
An Overview of the Decade
As the Vietnam War drew to a close and the Cold War entered a phase of détente, the
decade of the 1970s opened for the U.S. Navy with a resurgence of thinking about naval
strategy and the role of the Navy in American defense posture. While the emphasis
during the 1950s and 1960s had been on nuclear deterrence, the experience of the Viet-
nam War and the rising number of local crises increasingly stressed the role of conven-
tional arms. As Admiral Elmo Zumwalt took office as Chief of Naval Operations in
1970, he faced a situation in which the U.S. Navy’s 750-ship fleet, a high proportion of
which had been launched during World War II, was reaching the end of its useful life
and needed to be replaced. At the same time, the Soviet Navy had been increasingly
showing its presence on the world’s oceans.3 In 1970, it made a dramatic statement
with its exercise OKEAN ’70 in which two hundred Soviet ships exercised simulta-
neously in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans and the Mediterranean Sea. It was a
vivid demonstration of the Soviet Union’s naval capacity for global reach.
Zumwalt outlined the changes that he sought to make in this context in his “Project
SIXTY” document, which set the stage for developments across the 1960s. While this
plan looked forward, changes that had been set in motion during the late 1960s were
just coming to fruition.
As these developments were taking place within the Navy, the United States and the
Soviet Union showed some sign of movement in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT I). Negotiations on this matter had begun in 1969 and in May 1971, when the
first major breakthrough came in an agreement on antiballistic missile systems. As a
further step in this regard, President Richard Nixon and the General Secretary of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, met in Moscow on 26 May
1972 to sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which remained in force until 2002 and
established parity in these offensive and defensive systems. At the same time the two
powers made several statements that helped to improve mutual relations, as well as the
“Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms.” In addition, on 25 May 1972, during Nixon’s visit to Moscow, Admiral
of the Fleet Sergei G. Gorshkov and Secretary of the Navy John Warner signed an
important naval agreement on prevention of incidents on the high seas and in the air-
space above them (known as INCSEA).
As these discussions were in progress, the People’s Republic of China began to signal an
interest in improving relations with the United States as part of an effort to guard
against Soviet invasion. In response, in February 1972 President Nixon traveled to
China, where he met with Mao Zedong and Chou En-lai, taking the first step toward
creating normal diplomatic relations between the United States and China.
As a result of these international events, both China and the Soviet Union encouraged
North Vietnam to come to terms with the United States in the Paris Peace Accords,
which were signed on 27 January 1973, bringing the Vietnam War to an end. As Nixon
later explained,
I had long believed that an indispensable element of any successful peace initiative in Vietnam was to
enlist, if possible, the help of the Soviets and the Chinese. Though rapprochement with China and
détente with the Soviet Union were ends in themselves, I also considered them possible means to has-
ten the end of the war. At worst, Hanoi was bound to feel less confident if Washington was dealing
with Moscow and Beijing. At best, if the two major Communist powers decided that they had bigger
fish to fry, Hanoi would be pressured into negotiating a settlement we could accept.4
In October 1973, during the Arab-Israeli War, warships of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and of
the Soviet Fifth Eskadra faced off in one of the most dangerous naval crises of the Cold
War. The Soviet Union threatened to intervene in the war unilaterally and conducted
aggressive surveillance of U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean.5
These events in international affairs were temporarily overshadowed in American
domestic politics by the Watergate scandal, which was uncovered in October 1973 and
ultimately led to Nixon’s resignation, in August 1974. Under President Gerald Ford, the
United States continued the policy of détente, with Ford traveling to Vladivostok in
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November 1975 to sign a joint communiqué on the SALT talks, visiting China in December
1975, and then joining the Soviet Union in the Helsinki Accords in August 1975.
While these broad events were taking place in terms of Cold War détente, however,
competition between the Soviet Navy and the U.S. Navy continued to grow. The Soviet
Union was clearly spending large sums to develop its conventional military and naval
capabilities as the United States cut back in the wake of the Vietnam War. Even after
the SALT agreement, the Soviets widely deployed nuclear-armed weapons and built up
forces in Eastern Europe and the Far East, while aiding communist movements in Latin
America, Asia, and Africa. While this was going on, the Soviet Navy increased its pres-
ence around the globe in a manner that the U.S. Navy saw as a challenge to American
interests and American sea-control capabilities. Echoing its OKEAN ’70 Exercise, the
Soviet Navy held another, but smaller, exercise, OKEAN ’75, with 220 ships operating in
all the oceans. As part of this exercise, Soviet long-range bombers made simulated
strikes against the United States.
The rise of the Soviet Navy quickly became the primary concern of American naval
leaders, who, with the leaders of the other uniformed services, persistently pursued a
national strategy that was essentially a maritime strategy involving overseas-deployed
forces in Germany, Korea, and Japan. For the U.S. Navy, this meant keeping heavily armed
carrier forces forward deployed and U.S. Marine expeditionary forces embarked in amphib-
ious warfare vessels, ready to respond to crises and contingencies around the globe.
In this situation, the most important locus was Central Europe, especially the “inner
German border,” dividing the Federal Republic of Germany from the German Demo-
cratic Republic, where Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces were massed. This theater
remained the prime focus, closely bound to the NATO alliance and to allied participa-
tion.6 As a result, the ability of the U.S. Navy to support NATO forces was the first pri-
ority for the United States; the range of scenarios that this contingency presented in
case of a war became the fundamental basis for American naval force planning. The sit-
uation required the Navy to control of the essential sea lines of communication to key
areas in case of a war with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The situation began
to change into a global one, as Americans watched the Soviet Union begin steadily to
build up forces in the Pacific, by the end of the decade turning the former American
naval base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, into a major base for the Soviet Pacific Fleet.
As the U.S. Navy’s leadership continued to develop its strategic concepts, doctrine, and
contingency planning to meet this situation, at a time when the Navy was declining in
size, in terms of personnel, aircraft, and ships, it became obvious that the service could
not maintain its supremacy on a global basis. In February 1978, the Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral James L. Holloway III, testified to the House of Representatives
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Armed Services Committee that in the event of war with the Soviet Union the U.S.
Navy could not maintain complete superiority in the western Pacific or protect vital
commercial shipping to allies in Japan and Korea. As Holloway later recalled in his
memoir, “Supporting NATO was our first priority. With the continuing decline in our
naval force levels, we had become a one-ocean navy.”7 Nevertheless, on 1 January 1979,
the Taiwan Relations Act became effective, requiring the Defense Department “to
maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of
coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the
people on Taiwan.”8
The following year, the situation became even more difficult as a new theater for Amer-
ican naval concern opened in Southwest Asia. In Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter
and his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, began covert operations in 1979
to fund and to train antigovernment mujahideen forces. In response to the rising
strength of this force, the Soviet Union intervened on 24 December 1979; it occupied
the country for the next ten years.
In January 1978, while these events were taking place in Afghanistan, the Iranian Revo-
lution began with strikes and protests against the government of the shah of Iran. The
initial events were barely noticed in the United States. Following the shah’s departure
from Iran, the return of the exiled leader Ayatollah Khomeini from France, and the col-
lapse of the Pahlavi dynasty in February 1978, a republic was established. Relations
between the United States and the new Islamic Republic of Iran quickly deteriorated,
and on 4 November 1979 students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran. Although the sei-
zure had not been a government-led event, the Iranian government announced its
approval. As a result, fifty-two Americans were held hostage during intensive diplo-
matic negotiations that lasted for 444 days, until January 1981.
On 24 April 1980, President Carter ordered a secret joint military operation to rescue
the hostages. In this operation, called EAGLE CLAW or EVENING LIGHT, eight CH-53
helicopters were launched from the USS Nimitz (CVN 68) in the Indian Ocean, while
six C-130 aircraft carried special operations troops from the Marine Corps, Army, and
Air Force. The mission failed completely. A formal joint-service investigation led by
Admiral Holloway, by then retired, concluded that the failure of the operation had
been due to inadequate use of the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff
organization, resulting in poor planning.9 The failure of the rescue attempt and the
findings of the investigation led to significant changes in later years.
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The U.S. Navy’s Budget
During the 1970s, the Navy’s overall budget fluctuated from a low of $21 billion in
1971 to more than double at the end of the decade, with a high of $47 billion in 1980
(table 1):
Force Levels
Meanwhile the active ship force levels of the fleet, dropped steadily from the high of
752 vessels in 1971 to a low of 530 in 1980 (table 2).
As the total number of ships declined, the total number of fleet combat aircraft also
declined, from 3,457 on 31 March 1970 to 2,689 on 31 March 1980 (table 3).
Overall personnel strength dropped steadily from the 1970 total of 731,777 to the 1980
low of 525,096 (table 4).
Introduction of Major Naval Combat Systems
Even though the U.S. Navy was steadily declining in size throughout the 1970s, a num-
ber of new capabilities and changes were introduced during the decade. The long lead
time required for implementation of complex weapons systems meant that many of the
new capabilities introduced at the beginning of the 1970s had begun in the 1960s.
Among the new warships was a new class of command ships, beginning with the USS
Blue Ridge, laid down in 1967 and commissioned in November 1970. The lead ship of a
new class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, USS Nimitz (CVN 68), was laid down in
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1970 $22,444,000,000
1971 $21,731,000,000
1972 $24,028,000,000
1973 $25,350,000,000
1974 $26,860,000,000
1975 $27,934,000,000
1976 $31,480,000,000
1977 $36,538,000,000
1978 $39,504,000,000
1979 $41,694,000,000
1980 $47,041,000,000
TABLE 1
Budget of the U.S. Navy, 1970–1980
Total Obligational Authority
Source: Statistics for 1970 through 1977 are taken from “Appropriation Summary,” in U.S. Navy Dept., Historical Budget Data
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1978), pp. 4–6. Statistics for 1978 through 1980 are taken from
“Appropriation Summary,” in U.S. Navy Dept., Historical Budget Data (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Comptroller, 1985), pp.
4–5. See the “Budget of the U.S. Navy, 1794 to 2004,” Navy Department Library, www.history.navy.mil/library/online/budget.htm.
1968 and placed in commission in 1975. The USS Spruance (DD 963) was the first of a
new class of antisubmarine destroyers. The first gas-turbine-powered destroyer in the
U.S. Navy, Spruance was laid down in 1972 and commissioned in 1975. USS Tarawa
(LHA 1), laid down in 1971 and commissioned in 1973, was the lead ship in a new class
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TYPE
30 JUNE
1970
30 JUNE
1971
30 JUNE
1972
30 JUNE
1973
30 JUNE
1974
30 JUNE
1975
Carriers 19 19 17 16 14 15
Cruisers 31 30 27 29 28 27
Destroyers 155 152 132 139 119 102
Frigates 47 61 66 71 64 64
Submarines 103 100 94 84 73 75
SSG/SSBNs 41 41 41 41 41 41
Command Ships - - - - - -
Mine Warfare 64 59 31 34 34 34
Patrol 15 17 16 14 14 14
Amphibious 97 95 77 65 65 64
Auxiliary 171 177 153 148 135 123
Surface Warships 249 262 225 239 211 193
Total Active 743 751 654 641 587 559
TYPE
30 JUNE
1976
30 JUNE
1977a
30 SEPT
1978b
30 SEPT
1979
30 SEPT
1980
Carriers 13 13 13 13 13
Cruisers 26 26 28 28 26
Destroyers 99 92 95 97 94
Frigates 64 64 65 65 71
Submarines 74 77 81 80 82
SSG/SSBNs 41 41 41 41 40
Command Ships - - - - 3
Mine Warfare 25 25 25 25 25
Patrol 13 6 3 3 3
Amphibious 65 65 67 67 63
Auxiliary 116 114 113 114 110
Surface Warships 189 182 188 190 191
Total Active 536 523 531 533 530
TABLE 2
U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1970–1980
Notes:
a. This year marked the low point in total active ships during the 1970s.
b. Beginning with fiscal year 1978, the Defense Department fiscal year ran from 1 October through
30 September; previously it had run from 1 July to 30 June.
Source: “Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1917–,” Naval Historical Center, www.history.navy.mil/
branches/org9-4.htm#1965.
of five general amphibious assault ships that combined the functions of four different
ship types of the World War II era. The first ship of a new class of nuclear-powered
attack submarines, the USS Los Angeles (SSN 688), was laid down in 1972 and commis-
sioned in 1976. Finally, the first of a new class of fifty general-purpose guided-missile
frigates, the product of Admiral Zumwalt’s initiatives from “Project SIXTY” to find a
relatively inexpensive warship, was the USS Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG 7), laid down in
1975 and commissioned in 1976.
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YEAR TOTAL ACTIVE OPERATING FLEET COMBAT
1970 9,412 7,926 6,581 3,457
1971 8,548 7,358 6,068 3,405
1972 8,033 6,836 5,752 3,106
1973 7,660 6,587 5,444 2,967
1974 7,639 6,256 5,129 2,777
1975 7,376 6,018 5,004 2,827
1976 7,122 5,782 4,829 2,781
1977 6,960 5,590 4,752 2,844
1978 6,667 5,414 4,354 2,596
1979 6,449 5,418 4,458 2,681
1980 6,382 5,435 4,419 2,689
TABLE 3
Inventory of Active Aircraft
Source: Index for Allowances and Location of Navy Aircraft for 31 March of each year, from 1970 to 1980, as recorded in chart 1
of each 31 March report. See “Index for Allowances and Location of Navy Aircraft Covering January 1969 through September
1980,” Naval Historical Center, www.history.navy.mil/a-record/alna69-80.htm.
YEAR OFFICERS NURSES ENLISTED OFFICER CANDIDATES TOTAL
1970 82,565 2,283 643,164 6,048 731,777
1971 77,442 2,202 572,338 5,843 655,623
1972 74,208 2,254 524,205 5,774 604,187
1973 71,448 2,197 502,777 5,407 579,672
1974 68,250 2,527 483,257 5,021 556,528
1975 66,036 2,668 474,596 5,093 545,725
1976 64,110 2,570 460,161 4,938 529,209
1977 63,337 2,633 459,780 4,616 527,733
1978 62,890 2,606 458,710 4,915 526,515
1979 62,161 2,542 458,431 4,863 525,455
1980 62,648 2,640 457,459 4,989 525,096
TABLE 4
U.S. Navy Personnel Strength, 1970–1980
Source: “Frequently Asked Questions: Personnel Strength of the U.S. Navy—1775 to Present,” Naval Historical Center, www
.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq65-1.htm.
In the area of naval aircraft, the U.S. Navy began in 1970 the third main production
line of Lockheed’s Orion maritime patrol aircraft, the P-3C; at about the same time the
definitive version of Grumman Aerospace’s twin-engine Intruder attack aircraft was
introduced, the A-6E, and its derivative with the same airframe, the Prowler electronic
attack aircraft, the EA-6B. Also, the naval version of Sikorsky’s CH-53 group of heli-
copters, the RH-53D mine-countermeasures helicopter, was introduced. The F-14
Tomcat antiair-warfare aircraft entered service with the U.S. Navy in 1972 to replace
the F-4 Phantom. Grumman’s E-2C Hawkeye carrier-based, all-weather, tactical early-
warning aircraft became operational in 1973. Then, in 1974, Lockheed’s S-3 Viking
antisubmarine-warfare aircraft entered service.
Among other new weapons and sensors, the U.S. Navy adopted the British-designed
Mark 48 torpedo for operational use in 1972 to attack high-speed vessels and deep-
diving submarines. In 1971, the Poseidon C-3 strategic long-range ballistic missile, also
known as the UGM-73A, entered service to replace the Polaris missile carried by ballis-
tic missile nuclear submarines. In its turn, the Trident C-4 (UGM-96A) missile
replaced the Poseidon missile beginning in 1979. The improved Paveway II laser-
guided bomb was introduced about 1976. In 1977 the Harpoon all-weather over-the-
horizon antiship missile was introduced, with versions for use from aircraft, surface
ships, and submarines. An improved version of the Sea Sparrow missile, which had
seen extensive use during the Vietnam War, was introduced in 1976 as the AIM-7F.
General Changes
While this wide variety of improved warships and weapons were entering the fleet, two
very important substantive changes took place that had far-reaching and long-term
effects within the U.S. Navy and in the way the service thought and worked.
The first of these occurred in 1972–74 with Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner’s revolu-
tionary changes to the curriculum and research programs of the Naval War College,
setting the U.S. Navy’s senior institution for professional military education on a new
course, with increasing influence and intellectual leadership. Establishing a large permanent
academic faculty to work alongside the rotating uniformed faculty, Turner laid a long-
lasting foundation that linked academic rigor in a graduate-level program to applied aca-
demic research, a combination that was to have increasing impact on the understanding
and the development of strategic and operational ideas within the U.S. Navy.10
The second occurred in September 1977 when Admiral James L. Holloway III, as Chief
of Naval Operations, issued a message to naval commanders in chief in the Atlantic,
Pacific, and Europe that established a new battle-force organization for the Navy. In a
dramatic change, Holloway set aside the long-standing fleet organization that had
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centered on management by warship type commanders and shifted it to an operational
basis that reflected “the missions, function, roles, and employment of the Navy.”11 To
this end, Holloway provided the following succinct definitions:
A battle force is defined as the standing operational task force organization of carriers, surface com-
batants and submarines assigned to numbered Fleets. A battle fleet is further subdivided into battle
groups.
Battle groups are defined as integrated task groups capable of conducting offensive operations at sea
against the combined spectrum of hostile maritime threats. A battle group would be a task group con-
sisting of one carrier, two cruisers, four surface combatants, and one or two submarines operating to-
gether in mutual support with the task of destroying hostile submarine, surface, and air forces within
the group’s assigned area of responsibility.12
Within the broad context of the multiple layers of change and development that were
taking place within the U.S. Navy during the 1970s, the five documents selected for this
volume represent the key statements of strategic and doctrinal thinking within the ser-
vice. These five documents are very different in approach, style, and purpose; neverthe-
less, they all document gradual and consistent development of one very significant
thread in American naval thinking during the Cold War.
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Project SIXTY
“Project SIXTY” was Admiral Elmo Zumwalt’s plan of action for his four-year tenure as
Chief of Naval Operations, 1 July 1970 to 29 June 1974. In March and April 1970, Secre-
tary of Defense Melvin Laird and Secretary of the Navy John H. Chafee recommended to
President Richard Nixon that Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., a surface warfare officer
then serving as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, succeed Admiral Thomas H.
Moorer, a naval aviator, on his appointment to be chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Immediately on learning of his appointment, in mid-April 1970, Zumwalt began work
on a plan that he named “Project SIXTY,” indicating his intention to have a plan of
action that he could present to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy
within his first sixty days in office. Zumwalt saw that the surface Navy had deteriorated
in the previous decades and wanted a plan to rebalance the three separate arms of the
Navy—surface, subsurface, and air—in order to counter more effectively the growing
threat of the Soviet Navy.*
To head up his team dealing with “Project SIXTY,” Zumwalt selected Rear Admiral
Worth H. Bagley, who was then commanding a destroyer flotilla.† Unable to obtain his
services until he could be relieved of that assignment in August, Secretary of the Navy
Chafee assigned his executive assistant, Captain Stansfield Turner, to fill in and to lay
the groundwork for the project. Turner had just been selected for rear admiral and was
slated to go to a flag officer sea assignment, but Zumwalt directed Turner instead to
“write a strategy for the Navy.”* When Turner asked him for further guidance on what
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* For the background, see Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch: A Memoir (New York: Quadrangle,
1976), pp. 60–87, 104–108, 126, 154, 177, 211, 284, 306–307, 340, 444, 475; Norman Friedman,
“Elmo Russell Zumwalt, Jr.,” in The Chiefs of Naval Operations, ed. Robert William Love, Jr.
(Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980), pp. 365–79, 433–34. See also Jeffrey Sands, On His
Watch: Admiral Zumwalt’s Efforts to Institutionalize Strategic Change, CRM-93-22 (Alexandria,
Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, July 1993); “History of the Project 60 Effort” by Ens. D. A.
Rosenberg, USNR-R, Op-965, 23 July 1982, typescript of original draft supplied by Dr. David
Alan Rosenberg via Captain Peter M. Swartz, USN (Ret.).
† See Reminiscences of Staff Officers to Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., vol. 1, Worth H. Bagley, inter-
viewed by Paul Stillwell (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Oral History, 1989), Naval Historical
Collection, Naval War College, Oral History Collection, OH 122, pp. 233–34, 239–41, 243, 260,
263, 267–68, 313, 319.
he wanted, Zumwalt told him, “You write it, then let me see it.” Turner recalled that “it
was a wonderful opportunity for a young rear admiral to write a strategy with virtually
no guidance.” He obtained the assistance of a number of commanders to do some of the
spadework and research involved. As his work progressed and became more widely
known, the deputy chiefs of naval operations and other senior officers began “to offer
help that wasn’t particularly helpful” but seemed designed to infiltrate the work. On 26
August, before leaving for his next assignment, Turner briefed his concept to flag officers
in the CNO Conference Room. With this briefing he passed the basic concept on to Rear
Admiral Worth Bagley, who made some changes—which, Turner later recalled, were
largely in line with the initial ideas but contained more compromises than he would
have liked. At the same time, Turner sent directly to Zumwalt some thirty or forty two-
page decision papers for action. Zumwalt signed a substantial number of these, although
some met strong opposition within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
On 10 September 1970, seventy-two days after being in office, Zumwalt delivered the
“Project SIXTY” briefing to Secretary of Defense Laird and Deputy Secretary of Defense
David Packard. In the following week, on 16 September, Zumwalt sent a copy of this
briefing to all flag and Marine general officers, “to guide your actions as well as to keep
you aware of my thinking and to encourage your support as we move ahead.”
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* This and the following quotations in this paragraph are from a telephone conversation with
Adm. Stanfield Turner, USN (Ret.), 27 July 2007.
My purpose today is to report to you on our naval strengths and weaknesses and the
actions we are taking, or will propose, to achieve the highest feasible combat readiness.
The report reflects our survey of the Navy to date and sets forth the change of direction
which we think necessary. It is impossible to discuss these changes outside the context
of potential budget reductions. We will indicate the effect of such reductions; they
would curtail our capabilities critically, regardless of our actions. However, we hope to
emphasize the theme of the changes that we feel must be undertaken, whether we can
maintain our present expenditures or not.
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 7 0 S 3
The Navy’s capabilities fall naturally into four categories:
• Assured Second Strike Potential,
• Sea Control by our attack submarines, dual-mission carriers, escorts, and patrol
aircraft,
• Projection of power ashore by our dual-mission carriers and the amphibious force, and
• Overseas presence in peacetime
We want to see where each of these capabilities fits into the possible conflict situations
that we may face in the decade ahead. What, in short, does the country require of its
sea forces?
We are looking at this matter at a time when two factors have developed, of the highest
importance to the power relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union:
• Nuclear parity, and
• The emergence of a strong, worldwide-deployed Soviet Navy
ASSURED SECOND STRIKE POTENTIAL
The initial Navy capability is the contribution it can make to an assured Second Strike
potential.
Strategic deterrence must come first. Soviet achievement of nuclear parity, deployment
of SS-9’s, and potential deployment of MIRVs have all raised the value of our sea-based
strategic forces, and we are close upon the point when more of our deterrent forces will
have to be based more securely. We are confident that the Navy can design and build a
secure, effective ULMS. If the national decision is to rely more heavily on sea basing—
that is, to have ULMS operating before 1980—we must soon decide to accelerate.
SEA CONTROL AND PROJECTION
The other major naval missions at sea involve our sea control and projection forces.
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NAVAL CAPABILITIES
• ASSURED SECOND STRIKE
• CONTROL OF SEA LINES AND AREAS
• PROJECTION OF POWER ASHORE
• OVERSEAS PRESENCE IN PEACETIME
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN SOVIET THREAT OF LATE ’60s
• NUCLEAR PARITY
• EMERGENCE OF STRONG, WORLDWIDE DEPLOYED SOVIET NAVY
The recent changes in relative strategic power between the Soviets and ourselves also
have important implications for these conventional forces.
On the one hand, the credibility of our ability to control the sea is essential to the cred-
ibility of our strategic sea-based deterrent. On the other hand, now that we have lost
our superiority and are reducing our conventional forces, the Soviets are more likely to
use military force to achieve their political objectives. The importance of the portion of
our conventional force that is capable of overseas presence has thus been increased.
From the naval standpoint, these relationships are influenced further by the Nixon
Doctrine and by the large, modern Soviet Navy that emerged in the 1960s.
The continuing withdrawal of the United States from foreign bases and—in Asia—the
change in the forms of armed support we plan to make available to our allies, place
additional responsibilities on our sea control and projection forces. Both will employ
the dual mission carrier—the new CV concept. The Sea Control forces will see to it
that sea lift supplies get through to our allies. Projection forces will maintain a ready
deterrent to avoid any misunderstanding of our intent and provide support promptly
if needed. The Nixon Doctrine has effectively raised the threshold at which we would
commit land forces overseas. We have moved closer to a situation in which Soviet or
CHICOM involvement is the primary circumstance that might force us to intervene.
We therefore face conventional war that will not include the sanctuary of full use of
our sea lines of communication. The Soviets have conceded us this luxury in the past,
in part because of our nuclear superiority, in part because of their belief that we could
defeat them at sea in conventional war.
But now the Soviet Navy has evolved impressively in both size and spectrum of capa-
bilities. Its technical and industrial base operates at high levels of design, development,
and production. The Soviet Navy has been constructing and deploying submarines and
surface ships at an ominously high rate. The quantity and technical quality of these
ships has been rising sharply.
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SEA CONTROL AND PROJECTION
NUCLEAR-CONVENTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
• SEA CONTROL GUARANTEES INVULNERABILITY OF SEA BASED MISSILES
• NUCLEAR PARITY INCREASES LIKELIHOOD OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT
SEA CONTROL AND PROJECTION
• NIXON DOCTRINE
• NEW SOVIET NAVAL CAPABILITY
What does this new Soviet naval capability mean to us?
In strategic terms, the Soviet Navy is a worldwide force whose routine deployments
reach into the Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, and Caribbean, as well as the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Today the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean is as
great as ours; 10 years ago it was negligible. We devote fewer than 800 ship days a year
to limited parts of the Indian Ocean; the Soviets’ reach over that area has gone from
zero ship days to 2400 in the past 3 years. Their submarine activity is four times as
intense as ours and covers all the sea lanes of the world.
As you know, the Soviets have more attack submarines than we do. And they are build-
ing at a rate of 10–14 a year; we are building three. The Soviets are reducing the advan-
tage we had in quality by building new, quieter classes of submarines. These new
submarines have unique features that are so good we may copy them. In just two years,
the Soviets have produced at least 6 new designs in submarines. Their new attack sub-
marines are 3½ to 5½ knots faster than ours. Beyond this, they are giving priority to
the Yankee-class ballistic missile submarines, building them at a rate of 6 to 8 a year.
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These factors give the Soviets several advantages:
• With greater numbers of submarines, routine out of area deployments can be
increased without alerting our intelligence. Their readiness to fight is kept at a high
level.
• Quieter submarines decrease the acoustic advantage on which our submarine
barriers and underseas surveillance systems depend to detect Soviet submarine
transits.
• Their speed advantage permits the Soviet submarines to use leap-frog tactics and
brute speed in attack or evasion underseas.
And, highly important, the Soviets, with their large capacity and high building rate, can
exploit technical improvements more rapidly than we can. They have a potential pro-
duction level of 35 nuclear submarines a year without facility expansion.
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SEA CONTROL AND PROJECTION
• SOVIET SUBMARINES
• 10–14 NEW SSNs PER YEAR
• QUIETER
• NEW DESIGNS (FASTER)
• PRIORITY TO YANKEE CLASS SSBN’s (6–8/YEAR)
SOVIET ADVANTAGES
• INCREASED OUT OF AREA PATROLS
• DECREASED U.S. ACOUSTIC ADVANTAGE
• SPEED
YEARLY CONSTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR SUBMARINES
NOW BUILDING CAPACITY Avg. time to build 1 Sub.
USSR 14–20 35 21 MOS.
U.S. 3 6* 27 MOS.
*WHEN POSEIDON IS COMPLETE, U.S. CAPACITY WILL BE 10–12 A YEAR.
GROWTH IN SOVIET MISSILE-LAUNCH PLATFORMS
1960 1970
MAJOR MISSILE WARSHIPS 6 49
MISSILE PATROL BOATS 6 158
CRUISE MISSILE SUBMARINES 0 62
RECONNAISSANCE AND MISSILE AIRCRAFT 215 454
TOTAL 227 723
The Soviets have concentrated on weapons for use at sea. This chart shows the buildup
in missile-launching vehicles in their naval inventory.
Their surface fleet continues to grow in size and quality relative to ours.
They are building more ships than we are; amphibious ships are the only category in
which we have been outbuilding them.
And the Soviets are enhancing the effectiveness of these forces with a high quality capa-
bility for electronics warfare and communications. This includes active and passive
countermeasures directed at our systems, intercept equipment covering all of our emit-
ters, and excellent facilities for communications jamming, deception, and intelligence.
These assets are drawn together by a highly secure, worldwide communications system.
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US VS USSR GENERAL PURPOSE
NAVAL SHIP CONSTRUCTION 1966–1970
US USSR USSR/US IN %
MAJOR COMBATANTS 11 17 155
MINOR COMBATANTS 47 182 387
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 14 6 43
ATTACK SUBMARINES 26 43 165
The Soviet Navy I have touched on here can be deployed in all the oceans. To maintain
our own position, our Navy must be based on the two-ocean concept. We cannot con-
centrate forces in one ocean unless we are prepared to accept in war the loss of control
of the other oceans—and thus the destruction of the Free World Alliance.
As an example of this limitation, in the first naval capability to be examined—that of
support of war on land—we have looked at alternative ways to provide lift across the
Atlantic. The lift mission cannot be performed by air alone. For a NATO war in the
mid-1970’s, JCS plans call for moving seven million tons of military dry cargo and five
million tons of military POL in the first six months. Of this total only 6% could be
moved by air. This is consistent with our experience in Southeast Asia, where 96% has
moved in ships.
Heavy reliance on sea lift is an integral part of the U.S. role as a sea power. It empha-
sizes the absolute need to be able to control the seas if the nation is to exist. This slide
shows why the sea control role must be a main concern of the U.S. Navy. Seaborne
trade is several times more important to the U.S. than to the Soviets. Oceans lie
between us and our allies; most of the Soviet alliances are with contiguous nations.
Support of war-on-land requires not only the ability to lift forces across the seas but
also the ability to project power ashore.
At reduced force levels, we should be concerned about the threat to sea projection
forces during the early days of a NATO war. The situation on each flank is different.
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SEALIFT IS ESSENTIAL
• IN A NATO WAR IN THE MID 1970’S, AIRLIFT WILL BE ABLE TO HANDLE ONLY 6% OF MILITARY
CARGOES REQUIRED
• IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, ONLY 4% HAS MOVED BY AIR
SEABORNE TRADE
(MILLIONS OF LONG TONS)
1958 1965
U.S. 274 395
USSR 26 90
ALLIANCES
WITH CONTIGUOUS NATIONS WITH NON-CONTIGUOUS NATIONS
U.S. 2 43
USSR 7 4
POTENTIAL ENEMIES
U.S.: NO CONTIGUOUS ENEMIES
USSR: CHINA AND NATO
A combination of factors has given rise to a serious threat in the relatively restricted sea
area of the Mediterranean. There are three such factors:
1. Continuous operation of Soviet ships in the Mediterranean,
2. Soviet access to ports that were closed to them less than a decade ago, and
3. Soviet use of airfields in the UAR and Libya.
Because we lack adequate surveillance capabilities, we cannot keep full-time track of
Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean. For their part, the Soviets’ surface ships trail
our carriers, ready for a first-strike attack in the event of conflict.
Yet, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean demands militarily that we main-
tain our SIXTH Fleet at generally current force levels. Politically, the whole ambience
of NATO requires us to assume that those forces—or augmented forces—will be in
place and subject to early and very heavy attack at the outbreak of hostilities.
On the northern flank, however, political circumstances do not require our permanent
or prior presence. Hence, before moving in to support forces on land, we would proba-
bly operate from mid-ocean to erode the Soviets’ submarine force, sweep up their sur-
face ships and, as Allied land-based air operations took effect, slow down the rate of
sorties from enemy air bases.
These considerations also raise the question of the importance of the Naval air strike
responsibility in NATO. NATO plans call for using all our carriers in this role. Because
of air base shortages in Europe and competitive SAC requirements for tankers, I con-
sider that mission of central value in holding the line on the NATO flanks until
planned Air Force reinforcements can be deployed from CONUS. Though some feasi-
ble measures will reduce the Naval problem, the essential deficiency is in forces.
I should add that strategic warning does not lessen the Soviet naval threat, but it
might give us time to move our forces from the Pacific. Strategic warning might
also permit the Air Force to make deployments, though bases would be a limiting
factor.
Support of the land battle in a NATO war would thus require naval carrier strike forces.
Therefore, most of our sea control forces would be engaged in protecting these projec-
tion forces. There would be little left to provide more than random security to the sea
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NATO WAR
MEDITERRANEAN THREAT FACTORS
• CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS OF SOVIET SHIPS
• SOVIET ACCESS TO PORTS
• SOVIET USE OF AIRFIELDS
lines of communications. We would then be ceding to the Soviets this linch pin of
rapid reinforcement upon which NATO depends to stabilize the conflict on land and
reduce the likelihood of escalation.
Within likely budgets, this heavy commitment in one ocean would, in our judgment,
require the movement of Naval forces from the Pacific, abandonment of the Pacific
area west of Hawaii, and cession of control of those waters—including all of Japan, for
instance—to the Soviet Far East Fleet. We can also lose sea control in the Atlantic as a
result of events in the Pacific. The Soviets can give direct or proxy support to a North
Korean attack on South Korea. The logical first response to that situation, as in South
Vietnam, would be strikes by our carrier aircraft. Our analysis of the threat in the Sea
of Japan at the time the EC-121 was shot down* indicates a requirement for at least
four carriers, with large protecting forces. Again, within likely budgets, our forces will
be inadequate for sea control in the Pacific in the face of Soviet involvement—or threat
of involvement—at sea, unless we move the bulk of our Naval forces to the area. But
that would cost us control of the Atlantic and the sea lines that support NATO.
These considerations present us with a number of hard alternatives in the face of bud-
get reductions, if the Navy is to be in a position to make the necessary contribution to
the nation’s security.
• One course would be to commit all or nearly all the forces available, including the
carriers, to the sea control mission. If so, the NATO air strike responsibility would
have to be significantly reduced or even eliminated. In Asia, the cutting edge
provided by attack carriers in a situation such as Korea would be reduced drastically
if the Soviets chose to become involved at sea. At our lower force levels, we simply
could not risk the irretrievable loss of sea control by hazarding our few carriers in
land battles close to Eurasia.
• Another course would be augmentation of forces from one ocean to the other in
time of crisis or conflict, as an integral part of our strategic planning. If so, we
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ALTERNATIVES
• COMMIT ALL NAVAL FORCES TO SEA CONTROL
• CONCENTRATE FORCES IN ONE OCEAN
• INCREASE FORCES TO A LEVEL COMMENSURATE WITH TWO-OCEAN NEEDS
* On 15 April 1969, North Korean MiG aircraft shot down a U.S. Navy EC-121 Warning Star from U.S.
Navy Reconnaissance Squadron One (VQ-1). The aircraft crashed into the Sea of Japan ninety miles
off the North Korean coast. All thirty-one on board were killed, including eight officers and twenty-
three enlisted men, one of them a Marine Corps noncommissioned officer, all under the command
of Lieutenant Commander James Overstreet, USN.
would have to accept the risk or actual fact of Soviet control of the other seas and
the implications of that result for the Free World Alliance.
• The only real solution is maintenance of forces at the FY-1970 level or, for greater
assurance, an increase of forces. This alternative will retain the naval option to
provide the President with a mobile strategic contingency force whenever required
and ensures greater confidence in our capability to support the deployment of
Army and Air Force units.
Let me speak now of other naval capabilities that are required and that will fit into the
force implications just discussed in the war-on-land case.
In addition to possibly contesting for control of sea lanes incident to a war on land, the
Soviets’ naval strength enables them to start a war restricted to the sea. Such a conflict
could be directed at Free World merchant shipping, at our Naval forces, or at some
combination of the two, the choice depending on the Soviets’ objective. The Soviets
might also wage such a war by proxy.
If we were not already engaged in conflict, we could commit maximum available forces
immediately to the sea control mission. There would be no conflicting requirements
for projection of power ashore, though our ability to provide a strategic contingency
force for another crisis would be reduced. This slide shows the results of a recent study
of such a war at sea, including a high intensity war and a guerrilla war at sea. The Study
assumed present force levels projected ahead. In this Study, our losses are heavy. They
would be heavier at the lower levels we are now planning on.
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• HIGH-INTENSITY WAR D—D+60
• LOSSES OF U.S. AND ALLIES
MERCHANT SHIPS HIT______________________________1350–2550
NAVAL UNITS OUT OF ACTION:
CARRIERS ________________________________________9–12
ESCORTS_______________________________________120–180
SSN’S, SS’S _______________________________________5–12
• LOSSES OF SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES
SUBMARINES______________________________150–200 (40–60% OF
AIRCRAFT_________________________________100–200 INVENTORY)
• GUERRILLA WAR AT SEA
• FIRST-YEAR LOSSES
U.S. SHIPS HIT ________________________________________350
SOVIET SSN’s SUNK ___________________________________6–7
• STEADY STATE
SOVIETS COMMIT AND LOSE 6 SSN’s PER YEAR:
U.S. SHIPS HIT PER YEAR = 180
SOVIETS COMMIT AND LOSE 35 SSN’s PER YEAR:
U.S. SHIPS HIT PER YEAR = 1050
How our allies—we—and the Soviets estimate the outcome of such a conflict could
have a significant influence on responses to other situations. The Soviets surely gave
this matter prominence in their decisions during the Cuban missile crisis. In our judg-
ment, their naval course since that time originated then. Whether any President will
ever again be willing to impose a blockade will depend on his assessment—and ours—
of the risks if war at sea were to result. His decision will also depend on whether we
proceed now to provide him with credible tools. To expect our allies to help us counter
a Soviet initiative at sea will depend primarily on their view of our ability to pursue
such a conflict successfully.
OVERSEAS PRESENCE
I spoke earlier of the importance we ascribe to the dual-mission carrier in supporting
the Nixon Doctrine. It will give more flexibility. When we face opposition at sea, the
carriers, now operating both strike and ASW aircraft, can be used to protect the sea
lines of communications. When the seas are a sanctuary, as they have been off Vietnam,
all the carriers can operate in an air attack role.
These forces can be employed as an advanced force that is capable of rapid commit-
ment, possesses self-contained means of defense, and is easily withdrawn when a task is
completed or other forces are deployed.
In this way, Naval projection forces are unique. They can operate as a mobile strategic
contingency force—a ready, cutting edge. For instance, if it had been possible to turn
over all the air strike effort in Vietnam to land-based air after the first 12 months, we
could have pulled out the carriers. It would then have been feasible to reinforce the
SIXTH Fleet, which, by showing greater capability from time to time over the past few
years, might have proved helpful diplomatically. And we could have created a desirable
presence in the Red Sea or Indian Ocean. In another war, at lower force levels, this abil-
ity of our projection forces to provide a retrievable strategic reserve after land-based
forces are established might well be crucial.
All of a nation’s maritime capabilities bear on its influence around the world and its
ability to establish a peacetime presence at a point of choice. We need not look hard to
see how the Soviets have translated their naval presence into diplomatic leverage. Their
strength in the Arab world today is not entirely attributable to the buildup of their
Mediterranean fleet, but it was surely an important factor. The Soviets have, in a sense,
successfully turned NATO’s southern flank.
Another area in which the Soviet Navy has supported political influence in peacetime is
the Indian Ocean. Somali is a classic case. This chart, correlating Soviet ship visits with
internal events, shows how the Soviets have carried on a coordinated economic and
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diplomatic effort, supported by their merchant fleet and backed by their naval pres-
ence. It has been a subtle, piecemeal incursion.
First the Somalis were placed in debt to the Soviets. Next, that indebtedness was used to
shackle Somali oil imports exclusively to the Soviet Union. Then, the Soviet-trained
army executed a military coup. Finally, the campaign has developed into border harass-
ment of our friends in Ethiopia.
ALTERNATIVE COMBINATIONS OF SEA CONTROL AND PROJECTION FORCES
These, then, are some of the complex considerations that have engaged our thoughts in the past
two months as we face important program decisions that determine our course for the future.
In our reevaluation of the direction to follow, force options are constrained by an imminent
decline in the Defense budget and by predictions of a smaller percentage of the national bud-
get for defense in the years ahead. We must find the best combination of the capabilities that
we need most. In what has already been said, I have expressed our deep concern that our
options are already constricted beyond the point at which we can cope with the threat.
This is an illustrative force, emphasizing projection forces that we could provide in FY-
1972 with a budget $1B lower in expenditures than the fiscal guidance. We are not
advocating this budget level, and I shall remind you later of my confidence level in
maintaining control of the sea with the best Navy we can design with this budget. Here
we have categorized our forces by the broad missions they serve, though there is
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substantial overlap. One example is our dual-mission carrier, which fits, appropriately,
in both the projection and sea control groups. Another consists of the cruiser and
destroyer, which often project power ashore. The forces are designated here by the mis-
sions that will be affected most by marginal force changes.
This Case A force mix has been designed to provide: first, a moderate level of escort
protection for our carrier forces and replenishment groups, and, second, minimal pro-
tection for amphibious forces. It assumes that we can operate freely at sea, that the
Soviets allow us our sea lines of communication. I consider this an unacceptable risk.
Case B emphasizes sea control forces within the same FY 72 budget constraints. Here
we do not have enough carriers for the strike mission requirements described previ-
ously for the NATO and Asia situations. There has also been a reduction in our ability
to provide an attack and amphibious cutting edge as well as contingency force suitable
to the Nixon Doctrine.
These examples show that our choice, within these budget constraints, must be one of
relative emphasis between sea control and projection forces. In Case C, both are
reduced, but with less effect on sea control forces. As with any compromise, neither
type of force meets the need adequately. We are faced with the difficult alternatives set
forth for you earlier. These alternatives, in our judgment, make it mandatory for the
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FORCE STRUCTURE
$1 BILLION BELOW FISCAL GUIDANCE
FORCE LEVELS
PRESENT
FORCES
CASE A
EMPHASIS:
PROJECTION
FORCES
CASE B
EMPHASIS:
SEA CONTROL
FORCES
CASE C
EMPHASIS:
BALANCED
FORCES
STRATEGIC
PROJECTION
41 41 41 41
CVA (CV) 15 -— — —
CVW 14 12 8 9
AMPHIBS (MEF) 1 1/3 1 1/3 1 1/3 1
DUAL MISSION CARRIER (CV) -— 13 12 12
SEA CONTROL
CVS (CV) 4 — — —
CVSG 4 4 4 4
ESCORTS 226 110 196 180
CRUISERS 10 6 10 6
SS 59 0 31 12
SSN 44 54 54 54
VP RONS 24 10 24 24
SUPPORT FORCES
URG 75 62 55 56
national security that there be no reduction of Naval forces beyond the present levels. I
want to remind you now of my view that, while we have a somewhat-better-than-even
chance of defeating the Soviets with these FY 70 forces, the forces we can provide in a
reduced budget—even at the POM level—lower my confidence of success to about 30
percent.
Prospective budget levels and the implications of the current and growing Soviet threat
at sea require us to turn our force structure toward the sea control mission and to
reduce accordingly the forces that support other missions. In partial compensation, we
must take new actions to encourage the build-up of sea control forces by Japan and by
NATO countries that have the requisite maritime skill and potential.
OTHER TYPES OF CHANGE
There are other types of change to which we are giving our attention.
In structuring our Navy for the 1970’s, we shall seek a balance between maintaining
present force levels and modernizing for the future. As an extreme example, if we
wanted to maintain our present forces at the expense of modernization within a budget
of POM minus $1B in expenditures, we would have to eliminate every major procure-
ment. This, of course, is out of the question for two reasons:
• The rapidly improving technical quality of the Soviet Navy, and
• The necessity for a balance—between our present capability against the present
Soviet threat, and our future capability against a Soviet threat that not only is
growing in quality but shows no sign of significant reduction in numbers.
To be able to concentrate our smaller forces rapidly in a single ocean against a sophisti-
cated power and to meet strategic contingencies as well, the Navy—we are convinced—
must have more nuclear-powered ships.
The Navy is committed to several complex and expensive systems, i.e., the SSN-688’s,
S-3A’s, F-14’s, DD-963’s, DLGN’s, CVAN’s, and LHA’s. These large programs account
for a major part of the budget. Each, however, fits into the pattern of naval capabilities
I have set forth. Though each program will be reviewed against the threat and budget
environment, I believe that we can and should complete most of these major projects
that are now underway. Abrupt changes in direction of procurement are costly and dis-
ruptive, and the threat is rising so sharply that we cannot risk a hiatus in the introduc-
tion of new, more capable systems.
Some have said that naval missions can be carried out by forces that are much less
sophisticated. Some trade-offs, it is true, should be possible, but I am impressed with
the need for sophistication in the sea control mission, to counter the high quality
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submarines being produced by the Soviets. We need sophisticated carrier task forces
for defense against Soviet anti-ship missiles launched from either submarines, aircraft,
or surface ships. As for our employment of projection forces against third countries: we
note that the Soviets have, so far, supplied our opponents with highly sophisticated
defensive systems. We shall give this subject close attention and justify in detail all pro-
grams of high cost.
Let me report to you now on some actions we have taken—or are proposing—to
increase current capability, speed modernization, and offset the actual and potential
reduction in our forces.
As a matter of urgency in view of MidEast developments, we are examining ways to
enhance the security of the SIXTH Fleet in the Mediterranean. We need a plan of
action that will reduce the risk in the event of a confrontation with the Soviet Union.
A FORRESTAL-class CVA is being prepared for operation next spring as a dual-mission CV.
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• STUDY 6TH FLT DEFENSE
• CV CONCEPT
• MARINE AIR SQUADRONS IN CVWS
• AIR CAPABLE SHIP-LAMPS
• PG’S AND PGH TO MEDITERRANEAN
• DECOYS AND DECEPTION DEVICES
• CAPTOR
• SSN’S AS TASK GROUP ESCORTS
• INTERIM SSM
• SSN WITH SUBSURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE
• HARPOON
• NUCLEAR SAM AND SUBROC PROCUREMENT
• SECURE COMMUNICATIONS
• REVIEW OF ANTI-SHIP MISSILE DEFENSE
• POINT DEFENSE
• BETTER SURVEILLANCE
• TRAINING SUBS
• SPARE PARTS
• CHANGES IN R&D
• ALLIED SEA CONTROL FORCES
• SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT
• CNO EXECUTIVE PANEL
The Marine Corps will provide aircraft squadrons to operate in carrier attack air wings
to make up, in peacetime, for the reduction we are taking in Naval aircraft.
We shall enhance surface ship capability for the sea control mission, in face of the
Soviet anti-ship missile, by making surface ships air-capable. A Program Coordinator
has been designated for the broad program. This is what we have begun:
• An LPD, with six helicopters, will test tactics and procedures for a new breed of sea
control escort.
• An interim LAMPS program will place existing helicopters on DLG’s and a DLGN.
• To prepare for the longer-range LAMPS program and test the feasibility of an
interim capability, we shall test an existing helicopter in a DE-1052 class ship.
• We are speeding development of sensors for helicopters employed in the air-capable
surface ship.
• The regular LAMPS program for our new DE’s will be accelerated. We may need
your help on this proposal. Congress is balking at even the present, modest
program.
Before the end of the year, we shall deploy two patrol gunboats (PGs) to the Mediterra-
nean to test their capability in trailing the Soviet missile ships that trail our carriers
and other major combatants. This is another action of an interim nature, designed to
take some of the initiative from the Soviets, to make them react—as we now must—
and to make their operations difficult.
We shall deploy one hydrofoil gunboat (PGH) to the Mediterranean to test its suitabil-
ity in the trailing role. The results of this evaluation will help in the development of a
gunboat that is designed particularly for the mission.
We are increasing ASW R&D for decoys and deception devices and procuring addi-
tional torpedo countermeasures equipment to protect our ships.
The Captor mine development program is being accelerated, to give us additional
capability against the Soviet submarine. Captor is a deep-moored sensing device that
detects a submarine target and fires a MK-46 torpedo at it. It will be useful in our
blockade and barrier tasks and may be effective in protecting CVA operating areas
against submarine intrusions.
The employment of SSN’s as surface task group escorts will be tested. A program to
develop an improved submerged communications capability is being undertaken in
support of this concept.
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A proposal to develop an interim surface-to-surface missile by 1971, using off-the-shelf
equipment—either a drone or a modular standard missile—is being readied. This
weapons capability will give our ships a reach comparable to that of the Soviets and cut
their advantage in that respect. With the carrier force level reduced, our ships cannot
always count on air support, and this action will increase our flexibility in the employ-
ment of all our forces.
The Chief of Naval Material is conducting a conceptual design study of an advanced
SSN with a subsurface-to-surface missile.
For the long term, a proposal will be made to accelerate delivery of the Harpoon mis-
sile system, which can be launched from either aircraft or ships against surface targets.
This is the first formal program step toward achieving a requisite capability for both
these purposes.
We are reviewing the desirability of removing nuclear surface-to-air missiles from our
surface ships and terminating the procurement of SUBROC weapons. The prospective
trade-off is an increase in our conventional capability.
The procurement of secure communications equipment is being accelerated, to give
our ships and aircraft greater freedom of action. This measure, like others, will afford
us the greater unit effectiveness that our smaller forces must have.
Defense against the entire spectrum of threats posed by the Soviet anti-ship missile to
our task groups and convoys is under study. We are not convinced that our resources
for defense are being used efficiently or effectively, and we are going to establish an
office with authority and responsibility for centralized direction. We are looking at
active and passive electronic warfare, command and control, communications, air and
surface weapons, and new sensor areas, so as to match our response most effectively to
the threat. As this matter is sorted out, we shall report to you with specific proposals.
We have begun to speed installation of the Basic Point Defense Weapons System and to
develop the close-in Vulcan Phalanx gun system. We will thus increase our active
defense against current Soviet missiles at low cost, while we seek solutions to the longer-
range threat.
A smaller Navy must have better information and intelligence. We are establishing a
group to look into the near- and long-term possibilities of better surveillance—both in
satellites and underseas—including more effective use of the information already avail-
able from multiple sources. I expect a report within a month. In this area, our present
view is that strong support from you and funding at relatively low levels could make a
significant change in our favor in the power relation at sea.
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If required by budget reductions, we are planning to decommission 35 conventional
submarines, which now provide about 70 percent of our target services. We propose to
retain 10 of these submarines at very austere manning levels and to reclassify them as
ATSSs or target submarines. By taking similar action with an additional 7 conventional
submarines of the active fleet, we are able to trade-off operating costs and have 17 tar-
get submarines with no additional requirement for funds. We thereby, of course, accept
some loss of initial wartime combat capability.
To improve spare parts support, and thus material readiness, we are studying the desir-
ability of reprogramming FY 71 funds to rebuild the spares inventory. Last year, an aver-
age of 6 percent of our ships were not ready for combat because of spares deficiencies.
We are modifying our investment in research and development. In FY-1972, the
changes in emphasis will amount to about $90M for ASW and about $150M overall.
In pursuing the question of encouraging our allies to build-up their sea control forces,
I have asked Admiral COLBERT* of the Naval War College to examine the need and
possibilities. When his survey is complete—within two months—I shall recommend
specific measures.
On the systems management side, we are emphasizing the Project Coordinator/Manager
concept to deal with options that cut across all the complex disciplines of naval war-
fare. This concept—as exercised in the past—proved not effective enough; we are inves-
tigating ways of providing authority to go with the responsibility. We have already
taken steps to ensure that successful project managers stay with their programs and
receive promotion recognition.
You will note that these actions look to the present and to the future. They represent an
initial program against the primary threat to our control of the seas. Though improved
efficiencies in our use of forces may result, I refer you to my earlier remarks, pointing
out that any of the potential reductions in our forces leaves the Soviets with the advan-
tage at sea. The prospect that the momentum the Soviets have generated will lead to
significant new developments is our primary concern. We must invest heavily in the
future, even if we must pay for it by reducing current force levels.
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 7 0 S 2 1
* Vice Admiral Richard G. Colbert, USN, President, Naval War College, 30 August 1968–17 August
1971. As a captain and Naval War College graduate in 1956, Colbert became the first director of the
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the reputation of being “Mr. International Navy.” See Hattendorf, “International Naval Co-operation
and Admiral Richard G. Colbert: The Intertwining of a Career with an Idea,” in The RCN in Transition:
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Collected Essays (Malabar, Fla.: Robert Krieger, 2000), pp. 161–85.
To provide a better sense of direction for research and development, and promote force
and strategic planning, I have created a special group, to be known as the CNO Execu-
tive Panel. The panel will work directly for me in developing a long-term concept for
the Navy and in reviewing our current programs to make sure that they are consistent
with that concept.
We are also reviewing the Navy’s support structure and identifying special budget
problems, so as to eliminate all expenditures that do not contribute to Naval readiness.
You are familiar with the problems we are encountering in scaling down our base and
support facilities. Our current survey seeks to reduce overhead while providing a hedge
against any future requirement for buildup. This analysis is nearing completion, and
we shall come to you soon with a proposal for major savings in the consolidation and
closure of facilities.
Similar work, now in progress, will lead to changes in the Navy’s general support activi-
ties—base operations, training, logistics, command, medical, and individual support.
These activities account for 35 percent of the FY 72 POM Annex Navy budget, a sub-
stantial increase from the 29 percent of FY 64. We are looking at the factors that have
caused this increase. We are also establishing procedures to consider support and force
implications simultaneously, providing a degree of effectiveness that has not been pos-
sible till now. In the meantime, our planning assumes that general support for each
force category will be changed approximately in proportion to the changes in force
level.
The Navy has a special problem in a serious expenditure hump in FY 71 that could
induce even deeper cuts in force level. For example, a delay of several months in
required decisions on inactivations of ships and reductions in civilian employment
would cost the Navy on the order of $75M. Our FY 71 budget is already tight, and
trade-offs for the $75M will be hard to find. Rumors are rife in the fleet; the uncer-
tainty has created serious morale problems, with attendant effects on personnel reten-
tion. We need your help and shall continue to work closely with you on this.
We face a similar problem in out-year level funding. Inflation—at current or reduced
rates—amounts to a cut in defense resources. For example, a 5% inflation effectively
cuts $1B from the Navy budget and reduces the size of the Navy that can be supported.
The change of direction that I have described will not improve our exercise of power at
sea unless we are able to manage our personnel better. We must set a clear purpose
within the Navy. We must make naval service more attractive. I think measures to
achieve these goals offer the greatest single potential payoff in increased combat readi-
ness. Nothing less than an all-volunteer force will be acceptable.
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There are several critical areas that must be dealt with directly before retention rates
can be improved and shortages in experience corrected.
First, family separation must be reduced significantly. Second, pay must be raised to a
level that reflects the unique problems associated with a Naval career. Third, Naval per-
sonnel support facilities must be improved. Last—and more generally—we must find
new ways to restore the zest, challenge, and fun of a Naval career.
Our surveys have shown consistently that family separation is a key factor in the career
decisions of most Navymen. This slide shows the average number of days spent by our
ships in their home ports last year. Some of our career men in deprived ratings are at
sea for more than 7 years at a stretch on schedules such as these.
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PERSONNEL RETENTION AND MOTIVATION
• FAMILY SEPARATION
• COMPENSATION
• HOUSING/FACILITIES
• JOB SATISFACTION
DAYS AT HOME FY 70
SHIP TYPE DAYS IN HOME PORT NIGHTS AT HOME
(PER YEAR) 1 IN 3 1 IN 6
(WATCHES)
ATTACK CARRIERS 91 60 75
CRUISERS 146 97 122
DESTROYERS* 168 112 140
AMPHIBS 168 112 140
MINE COUNTERMEASURES 199 131 165
UNREP 128 85 107
SUBMARINES 168 112 140
CVS 193 129 161
*INCLUDES SOME NON-DEPLOYING DE’s
ACTION TAKEN TO MINIMIZE FAMILY SEPARATION
A. CONUS IN-PORT POLICIES
1. 30 DAYS LEAVE FOR ALL CHANGES OF DUTY STATION
2. LEANER WATCH SECTIONS
3. ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND WATCH STANDING SUPPORT BY SHORE COMMANDS FOR TENANT SHIPS
4. LEAVE FOR 50% OF ALL CREWS DURING POST-DEPLOYMENT PERIOD
5. IMPROVED PIER FACILITIES TO PROVIDE UTILITIES FOR ALL POST-DEPLOYMENT SHIPS
6. IMPROVED IN-PORT STABILITY BY 40% REDUCTION OF SCHEDULE CHANGES
B. OVERSEAS POLICIES
1. CONUS LEAVE FOR 5% OF DEPLOYED CREWS
2. NAVAL-SPONSORED/COORDINATED FLIGHTS TO MED FOR DEPENDENTS
Here are some actions we have initiated—or intend to initiate—to increase the amount
of time that Navymen can spend with their families. We are willing to accept the slight
reduction in our CONUS training and readiness as the price of increases in time at
home—“family” time.
These actions are clearly inadequate, however, unless they are coupled with real reduc-
tions in Naval commitments commensurate with reductions in force levels. Conse-
quently, if force levels are reduced further, we will ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support
a selective reduction of our forward deployments, to ensure a one-in-three rotation pol-
icy for deployable units. The resultant reductions in our deployed forces for Case C,
based on a budget $1B lower in expenditures than the fiscal guidance, are shown here.
The main effect, of course, would be to reduce further the number of attack carriers in
the SEVENTH Fleet to only 2. There would be no significant decrease in our Mediterra-
nean commitment. At a ratio of 1:3, or at the more desirable peacetime 1:4, we would
retain the capability of a strategic contingency force for quick reaction.
2 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
DEPLOYMENTS
FOR 1:3 ROTATION FOR CASE C FORCES
SHIP/UNIT COMMITMENT LEVEL
TYPE NOW FORCE C
ATLANTIC
CV 2 2
CRUISER 2 1
DESTROYERS 29 21–23
PACIFIC
CV 3 2
VPRON 5 4
CRUISER 2 1
UNREP 17 11
SS/SSN 9 6
RECOMMENDED PERSONNEL LEGISLATION
ADDITIONAL COSTS/YR.
• SEA PAY $71.7M
• OFFICER CONTINUATION PAY 12.1M (FIRST YEAR)
($20–30M SAVINGS IN
OUT YEARS)*
• SECOND TERM VARIABLE
REENLISTMENT BONUS 35.3M
• VARIABLE HOUSING
ALLOWANCE 20.6M
• QUARTERS ALLOWANCE FOR
BACHELORS ON SEA DUTY 57.2M
TOTAL $196.9M/YR.
Raising pay requires your personal support more than any other single subject. In the
absence of comprehensive salary reform legislation, I solicit your support toward the
enactment of legislation in each of these areas.
Sea Pay constitutes the single most important “people legislation” sponsored by the Navy,
because it identifies and provides compensation for the unique, hardship aspect of a Navy
career. We had sea pay before 1949. It amounted to 10% and 20% of the base pay of officers
and enlisted men respectively. In 1949, payment of sea pay to officers was discontinued, and
the enlisted entitlement was changed to a flat rate; for a typical second class petty officer, it
is now 4.3% of base pay. Our proposal, which is also for a flat rate, increases entitlement (to
12.6% of base pay for the second class petty officer), extends it to officers, and relates
increases in sea pay to years spent at sea rather than seniority. This legislation has been
returned from the Bureau of the Budget with the recommendation that it be studied fur-
ther. We will discuss this matter with you separately and need your support in gaining
approval of this vital proposal. The other recommended legislation is concerned with spe-
cific trouble spots in retention and puts the money where the problems are.
A compensation-related problem is the poor condition of many of our housing units
and training facilities. We are exploring ways to engage the Seabees and other self-help
forces more actively in such construction forces. To stretch our construction dollars, we
are investigating innovative financial approaches. As an example, the Navy Relief Soci-
ety has agreed to extend a $2M low-interest loan to construct personnel facilities. The
shortfalls in our current facilities are so acute that we are recommending changes in
our MILCON, even at the price of smaller forces today.
The family separation problem is especially acute in artisan enlisted ratings for which
there is a paucity of shore assignments in the Navy. Many of these petty officers have
skills that are usable in other areas of government—such programs as the Job Corps and
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SEA-SHORE ROTATION
ARTIFICER RATINGS
RATING
AVERAGE YEARS OF SEA DUTY
IN 20 YEAR CAREER
BOILER TENDER 14–16
ELECTRICIAN MATE 14–16
MACHINIST MATE 14–16
ENGINEMAN 12–14
SHIPFITTER 12–14
INTERIOR COMMUNICATIONMAN 12–14
SHIPSSERVICEMAN 12–14
MACHINERY REPAIRMAN 12–14
DISBURSING CLERK 10–12
VISTA, for instance. As an interim objective, I request your support in helping to ease our
severe rotation problems by the authorization of 4,000 additional billets ashore. We
would try to make as many of them reimbursable as possible, that is, other government
agencies would repay the Department of Defense. But even if the entire cost came from
the Navy’s budget, I would regard the expenditure as well worth our while.
To restore the zest of going to sea, we have initiated a number of programs; some are
outlined here. I hope that the net effect of these and related initiatives will be to dis-
solve conventional—and now obsolete—career patterns, encourage greater latitude and
more personal attention in both officer and enlisted assignments, provide increased
responsibility earlier, encourage a bolder and more innovative philosophy of com-
mand, and open new avenues of communication.
The turbulence associated with rapid force reductions has a very real bearing on reten-
tion. To achieve lowered budget targets, we have had to take personnel release and
redistribution actions that degrade fleet readiness and undercut our retention efforts.
In my opinion, if we drop below 575,000 in FY 72, we will jeopardize seriously our
ability to “put people first.” Yet, force mixes A, B and C all could be as low as 550,000
depending on actions taken in the shore establishment. Even a figure of 575,000 would
require stringent personnel actions, starting this year. Further reductions would have
severe and lasting effects on the Navy’s readiness and retention.
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INITIATIVES TO INCREASE JOB SATISFACTION
A. IMPROVED JOB ASSIGNMENT POLICIES
1. INCREASE ATTENTION TO OFFICER JOB ASSIGNMENTS.
2. PROVIDE INDIVIDUAL ATTENTION TO JOB ASSIGNMENTS FOR ENLISTED MEN.
3. CREATE MORE CHALLENGING ASSIGNMENTS FOR THE 500 TO 600 ENLISTED MEN WITH ADVANCED DEGREES.
B. EARLIER RECOGNITION AND GREATER RESPONSIBILITY FOR TOP PERFORMERS
1. DISSOLVE CONVENTIONAL CAREER “PATTERNS” FOR TOP TEN PERCENT
2. DOUBLE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE PROMOTED EARLY
3. SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE COMMAND OPPORTUNITY FOR LIEUTENANTS
4. ESTABLISH TRIAL PROGRAM TO INCREASE RESPONSIBILITY IN GRADE IN ONE DESTROYER AND FOUR AVIATION
SQUADRONS
5. EXCHANGE DUTY ASSIGNMENTS BETWEEN AVIATORS AND SURFACE OFFICERS TO BREAK DOWN
TRADITIONAL ASSIGNMENT CONSTRAINTS
ALTERNATIVE ACTIONS TO REDUCE MILITARY MANPOWER
END FY 72 MANPOWER
ACTIONS REQUIRED FY 71 & 72 575,000 515,000
NO. OF PERSONEL RELEASED EARLY 180,000 243,000
NO. OF SENIOR ENLISTED PROMOTIONS TOKEN NOS. ONLY NONE—RESCIND 4500
ANNOUNCED
NO. OF JUNIOR OFFICER RIFs 3300 8200
OFFICER PROMOTION ACTIONS NONE DRASTIC REDUCTION
IN PROMOTIONS TO
LCDR, CDR, CAPT
These, in sum, are the areas related to retention in which we will need your personal
support.
SUMMARY
This completes the detailed part of my presentation. I would like now to summarize
my main points. It is from these that our proposals will originate in the immediate
future; we will request your support.
1. The Soviet Navy has attained significant worldwide capability toward controlling
the seas. The Soviet forces are increasing in quantity and quality and have a
momentum of development that suggests further sharp improvements in the future.
2. The Soviets have a two-ocean Navy. If our Naval forces are reduced below the
level of end FY 70, we will no longer be able to oppose them simultaneously in the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
3. The Soviet Naval threat, our commitments abroad, and the credibility of our sea-
based strategic deterrent demand that the sea control mission be assigned priority
of resources at the expense of projection of power ashore. This action will reduce
the capability of our projection force to support the Nixon Doctrine in Asia and to
serve as a strategic contingency force.
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SECDEF SUPPORT NEEDED IN FOLLOWING RETENTION-RELATED AREAS:
1. SELECTIVE REDUCTION OF FORWARD DEPLOYMENTS TO INSURE ONE-IN-THREE ROTATION POLICY THIS YEAR
AND ONE-IN-FOUR POLICY BY F Y 72
2. DISSOLUTION OF FIXED COMMITMENTS, TO PERMIT GREATER NAVAL FLEXIBILITY IN EXTENDING PEACETIME
PRESENCE
3. BILLETS IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR RATINGS WITH INADEQUATE SEA/SHORE ROTATION
4. SPECIFIC PAY LEGISLATION
5. FORCE STRENGTH NO LOWER THAN 575,000
THE SOVIET NAVY HAS ATTAINED SIGNIFICANT WORLDWIDE CAPABILITIES
• IT IS CONTESTING U.S. FOR CONTROL OF THE SEAS
• ITS FORCES ARE GROWING IN QUALITY AND QUANTITY
• WITH ITS PRESENT MOMENTUM, FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS ARE CERTAIN
• IF U.S. NAVAL FORCES ARE REDUCED BELOW THE END FY 70 LEVEL, SIMULTANEOUS TASKS
AGAINST THE SOVIETS IN THE PACIFIC AND ATLANTIC MAY NO LONGER BE FEASIBLE
• SEA CONTROL MISSION SHOULD HAVE PRIORITY OVER PROJECTION OF POWER ASHORE
• PROJECTION  FORCES SHOULD BE STRUCTURED TO:
• SUPPORT NIXON DOCTRINE IN ASIA
• PROVIDE STRATEGIC CONTINGENCY FORCE
4. If the Soviets challenge us at sea, either as an adjunct to conflict on land or in a
war restricted to the sea, we will have, in my judgment, a 55% chance of defeating
them with our present forces. The forces at the POM-72 level, even after optimization,
reduce my confidence of success to about 30%. The U.S. may thus be unable to
support or hold together the Free World alliance in the face of a conflict with the
Soviets at sea.
5. We propose a number of actions designed to increase our capability for sea
control while retaining some forces for projection of power ashore in support of the
Nixon Doctrine—all within the fiscal restraints we face. These actions are intended
to increase combat effectiveness within a given force structure and funding level,
but do not offset the potential force reduction or reverse the critically adverse power
relationship with the Soviets implicit in that reduction.
6. Under the current and potential FY 72 Fiscal Guidance, we see no alternative to
accepting some further reduction in force levels, so that development of new
weapons systems and modernization of forces can continue.
7. We shall pay particular attention to all high-cost programs, adding sophistication
only where the threat makes it necessary. The high quality of some of the Soviet
systems, particularly in submarines, missiles and air defense, sets some limits to that
objective.
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• IF THE SOVIETS CHALLENGE THE U.S. AT SEA, OUR CHANCE OF DEFEATING THEM IS:
• 55% WITH PRESENT FORCES
• 30% WITH POM-72 FORCES
• WE ARE PROPOSING ACTIONS THAT CAN, WITHIN FISCAL CONSTRAINTS:
• INCREASE OUR CAPABILITY FOR SEA CONTROL
• RETAIN SOME PROJECTION FORCES TO SUPPORT NIXON DOCTRINE
• INCREASE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
• THESE ACTIONS CANNOT:
• OFFSET FORCE REDUCTIONS
• REVERSE THE CONSEQUENTLY ADVERSE POWER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS
• GIVEN CURRENT AND POTENTIAL FY 72 FISCAL GUIDANCE, THE NAVY:
• MUST CUT FORCES TO MAKE FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR:
• DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS
• MODERNIZATION OF FORCES
• NAVY WILL PAY ATTENTION TO ALL HIGH-COST PROGRAMS; SOPHISTICATION WILL BE ADDED
ONLY WHERE IT IS NEEDED TO MATCH THE SOVIET THREAT.
8. We must engage the understanding and commitment of appropriate allies to
build up their own sea control forces. This objective should be coordinated closely
with our capabilities. In pursuing this course, we must realize that the commitment
of even our closest friends will depend on their assessment of our naval power,
compared with the Soviets.
9. We shall require assistance in funding an acceleration in ULMS, if directed to
achieve an IOC in the late 1970’s.
10. We are examining the situation in the Mediterranean, to develop a plan of action
that will increase the defensive capabilities of the SIXTH Fleet in the event of
hostilities, to permit it to carry out its offensive mission.
11. We are establishing an office with the necessary authority and responsibility to
centralize direction of electronic warfare and command and control.
12. We anticipate large returns in combat capability at low cost by taking strong
actions to improve our capabilities for satellite and underseas surveillance.
13. The most urgent action within the Navy, to reduce costs that are not related
directly to combat strength, to increase readiness, and to reemphasize purpose lies
in the personnel field. We are giving this area the closest attention. Some proposals
have gone forward to you; others are in process. We are prepared to make some
sacrifices in immediate force level in exchange for potential gains in personnel
readiness. Your support in this key and vital matter is essential.
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• U.S. SHOULD ENCOURAGE APPROPRIATE ALLIES TO BUILD UP THEIR SEA CONTROL FORCES
• U.S. MUST REALIZE THAT THE COMMITMENT OF EVEN OUR CLOSEST ALLIES WILL DEPEND ON
THEIR COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT OF U.S. AND SOVIET NAVAL POWER
• FUNDING ASSISTANCE IS REQUIRED FOR ULMS IOC IN LATE 1970’s
• DEVELOPING PLAN OF ACTION TO INCREASE 6th FLEET DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES
• CENTRALIZED CONTROL OF EW & COMMAND & CONTROL AREAS
• SURVEILLANCE IMPROVEMENTS WILL PROVIDE LARGE RETURNS IN COMBAT CAPABILITY AT
LOW COST
• THE PERSONNEL SITUATION REQUIRES IMMEDIATE ATTENTION:
• TO REDUCE COSTS NOT RELATED TO COMBAT STRENGTH
• TO INCREASE READINESS
• TO REEMPHASIZE PURPOSE
• NAVY
• IS GIVING THIS AREA THE CLOSEST ATTENTION
• WILL SACRIFICE FORCE LEVELS NOW IN EXCHANGE FOR LONG-TERM GAINS IN PERSONNEL READINESS
We are not presenting specific matters for your approval today. However, the actions
we are taking or plan to take to set the new direction, will be introduced into the bud-
get process. As these, and related, papers go forward we will request your support in
each instance.
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Missions of the U.S. Navy
While serving as President of the Naval War College, and as Admiral Zumwalt neared
the end of his term of office as Chief of Naval Operations, Vice Admiral Stansfield
Turner wrote an article for the Naval War College Review entitled “Missions of the U.S.
Navy.”* Turner’s article was designed to support the ideas in “Project SIXTY” and to
provide a clear rationalization of the broad concepts it embodied. Working with Com-
mander George Thibault as his sounding board and editor, Turner further developed
some of the thoughts that he had had in 1970 during the early conceptualization of “Proj-
ect SIXTY” and joined these to some of the broader thinking that he had developed in
changing the basic curriculum at the Naval War College in 1972–74.†
In planning a naval force for the future, Turner felt strongly about the need to change the
thinking of officers within the U.S. Navy in a way that emphasized the Navy’s overarch-
ing missions, instead of promoting particular communities within the Navy or particular
types of ships and vessels. To this end, he stressed the interdependence among the four
principal naval missions and the point that sea control was the essential prerequisite to
power projection and other naval missions.
At the outset, Turner was impatient with Mahan’s term “command of the sea.” “What
does that mean?” he asked. “There was no way to translate that into guidance for what
kind of Navy we needed in terms of how many submarines, destroyers, aircraft carriers. I
wanted to put meat on the concept to let people make decisions.”‡ Turning Mahan’s
phrase around, he coined the term “sea control” and to that added power projection,
naval presence, and strategic deterrence. In the thirty years since its publication, Turner’s
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* Stansfield Turner, “Missions of the U.S. Navy,” Naval War College Review 26, no. 5 (March–April
1974), pp. 2–17, reprinted vol. 51, no. 1 (Winter 1998), pp. 87–103. A modified version of the
original article appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (December 1974), pp. 18–24.
† See John B. Hattendorf, B. Mitchell Simpson III, and John R. Wadleigh, Sailors and Scholars: The
Centennial History of the Naval War College (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1984), chap.
11, pp. 273–95. Also Captain George Thibault, USN (Ret.), e-mail to Hattendorf, 23 July 2007.
‡ Telephone conversation with Admiral Stanfield Turner, USN (Ret.), 27 July 2007.
article has become highly influential within the U.S. Navy and has been widely cited by
academics in the defense literature.
Usefulness of Categorizing Navy Missions
Observers of military affairs will have noted a changed naval lexicon over the past several
years. To those accustomed to phrases such as “sea power,” “command of the seas,” “com-
merce warfare,” and “amphibious warfare,” the new terms “strategic deterrence,” “sea
control,” and “presence” may seem to be just a new jargon. Not so. Since 1970 there has
been a redefinition of traditional U.S. naval roles and missions. The primary purpose of
this redefinition is to force the Navy to think in terms of output rather than input.
Why must we emphasize output? First, a nation of concerned free citizens and skeptical
taxpayers is naturally more interested in what is harvested than in what is sown. By mea-
suring the value of output in terms of national objectives, the country can rationally
decide what resources it should allocate to the Navy. Input categories such as manpower,
ships, aircraft, and training are of little help in trying to determine why we need a Navy
or, if we do need one, how big it should be and what it should be prepared to do.
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Second, focusing on missions helps tactical commanders to keep objectives in mind.
Antisubmarine warfare (ASW) tacticians often over-concentrate on killing submarines
when their ultimate objective is to ensure safe maritime operations. An example of a
good sense of objectives was the Israeli achievement of air superiority in the 1967 war.
Even though air superiority is traditionally thought of as a function of dogfight tactics,
the Israelis recognized that shooting the enemy from the air was not the objective.
Destroying Egyptian aircraft was. They employed deep surprise attacks on enemy air-
fields to achieve this objective.
Third, an amorphous mass of men, ships, and weapons is difficult to manage because it
is difficult for an individual to visualize. By subdividing these masses into their expected
output, or missions, we are able to establish priorities for allocating resources—to know
how much we are spending for different objectives and to judge their consonance with
national strategy.
Mission categorization is useful in less abstract decisionmaking also. For instance, we
shall propose that the sea control mission is executed by tactics of sortie control (bar-
rier operations), chokepoint control, open-area operations, and local defense. Different
platforms have different utility in each of these tactics. Generally speaking, maritime
patrol aircraft are best for open-area operations, surface escorts best for local defense,
and submarines best for chokepoint operations. Although each of these forces has sec-
ondary applications, resource distribution among them will be dictated by our evalua-
tion of which tactics are going to be most important to us.
Categorization of mission tactics can also be used at even more detailed levels of
resource allocation. A submarine designed for chokepoint operations should empha-
size quietness at the expense of speed; a submarine for local or escort defense needs
speed even at the expense of quietness. If we understand this, we will trade off speed
versus quietness according to our evaluation of probable employment.
Fourth, an understanding of missions assists in selecting the best among several com-
peting systems. A research program may develop five new air-launched munitions, but
we may not be able to afford production of more than three. We shall divide tactical air
projection tactics into deep interdiction, battlefield support, close air support, and
counter air/antiair warfare. Each of these makes slightly different demands for weap-
ons. While precision is mandatory for deep interdiction, it is critical in close air sup-
port. Surely in our mix of three new weapons we will want at least one that stresses
accuracy. If this seems obvious, an examination of history will show that the military
has sometimes become hypnotized by the weapons needed or used in one particular
tactic or mission to the neglect of newly emerging requirements.
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Finally, stressing missions helps to ensure that members of the organization focus on
the whole rather than on one of its parts. This can help keep vested interests in proper
perspective. Even the most professional, well-motivated individual can become so com-
mitted to a particular missile system, type of ship or aircraft, or special personnel pro-
gram that he loses sight of what is best for the whole organization.
Evolution of Naval Capabilities and Missions
How did the Navy come to define the four mission areas as strategic deterrence, sea
control, projection of power ashore, and naval presence? It was evolutionary. Navies
have not always had each of these missions, nor is this likely to be the definitive list of
naval missions.
The first and only mission of the earliest navies was sea control. A classic example of
the importance of being able to move military forces by sea is the battle of Salamis in
480 B.C. The Persian armies had pushed the Greeks to the wall. The Athenian admiral
Themistocles turned the tables by soundly defeating the Persian fleet at Salamis. Cut
off from reinforcement and resupply, the Persians left Athens and Attica.
A few decades later, in the Peloponnesian Wars, Athenian sea control repeatedly per-
mitted outflanking the land-based Spartan campaign. In the Punic Wars, Rome’s exer-
cise of sea control prevented the Carthaginians from being able to support Hannibal.
And so it went. There were many technological milestones, new tactical concepts, and
maritime initiatives, but the basic mission of navies was to ensure the safe movement
of ground forces and their supplies across the sea.
In time, trade routes flourished, exploration became more far-ranging, the horizons of
imperialism widened, commerce grew, and with it, piracy. Nations began to demand
security for their endeavors. Broad command of the sea became the sine qua non of
economic growth and well being. The nature of sea control evolved to include the pro-
tection of shipping for the nation’s economy as well as its overseas military expeditions.
By the same token, denial of an enemy’s use of the seas for commerce as well as mili-
tary purposes became an important element of warfare—blockade hurt economies and
warmaking potential.
By the early 19th century, another important naval mission had evolved—the projec-
tion of ground forces from the sea onto the land. While there are many examples of
landing operations throughout military history, amphibious warfare in the modern
sense began during the wars of the French Revolution. Examples are the British
amphibious assault operations at the Helder (1799) and Aboukir (1801). Ground
troops, traditionally transported by sea to some staging area, began to use sea plat-
forms as combat springboards. A new dimension in tactics was given to commanders
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in the projection of power ashore through amphibious assault. This also extended the
traditional sea control mission. In addition to protecting supply reinforcement and
economic shipping, navies now had to protect the amphibious assault force.
Also during the 19th century, the term “gunboat diplomacy” came into the naval vocabu-
lary. In the quest for colonies, nations paraded their naval forces to intimidate sheiks and
pashas and to serve warning on one another. In time the range of this activity extended
from warning and coercion to demonstrations of good will. It has come to be known as
the naval presence mission. Sea control, projection of power ashore by amphibious
means, and naval presence were the missions of navies through the end of World War II.
During that war, naval tactical air was used primarily in the sea control mission (e.g.,
Midway, Coral Sea, and the Battle of the Atlantic) and secondarily in direct support of the
amphibious assault mission. When the war ended, however, there was no potential chal-
lenger to U.S. sea control. In essence, the U.S. Navy had too much of a monopoly to justify a
continuing sea control mission. It was a navy in quest of new missions. Two arose.
The innovation in missions came from the final stages of World War II, when naval
tactical airpower played a role in the bombing of the Japanese home islands. Postwar
improvements in aircraft and munitions made it logical to extend this use of naval
airpower. In a sense, the tactical air projection mission was born. The Navy staked out
its claim to the use of airpower in support of land campaigns: strategic air attack on
enemy industry, transportation, and cities; air superiority over the battlefield; and close
air support of ground forces. Its value was demonstrated early in the Korean campaign,
where there were few alternative means of providing air support ashore.
The second innovation in naval missions came with the introduction of strategic deter-
rence as a national military requirement. The combination of improved aircraft perfor-
mance and smaller packaging of nuclear weapons made the aircraft carrier capable of
contributing to this new mission. With the Navy struggling to readjust its missions to
peacetime needs, and the U.S. Air Force establishing its own place in the military fam-
ily, it is understandable that there was a sense of competition for this new role. However,
by the mid-1960s, the development of the Polaris ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) con-
cept eliminated any question of appropriateness of this mission for the Navy.
At about the same time, the dramatic and determined growth of the Soviet naval chal-
lenge caused mission priorities to begin to shift and brought about a resurgence of tra-
ditional sea control requirements. Today, the balance of naval resources and attention
devoted to each of these four missions—strategic deterrence, sea control, projection of
power ashore, and naval presence—is especially difficult, because of their complex
interdependence and because almost all naval forces have multimission capabilities.
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The distinction between the four missions is primarily one of purpose. Despite these
inevitable overlaps and interdependence, we can understand the Navy far better if we
carefully examine each mission individually. We must know what each mission’s objec-
tives are so that we do not overlook some useful new tactic or weapon and so that we
can strike the proper balance whenever these missions compete for resources.
Definition of Naval Missions and Discussion of Their Forces and Tactics
Strategic Deterrence Mission. Our strategic deterrence objectives are:
• To deter all-out attack on the United States or its allies;
• To face any potential aggressor contemplating less than all-out attack with
unacceptable risks; and
• To maintain a stable political environment within which the threat of aggression or
coercion against the United States or its allies is minimized.
In support of these national objectives, we have three principal military “tactics” or force-
preparedness objectives. The first is to maintain an assured second-strike capability, in
the hope of deterring an all-out strategic nuclear attack on the United States. Today that
means dissuading the Soviets from starting a nuclear war. We hope to achieve this by
maintaining a strategic attack force capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on any
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enemy even after he has attacked us. The Navy’s Polaris/Poseidon/Trident forces are fun-
damental to this deterrence because of their high nuclear survival probability.
A second tactic is to design our forces to ensure that the United States is not placed in an
unacceptable position by a partial nuclear attack. If the Soviets attacked only a portion of
our strategic forces, would it then make sense for the United States to retaliate by striking
Soviet cities, knowing that the Soviets still possessed adequate forces to strike our own
cities? In these circumstances do we need an alternative of controlled response? This
means making our strategic strike forces quickly responsive to changes in targeting and
capable of accurate delivery. SSBN forces can be well tailored to these requirements.
A third objective is to deter third powers from attacking the United States with nuclear
weapons. Because of the great disparity between any third country’s nuclear arsenal
and ours, the same forces deterring the Soviet Union should deter others.
Finally, we maintain a quantity and quality of strategic forces which will not let us appear to
be at a disadvantage [with respect] to the Soviet Union or any other power. If we were to
allow the opinion to develop that the Soviet strategic position is markedly superior to ours,
we would find that political decisions were being adversely influenced. Thus we must always
keep in mind the balance-of-power image that our forces portray to the non-Soviet world.
In part, this image affects what and how much we buy for strategic deterrence. In part, it
affects how we talk about our comparative strength and how we criticize ourselves.
In summary, the strategic deterrence mission is subdivided into four tactics:
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There is very little overlap between strategic deterrence and other Navy mission areas
at present. However, significant improvements in enemy ASW technology could reduce
the ability of SSBNs to survive without assistance from friendly sea control forces. With
this exception and the fact that aircraft carriers still possess the potential for nuclear
strikes, naval forces for strategic nuclear deterrence are almost exclusively devoted to
that mission.
Sea Control Mission. The term “sea control” derives from the traditional phrase “control
of the sea.” This change in terminology may seem minor, but it is a deliberate attempt to ac-
knowledge the limitations on ocean control brought about by the development of the sub-
marine and the airplane.
In the 18th and 19th centuries, we passed through a period of maritime history in
which full regulation of the seas in wartime was the ambition of Great Britain. Initially,
this could be accomplished through possession of a superior sailing fleet. The enemy’s
harbors were closely watched by patrolling cutters and frigates. Ships of the line were
called forth to defeat the enemy or at least to force him back into port whenever he
dared to sortie. Later, when steam propulsion afforded ships greater mobility, the Brit-
ish found that they needed both coaling stations and control of vital chokepoints
around the world. The intention was still to be able to move a superior fleet into posi-
tion for a showdown engagement before an enemy had the opportunity to use the seas
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for his advantage. The term “control of the sea,” as used by Mahan, meant both deny-
ing use of the seas to the enemy and asserting one’s own use.
British and German naval strategies in World War I reflected this heritage. Both navies
believed that a decisive encounter of their battle fleets would determine control of the
seas. Hence caution dominated the tactics of Jutland. Germany challenged British reli-
ance on a superior battle fleet first by employing surface-ship commerce raiders, then
by unrestricted submarine warfare. The British reacted by attempting to blockade the
German U-boats with mines laid across the exit to the North Sea. It failed. Few naval
strategists understood how radically the concept of “control of the seas” was altered by
the advent of the submarine. British, German, Japanese, and American preparations
for World War II all concentrated on potential battle fleet actions. Only a few voices
pointed out that an additional submarine might be more useful than another battle-
ship or two.
Equally few strategists forecast the dominant role that control of the air over a surface
fleet would have. However, in March 1941, off Cape Matapan in Greece, the first
engagement of major surface forces since Jutland demonstrated that it was the presence
of a British aircraft carrier that allowed an otherwise weaker force to prevail. By the
end of World War II the idea of totally denying the seas to one’s enemy while asserting
one’s own exclusive use had been overtaken by technology. On the one hand it was
nearly impossible to deny an enemy submarine fleet access to the seas; on the other,
there were likely to be areas of the sea where enemy airpower would make the assertion
of one’s presence prohibitively costly. Yet, for the first several decades after the Second
World War, the U.S. Navy had such a monopoly on seapower that the term “control of
the sea” understandably continued to carry its long-established connotation.
The new term “sea control” is intended to connote more realistic control in limited
areas and for limited periods of time. It is conceivable today to exert air, submarine,
and surface control temporarily in an area while moving ships into position to project
power ashore or to resupply overseas forces. It is no longer conceivable, except in the
most limited sense, totally to control the seas for one’s own use or to deny them totally
to an enemy.
This may change with evolving technology and tactics, but in the meantime we must
approach the use of the term “sea control” from two directions: denying an enemy the
right to use some seas at some times, and asserting our own right to use some seas at
some times. Any seapower may assert its own right to use the seas and deny that right
to the enemy at any given time. Its efforts will usually be divided between the two
objectives. For instance, in figure 1, if the United States were attempting in wartime to
use the North Atlantic to reinforce Europe, the greater percentage of its effort would be
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on asserting sea control. In a situation like the Vietnam War, we operated on the other
extreme, since our use of the seas was not challenged, but we did make a substantial
effort to deny the other side access to Haiphong. An opponent, of course, will usually
respond with countering objectives and tactics.
Four U.S. national objectives which call for asserting our use of the sea and, by the
same token, denial of them to an opponent are:
• To ensure industrial supplies
• To reinforce/resupply military forces engaged overseas
• To provide wartime economic/military supplies to allies
• To provide safety for naval forces in the projection of power ashore role.
There are four different tactical approaches for achieving these sea control objectives:
Sortie Control. Bottling up an opponent in his ports or in his bases can still be
attempted. As opposed to the 18th and 19th-century tactic of forcing a major fleet
engagement at sea, today’s blockade seeks destruction of individual units as they sortie.
If we assume an opponent will be in control of the air near his ports, sortie control tac-
tics must primarily depend on submarines and mines.
If successful, sortie control is a most economical means of cutting off a nation’s use of
the seas or ability to interfere. Nevertheless, such established techniques have their dis-
advantages. No blockade is 100 percent successful. Some units may be beyond the
blockade when hostilities commence and will remain to haunt opposition forces.
Against the enemy’s aircraft there is no static defense; planes must be bombed at their
bases. Thus we must conclude that blockades are weapons of attrition, requiring time
to be effective. But the lesson of history is perhaps the most instructive of all—ingenious
man has usually found ways to circumvent blockades.
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Chokepoint Control. Sometimes the best place to engage the enemy is in a geographical
bottleneck through which he must pass. In so doing, platforms like ASW aircraft that
probably could not survive in the area of the enemy’s sortie point can be used. This
also requires patience. For those enemy forces that have cleared sortie and chokepoint
operations, there are two remaining tactics for dealing with them.
Open Area Operations. Once the enemy is loose at sea or in the air, surveillance and
search systems can assist in locating and putting him at bay. Aircraft are perhaps the
most appropriate platform, because of high search rates. Here again, though, time and
patience are required.
Local Defense (Engagement). In contrast to searching out a large area, we can let the
enemy come to us. If we are asserting our use of the seas, this means that his attacking
craft, ships, or submarines must close our forces to within weapon-release range. This
enables us to concentrate our defensive forces around the units to be protected. Defen-
sive forces may consist of surface escorts, submarines, and whatever aircraft can be
brought to the scene—maritime or ASW patrol, fighter or attack. These forces may
attempt to destroy the enemy’s launching platform prior to weapon release or may
attempt to deflect or destroy the attacking weapons themselves. If we are denying use
of the seas to someone else, local engagement amounts to positioning forces in a lim-
ited region and then preying upon the enemy.
The weapons employed in these four tactics are numerous, their selection depending on
timing and the situation. The same weapon may be used to assert our control or to deny
control to an opponent. This multimission character of many weapons systems often
causes misunderstanding of the boundary between sea control and the other naval mis-
sions. Figure 2 shows the weapons systems applicable to specific Sea Control tactics.
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In executing sea control tactics, two passive techniques deserve particular mention:
Deception. Assertive sea control objectives do not necessarily demand destruction of
the enemy’s force. If the enemy can be sufficiently deceived to frustrate his ability to
press an attack, we will have achieved our sea control objective. Force routing, deceptive/
imitative devices, and other antisearch techniques can be employed, often in combina-
tion with other tactics.
Intimidation. The perceptions of other nations of our sea control capability relative to
that of other major powers can influence political and military decisions. What any
nation says about its capabilities influences the challenges that are offered or accepted.
In summary, sea control tactics include:
Projection of Power Ashore Missions. Sea control is concerned with what happens on,
under, and over the ocean surface. Projection of power ashore is concerned with the
impact of naval forces on land forces, and it can be divided into three categories: am-
phibious assault, naval bombardment, and tactical air.
Amphibious Assault Projection. Ships have long been used to transport military power
to conflict areas. As noted earlier, assault from the sea in the face of opposition began
to develop as a naval mission in the early 19th century. The calamitous assault at
Gallipoli in 1915 and subsequent failure to distinguish poor execution from good strat-
egy lowered enthusiasm for this mission. However, World War II and the Korean con-
flict testified to its continuing importance.
Amphibious assaults are opposed landings on hostile territory and have four
objectives:
• To secure territory from which a land campaign can be launched and supported. We
do this by assault from the sea in several circumstances. One is when there is no
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other practical approach, that is, the enemy territory is a geographical or political
island. Another is when we want to outflank and surprise the enemy. The Okinawa
and the Normandy landings in World War II are examples. The purpose of the
assault on Okinawa was to secure a base from which to launch the invasion of
Japan. In Normandy the assault launched the attack into the heartland of Germany.
• To secure a land area from which an air operation can be launched and supported.
One of the costliest amphibious assaults during World War II was launched against
Iwo Jima to gain a site from which the Air Force could strike Japan.
• To secure selected territory or facilities to prevent enemy use of them. The first
offensive action of World War II in the Pacific was the capture of Guadalcanal to
deny the Japanese the airfield facilities from which they could interdict U.S. supply
routes between Pearl Harbor and Australia.
• To destroy enemy facilities, interrupt his communications, divert his effort, et
cetera, by means of amphibious raids with planned withdrawal.
Amphibious tactics are classified by the size of the operation, as indicated in figure 3.
These rough force compositions are by no means rigid. There are many specific ways in which
amphibious assault forces can be tailored to the particular requirements at hand. Obviously
the landing force must be adequate in size to handle the tasks assigned ashore. As the size of
an assault increases, there are two factors that scale upward more than proportionally to the
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 7 0 S 4 3
number of troops to be landed. One is the number of specialized units that are required,
such as command, control, and communications ships or facilities; minesweeping capabil-
ity; aircraft and gunfire support. The other factor is the time to assemble, sail, prepare the
landing area and assault. The larger the operation the more complex it becomes, with atten-
dant delays and the risk of enemy advance defensive preparations.
Finally, when little or no opposition is encountered, such as in Lebanon in 1958,
amphibious forces can be landed “administratively.” They can then be employed as reg-
ular ground forces, if supported. Administrative landings are considered amphibious
operations only when the unique over-the-beach capability of amphibious force is an
essential element.
Naval Bombardment. Although most commonly associated with amphibious assault,
bombardment can have three separate objectives:
• To provide direct support to troops operating near a coastline
• To interdict movements along a coastline
• To harass military or civil operations in coastal areas.
Bombardment is presently available from naval guns in destroyers and cruisers. There
are two tactics: either direct or indirect fire control can be employed, depending on the
distance of the ship and target from shore. Targets can be prearranged geographically,
found by observers on the beach, or selected visually from a ship or aircraft. The accu-
racy of fire can be spotted from on board ship, from ashore, or from an aircraft. In
time, even conventionally armed missiles may also be employed in this role.
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Tactical Air Projection. Tactical airpower is used to achieve three objectives:
• Destroy portions of the enemy’s warmaking potential
• Provide support to a ground campaign directly or by interdicting enemy support to
the engaged areas
• Deny an enemy these same options against us.
There are four basic tactics by which these objectives are achieved: deep interdiction,
battlefield interdiction, close air support, and counterair/antiair warfare.
Deep interdiction: attacks conducted to destroy, neutralize, or impair the enemy’s mili-
tary potential before it can be directed against friendly forces are deep interdiction.
Targets assigned may be military or civilian, remote from the battle area, and perhaps
more strategic than tactical. To prevent the enemy from moving forces and material
under the protective cover of darkness or adverse weather, an all-weather attack capa-
bility is important.
Battlefield interdiction: sometimes referred to as direct air support (DAS), battlefield
interdiction differs from deep interdiction in two ways: targets are usually military and
of immediate tactical importance, and airspace control must be closely coordinated
with frontline support operations. Sustained battlefield interdiction can restrict the
enemy’s capability to move supplies/reinforcements or maneuver his forces.
Close air support: providing direct support to frontline ground forces, close air support
is generally exercised in a similar manner as call-fire support from field artillery. There-
fore, very close coordination with gunfire support elements is necessary.
Counterair/antiair warfare: in order to conduct the three types of air strike operations,
counterair forces are employed to neutralize the enemy’s air capabilities to minimize
expected attrition of our forces. The threat over enemy territory may be surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs), antiaircraft guns (AAA) or fighter interceptor aircraft. Counters to
these range from attack on enemy airbases or weapons sites to direct protection with
our fighters or electronic countermeasures. When the situation is reversed and an
opponent is projecting his airpower over our territory, antiair warfare operations come
into play. Fighters, SAMs, and AAA are employed to exact attrition on enemy aircraft.
All of these tactical air projection tactics are carried out by attack aircraft supported as
feasible and necessary by fighter-interceptor air-superiority forces. One of the values of
categorizing air projection missions is to identify the aircraft and weapon characteris-
tics and tactics best suited to each mission. Figure 4 does this with some of the princi-
pal aircraft and weapon characteristics. There will be specific scenarios where some of
the judgmental evaluations in figure 4 will be incorrect. It would be desirable to be
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infinitely flexible and have maximum characteristics in all aircraft and weapons; unfor-
tunately, the laws of both physics and economics prevent that. Hence, some evaluation
of probable use and likely need can be valuable.
Before leaving the projection mission, we would note that only a fine distinction sepa-
rates some aspects of the sea control and projection of power ashore missions. Many
weapons and platforms are used in both missions. Amphibious assaults on chokepoints
or tactical airstrikes on enemy air bases can be employed as a part of the sea control mis-
sion. Sea-based tactical aircraft are used in sea control missions for antiair warfare and
against enemy surface combatants. The distinction in these cases is not in the type of
forces nor the tactics which are employed, but in the purpose of the operation. Is the
objective to secure or deny use of the seas, or is it to support the land campaign directly?
For instance, much of the layman’s confusion over aircraft carriers’ use stems from the
impression that they are employed exclusively in the projection of power ashore role.
Actually, from the Battle of Cape Matapan through World War II, aircraft carriers were
used almost exclusively to establish control of the ocean’s surface. Today they clearly have
a vital role to play in both the sea control and projection of power missions.
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In summary, projection of power ashore tactics are:
Naval Presence Mission. Simply stated, the naval presence mission is the use of naval
forces, short of war, to achieve political objectives. The use of presence forces is for two
broad objectives:
• To deter actions inimical to the interests of the United States or its allies
• To encourage actions that are in the interests of the United States or its allies.
We attempt to accomplish these objectives with two tactics: preventive deployments
and reactive deployments. The key difference is whether we initiate a show of presence
in peacetime (preventive) or whether we are responding to a crisis (reactive). In a pre-
ventive deployment our force capabilities should be relevant to the kind of problems
which might arise; clearly they cannot be markedly inferior to some other naval force
in the neighborhood, but they can rely to some extent on the prospect that reinforce-
ments can be made available if necessary. On the other hand, in a reactive deployment
any force deployed needs to possess an immediately credible threat and be prepared to
have its bluff called. If another seapower, such as the Soviet Union, is in the area, a
comparison of forces will be inevitable.
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In deciding to insert a presence force, we must consider what size and composition of
force is appropriate to the situation. There are basically five actions with which a naval
presence force can threaten another nation:
• Amphibious assault
• Air attack
• Bombardment
• Blockade
• Exposure through reconnaissance.
In addition, almost any size and type of presence force can imply that the United States is
concerned with the situation and may decide to bring other military forces to bear as well.
All too often, especially in reactive deployments, we tend to send the largest and most
powerful force that can move to the scene rapidly. The image created may not be
appropriate to the specific problem. For instance, the threat of major air attack on a
small oil sheikdom would not be credible, but the threat of an amphibious assault on
the capital might be; or, sailing a major fleet to show support for a small government
threatened with insurrection might be more unsettling than stabilizing, perhaps
prompting over-reaction.
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When selecting a naval presence force, we must also take into account how the coun-
tries that we want to influence will perceive the situation. There are three distinctly dif-
ferent categories of national perceptions:
The Soviet Union. When contemplating a U.S. presence force, the Soviets must assess
their comparative naval strength available over time and the expected degree of U.S.
resolve. Their principal strength comparison would probably be on which country can
exercise sea control in the area in question, since the United States is not likely to pose
a threat of projecting power directly against the U.S.S.R., except in a worldwide crisis
of the most serious proportions.
Nations Allied to the Soviets. Nations with close ties to the Soviets must assess relative
United States–U.S.S.R. capabilities in the particular circumstances. These powers will
be asking the questions, “Can the United States project its assembled power onto my
shores?” and “Can the U.S.S.R. deny them that capability?” Thus third-nation appraisal
of relative sea control strengths may be the most critical factor. We should note, how-
ever, that third-power assessments may not correspond to the assessments either we or
the Soviets would make of identical military factors.
Unaligned Third Nations. There will be cases where a nation is not able to invoke
major-power support in a dispute with the United States. The perceptions of such a
country would likely focus on U.S. capability and will to project its power ashore to
influence events in that country itself.
Thus, the naval presence mission is simultaneously as sophisticated and sensitive as
any, but also probably the least understood of all Navy missions. A well orchestrated
naval presence can be enormously useful in complementing diplomatic actions to
achieve political objectives. Applied deftly but firmly, in precisely the proper force,
naval presence can be a persuasive deterrent to war. If used ineptly, it can be disastrous.
Thus, in determining presence objectives, scaling forces, and appraising perceptions,
there will never be a weapons system as important as the human intellect.
In summary, the tactics of the naval presence mission are:
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Current and Future Issues Involving Naval Missions Areas
The United States, as we have seen, has performed the four basic naval missions for
many years. Yet the dynamic nature of world conditions demands a continuing reas-
sessment of the relation of one mission to another and the comparative emphasis on
their individual tactics. National priorities change; the nature of the threat changes.
Only by understanding the complex interdependence between naval missions and their
elements can we expect to be able to allocate resources wisely and prepare for the
future rather than the past.
Some of the key issues which must be addressed are:
Intra-mission Issues
Strategic Deterrence.
• Can we maintain our balance of power image and accent controlled response
without appearing to be developing a first-strike capability?
Sea Control.
• Will probable scenarios allow time for attrition tactics?
• Can local engagement forces be made more effective?
• Should future SSNs be designed for employment in barriers (attrition), or as escorts
(local engagement)?
Projection of Power Ashore.
Amphibious Assault—
• What size assault force is most likely to be needed?
• Should we design lift forces and tactics differently for different-size assaults?
Naval Bombardment—
• Should the vanishing 6-inch and 8-inch guns be replaced?
• Is there a place for bombardment by non-nuclear missiles?
Tactical Air—
• How much high-performance capability is needed—or can we afford—for deep
interdiction?
• What tactical application could vertical-and-short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft best
fulfill?
• In what ways are electronic warfare requirements influenced by the different tactics?
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Naval Presence.
• Are there different operating policies that would yield a greater presence capability?
Inter-mission Issues
Strategic Deterrence vs. General-Purpose Forces.
• How much of the Navy’s resources belongs in strategic deterrence?
• Should sea-based missiles be favored over the other elements of the SSBN/ICBM/
bomber triad and assume a greater role in strategic deterrence?
Sea Control vs. Projection of Power.
• Does the increased size of the Soviet Navy signal the end of our freedom to project
power from sea sanctuaries and justify shifting more resources into sea control?
• Did our Vietnam experience diminish the probability of future force-projection wars?
• Are “low-mix” sea control forces incompatible with the projection of power?
Presence vs. Combative Missions.
• Is the presence mission becoming sufficiently important to warrant building or
designing forces for that purpose?
Obviously we cannot resolve these issues of inter-mission priority in a vacuum. We must
consider both what our national political objectives are and what any potential opponent is
doing. Our principal military concern, of course, is the growing Soviet Navy. The evolution
of their post–World War II navy would indicate that they started with a sea denial orienta-
tion, as evidenced by their emphasis on submarines. There are those who argue that this
was intended only to deny us access to waters from which we could project power into the
Soviet Union. There are others who contend that their sea denial capability now includes
being able to interdict our resupply operations over a wide span of oceans. It also seems
clear that the Soviet Navy has chosen to exercise its naval presence capabilities aggressively.
Whether it looks on this as a fallout of its other capabilities or has done so deliberately is
difficult to assess. With the advent of Soviet aircraft carriers and the continuing expansion
of their amphibious forces, there is a growing question of whether the Soviets have ambi-
tions for projection of power ashore capability. If so, it would logically be accompanied by
assertive sea control capabilities to defend their projection forces. Even smaller non-allied
navies, such as the Chinese, must be taken into account. They, like the Soviets, are starting
with a sea denial orientation. With relatively simple sea denial weapons, such as antiship
missiles and mines, proliferating and extending in reach, the threat of sea denial in
restricted waters from even the smallest navies may well increase in the future.
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There will always be this constant flow and counterflow of mission emphasis and tacti-
cal adaptation. Perhaps it is even more accentuated today than in the past. On the one
hand, the pace of technological innovation is forcing this. On the other, the changing
nature of world political relationships demands a continual updating of naval capabili-
ties to support national policy. Naval officers, as professionals, must understand the
Navy’s missions, continually question their rationale, and provide the intellectual basis
for keeping them relevant and responsive to the nation’s needs. Unless we do, we will
be left behind, attempting to use yesterday’s tools to achieve today’s objectives.
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Strategic Concepts for the U.S. Navy
Admiral James L. Holloway III, a naval aviator, succeeded Admiral Zumwalt as Chief of
Naval Operations on 29 June 1974. He was to serve from the very end of Nixon’s presi-
dency through the entire administration of President Gerald Ford and on into the middle
of President Carter’s administration before leaving office on 1 July 1978. Holloway’s
term of office nearly exactly coincided with the tenure of General George S. Brown, U.S.
Air Force, as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but during this period Holloway also
served under three successive secretaries of defense—James Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld,
and Harold Brown—and two Secretaries of the Navy, William Middendorf II and W.
Graham Claytor, Jr.
During this period of change, Admiral Holloway’s strategic concepts for the Navy evolved
through a number of actions, statements, and publications. Holloway’s opening step was
to deal with the problem of fleet organization by implementing the battlegroup concept;
up to that point, the fleet had been organized around ship types rather than by broad
roles or missions. His next major step was to record in a manual his guidance for future
naval planners. The first version appeared in December 1975 as a classified publication
entitled Strategic Concept for the U.S. Navy; portions of it later appeared in an article
in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings in July 1976, two versions as Naval Warfare
Publication 1 (NWP 1), and in his 1976 posture statement.* Admiral Holloway
reworked and updated his guidance for 1977 and 1978 posture statements, disseminating
each as a stand-alone brochure, before capping off the whole process with the ultimate
version in NWP 1 (Rev. A).† This was the largest and most complete statement of May
1978, and it is reprinted in full below.
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* James L. Holloway III, “The U.S. Navy: A Bicentennial Appraisal,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceed-
ings (July 1976), pp. 18–24; Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy (Generation of Naval Force
Requirements), Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 1 (Washington, D.C.: May 1978); U.S. Con-
gress, Statement of Admiral James L. Holloway III, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations before the
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Concerning the FY 1976 Military Posture, FY
1976 and Transition Budgets and FY 1977 Authorization Request of the United States Navy, 11 Feb-
ruary 1975, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975.
† U.S. Congress, Statement of Admiral James L. Holloway III, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations
Concerning the FY 1977 Military Posture and FY 1977 Budget of the United States Navy, 94th
Cong., 2nd sess., 1976; CNO Report: A Report by Admiral James L. Holloway III, U.S. Navy Chief
of Naval Operations Concerning the FY 1979 Military Posture and Budget of the United States
Navy, March 1978 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1978).
Admiral Holloway was personally involved with this document. His executive assistant,
Captain John Poindexter, served as Holloway’s sounding board and shared his vision for
the document as “the overarching guideline that would provide a point of departure for
all of our strategic thinking and the common basis for the formulation of naval require-
ments.”* Lieutenant Commander Joseph C. Strasser, of the Strategic Concepts Group
(OP-60N), was assigned as the action officer. At that point, OP-60N was a very small
shop of two or three officers with an office in nearby Rosslyn, Virginia, where it was
hoped its officers would not be drawn into the day-to-day business of the Pentagon and
could focus on studies and longer-term projects. Strasser met privately with Admiral
Holloway to discuss the paper, later recalling that Holloway had provided him with a
very rough draft with which Holloway was unsatisfied. After they first talked, Strasser
went back to his office in Rosslyn to work on it; he met two or three additional times
with Holloway to discuss drafts and get guidance.
In this document, Holloway suggests revisions to the terminology that Zumwalt and
Turner had used and modifies the four missions for the Navy that they had employed.
Holloway felt that the term “mission” had been misused; he believed that missions were
warfare areas, such as antiair warfare, antisubmarine warfare, etc. He used instead the
term “function” to describe the two primary roles of naval forces: sea control and power
projection. In his view, presence was a result of those functions, not a specific function
in itself.†
Preface
NWP 1, STRATEGIC CONCEPTS OF THE U.S. NAVY, consists of two parts: PART I—
(Generation of Naval Force Requirements); and PART II—(Planning, Employment and
Readiness Doctrine for Naval Operating Forces). PART I is intended to provide a sound,
common basis for the development and articulation of naval force requirements
which fully support national interests and objectives as well as foreign and domes-
tic policies, and which are consistent, coordinated and thoroughly justified. PART
II is intended to establish a basic system for the employment planning of the operat-
ing forces of the U.S. Navy on both a long and short term basis; and to define the con-
cepts and terms for execution of current operations, and for the derivation of
operational planning factors which are required for the formulation of programs and
the analysis of readiness.
Throughout this publication, references to other publications imply the effective edition.
New or modified information will be indicated by a vertical line in the adjoining margin.
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* Adm. James L. Holloway III, USN (Ret.), e-mail to Hattendorf, 1 August 2007. For a detailed
account, see James L. Holloway III, Aircraft Carriers at War: A Personal Retrospective of Korea,
Vietnam, and the Soviet Confrontation (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007), pp. 392–93.
† Rear Adm. Joseph C. Strasser, USN (Ret.), e-mail to Hattendorf, 27 July 2007.
Recommended Changes
Recommended changes to this publication may be submitted at any time using the
accompanying sample format.
Atlantic and Pacific fleet units and stations, all other units, and CONUS shore activities
submit recommendations to: Chief of Naval Operations, ATTN: OP-60N, Washington,
D.C. 20350. In addition, forward two copies of all recommendations to: Officer in
Charge, Navy Tactical Doctrine Activity, Washington D.C. 20374.
Part I: Generation of Naval Force Requirements
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 PURPOSE
A clear statement of the process involved in the generation of naval force requirements
provides a sound basis for planning future force requirements and ensures understand-
ing and support of naval requirements throughout the Navy and in the Department of
Defense, the Congress, and the general public. The complexities involved in the consid-
eration of force generating factors demand an orderly, logical, thorough, and disciplined
planning process to ensure the continued capability of the Navy to fulfill its responsi-
bilities in a dynamic world environment. Part I of NWP 1 is intended to provide a
sound, common basis for the development and articulation of naval force requirements
which fully support national interests and objectives as well as foreign and domestic
policies, and which are consistent, coordinated and thoroughly justified.
1.2 SCOPE
Part I of this publication:
1. Examines briefly U.S. national strategy and national military strategy, and also the
effect of our insular position on the formulation of these strategies.
2. Reviews the primary mission and functions of the Navy.
3. Defines Navy roles in support of the national military strategy.
4. Stipulates the required capabilities and characteristics of naval forces.
5. Considers threats to the Navy’s ability to support the strategy and the impact of
those threats on Navy force levels.
6. Discusses the element of risk associated with varying force levels.
7. Outlines the system for the generation of naval force requirements.
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Figure 1-1 illustrates in diagram format all of the major considerations involved in the
generation of naval force requirements. It is, in essence, a picture of the contents of
Part I of this publication.
1.3 NAVAL CAPABILITY
1.3.1 Elements of Naval Capability. There are four distinct elements of naval capability
which in their aggregate provide the total force capability of a Navy.
1. Force Structure—The numbers and types of organized units, active and reserve, of
operating ships (or craft) and aircraft, and the facilities of the supporting base
infrastructure.
2. State of Modernization—The level of weapon system technology reflected in the
components of the force structure.
3. Readiness—The degree to which the operating units in the force structure are capa-
ble of performing the tasks for which they were designed and organized.
4. Sustainability—The ability of operating units to continue to conduct naval opera-
tions over extended periods.
1.3.2 Programming Naval Capability. Of the four elements which make up total naval
capability, only readiness and sustainability are immediately responsive to corrective
actions in the short term. Readiness and sustainability are elements which can rapidly
change with the redeployment of forces, the redistribution of resources, and the
increase of operating tempos to train ship and aircraft crews. Some aspects of readiness
improvement do require somewhat longer to accomplish, such as increasing availability
of replacement parts, or achieving higher levels of intermediate and depot-level main-
tenance. Similarly, there are aspects of sustainability, such as the procurement of
weapon-systems and replacement parts, which take longer to influence than the simple
redistribution of existing assets. But the improvements achieved in the short term must
not be at the cost of future capability. Actions such as deficit spending, priority man-
ning of selected fleet units, preferential supply support for deployed units, or permit-
ting a surge in operating tempo to modify a level-funded flying hour or steaming day
program, all mortgage the future. Instead, improvements must be carefully pro-
grammed and fully funded to achieve current benefits without a drawdown in capabil-
ity at a later time. Improvements in the other two elements of naval capability, that is,
force structure and state of modernization, occur over the longer term. Improvements
in force structure can only occur through construction and procurement programs,
which normally involve a 3 to 5 year span. Similarly, modernization requires research,
development, procurement, and then construction or installation, a process which may
take 10 years or more. Thus, from a programmatic point of view, a distinction must be
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FIGURE 1-1
Generation of Naval Force Requirements (Cont.)
made between those elements of total naval capability that can be effected in the short
term (readiness, sustainability) and those in the longer term (force structure, state of
modernization).
1.4 RESPONSIBILITIES
In order to assure its continued capability to carry out the roles prescribed by the
national military strategy, the Navy has two principal and distinct responsibilities: to
maintain current fleet readiness, and to ensure future force capabilities. These two cor-
respond to the short and long term programming actions just discussed.
1.4.1 Current Fleet Readiness. This refers to the capability of naval forces to carry out
their roles in prompt response to the National Command Authorities. It is the product
of personnel readiness, material readiness and operational training. Current fleet readi-
ness depends upon:
1. Personnel—Maintaining the numbers, skills, and experience of personnel.
2. Material—An efficient and effective logistic support structure to provide higher
material readiness and sustainability.
3. Training—A training program to achieve the most effective utilization of current
sensor and weapon systems and platforms.
1.4.2 Future Force Capabilities. The future force capabilities of the U.S. Navy are
mainly influenced by the projected force structure (numbers and types of units) and
state of modernization (the level of weapon system technology incorporated in the
force structure). Future force capabilities depend upon:
1. Weapons—Weapon system development and procurement to provide naval ships
and aircraft with the most modern weapons technology available.
2. Aircraft—Aircraft acquisition to maintain or increase force structure, and to main-
tain a high level of force modernization.
3. Ships—Ship construction to maintain, increase, or adapt force structure to changing
requirements or projected threats.
1.5 UNIQUE CONSIDERATIONS IN NAVAL FORCE PLANNING
In discussing the factors involved in the generation of naval force requirements, and
the translation of those requirements into future force capability, it is important to
consider planning factors that are unique to naval forces. Shipbuilding is an especially
complex and demanding process which, because of the long life and high initial unit
cost of a ship, is unique in defense programs. The most careful planning is therefore
required to ensure that a ship will be a useful investment over its programmed lifetime.
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For this reason, major ships must be multi-purpose in concept and capability in order
to adapt to changes in strategies and areas of operation. Their design must be suffi-
ciently flexible to permit weapon system modernization needed to counter emergent
threats and weapon technologies. The factors which must be considered in shipbuild-
ing are:
1.5.1 Long Planning Times. The construction period of a major warship will take 4 to
7 years from Congressional approval to operational deployment depending upon size,
complexity, and design. The useful lifetime of a major combatant is 20 to 30 years. A
ship’s lifetime can be extended for another 10 to 15 years through extensive rework and
weapon system modernization.
1.5.2 High Unit Cost. The high unit cost of a naval ship is due primarily to its com-
plexity in comparison to a commercial ship. All installed weapon systems must be
included in the total cost of a naval ship in the end cost system of budgeting. In addi-
tion, the full funding method used by the Department of Defense in naval ship pro-
curement requires that costs be escalated over a ship’s lengthy construction period to
accommodate inflation.
1.5.3 Evolutionary Nature of Fleet Modernization. The long life of a ship and the high
cost of replacement results in most major ships remaining in active service for the full
span of their material lives. For this reason, the composition of the fleet is relatively
slow to change. One can predict the force structure of the fleet for the next 10 years
because of the 5-year shipbuilding plan and the 5-year average construction period.
Twenty years from now 70 percent of the ships in the active force today will still be in
the fleet. Forty years in the future, the major units in the fifth year of the five year con-
struction period will just be reaching the end of their useful lifetimes. Because of the
evolutionary nature of naval change, new ships must be designed to operate both in the
future and in a compatible way with those ships already in the force.
1.6 DETERMINING FUTURE FORCE STRUCTURE
From the foregoing it is clear that the process of generating naval force requirements
demands a disciplined and carefully developed approach. In essence, the process is
based on three factors:
1. Strategy—The national military strategy which the naval force structure will be
called upon to support,
2. Threat—The military force and weapons technology which the naval force structure
will encounter in fulfilling its roles within the national military strategy, and
3. Risk—The degree of assurance that the Navy can successfully fulfill its roles in sup-
port of the national military strategy.
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These factors are examined in further detail in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 2: National Strategy
2.1 STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
National strategy is that broad course of action designed to achieve national objectives
in support of national interests. U.S. defense forces are maintained to preserve the
physical security and protect the political independence of the United States. The
defense forces’ ability to satisfy this objective depends on a capacity to deter aggression,
to prevent coercion, and to exercise a degree of influence to shape world events in a
manner conducive to U.S. interests.
2.1.1 National Interests. National interests are generalized conditions, frequently of a
continuing nature, the pursuit or protection of which is perceived to be advantageous
to the nation. They range from the ultimate interest, national survival, to very specific
regional interests which collectively determine the importance of a particular region to
the security of the United States.
2.1.2 National Objectives. National objectives are specific goals which a nation seeks in
order to advance, support or protect identified national interests. National objectives
can be broadly categorized as political, economic or security.
2.1.2.1 Political. The political objective of U.S. national strategy is to foster an inter-
national environment that is conducive to the maintenance of world peace and stabil-
ity and in which the United States, its allies, and its friends can pursue their national
objectives in security and freedom. The United States alone cannot maintain such an
environment; however, the experience of World War II emphasized the unmistakable
fact that the security and well-being of the United States, even its very survival as a free
nation, are dependent upon the utilization and application of its power to influence
the international environment in a manner compatible with U.S. and allied interests
and security.
The United States is linked closely by strong historic, political, economic, and cultural
ties to Western Europe, by close political and economic ties to Japan, and by one or
more of these ties to other selected nations, but to a lesser degree. These associations,
which reflect the fact that no nation has the capability to combat unilaterally the total
potential threat to its security, have resulted in a series of mutual defense or collective
security agreements between the United States and its allies which serve to provide for
a common defense against aggression.
2.1.2.2 Economic. The economy of the United States depends heavily upon interna-
tional trade for raw materials to support its industry, and for markets in which to sell
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its agricultural and manufactured goods. In large measure, it is the effectiveness with
which we engage in this trade that determines the standard of living enjoyed by U.S.
citizens. Therefore, the basic objective in international economics is to promote a sys-
tem of free and open trade which will enable the U.S. to benefit from those areas in
which it has a relative productive advantage.
An important economic consideration is the portion of U.S. foreign trade that moves
over the oceans of the world. In terms of volume, 9 percent of U.S. overseas export and
imports are transported by sea. The seas will become increasingly important as high-
ways of commerce and as a source of food and mineral supplies. In the next decade
alone trade predictions indicate that both imports and exports will increase over 200
percent by volume. Additionally, over 50 percent of the U.S. requirements for 19 of 29
critical raw materials are met by imports, most of them delivered by sea. The search for
additional sources of energy, minerals and food will inevitably result in international
competition over future exploitation of sea-bed resources. Control of the level and
intensity of this competition will depend in part on political and military strength.
2.1.2.3 Security. The basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as
a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. This involves assuring
the physical security of the United States and maintaining an international environ-
ment in which U.S. interests are protected. Achieving this objective is contingent upon
the ability of the United States to deter aggression, to prevent coercion, to influence
international affairs from a position of recognized strength and credibility, to fight
when necessary, and to terminate conflict on terms compatible with U.S. national secu-
rity interests.
2.2 NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
2.2.1 Defined. The national military strategy is that component of the national strategy
prescribing the manner in which the elements of national military power will be devel-
oped and employed. To be effective it must be integral to the national strategy, able to
achieve the national objectives in the face of the projected threat, and capable of
accommodating to change. The U.S. national military strategy includes three principal
elements.
2.3 ELEMENTS OF U.S. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
2.3.1 Deterrence. Deterrence of aggression requires a clear and evident capability and
resolve to fight at any level of conflict, so that any potential opponent will assess his
own risk to be unacceptable. Toward this end the United States maintains forces capa-
ble of exerting military power across the entire spectrum of requirements from show-
the-flag deployments overseas to retaliation for strategic nuclear attack.
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2.3.2 Flexible Response. Should deterrence fail, a full range of options for applying
military power should be available to control the escalation, scope, intensity and dura-
tion of any conflict. Military forces available to provide for flexible response include
strategic nuclear forces, theater nuclear forces and general purpose forces.
2.3.3 Forward Strategy. The national military strategy of the United States is a forward
strategy, driven by geopolitical considerations. The U.S. is characterized by its insular
position on the North American continent. It has only two international borders, nei-
ther of which is threatened by a hostile force, and communicates with the rest of the
world to the east, west and south by way of two major oceans. One of the states and all
of the territories for which the U.S. is responsible lie overseas. Additionally, the interde-
pendent free-world economy increasingly depends upon the use of ocean shipping and
access to the resources of the seas and sea bottoms. This forward strategy of the United
States utilizes the oceans as barriers for the defense of the country, as military lines of
communication with overseas allies, and as avenues of world trade.
2.3.3.1 Requirements of a Forward Strategy
2.3.3.1.1 Overseas Deployed U.S. Forces. U.S. forces are deployed overseas to be in
position to engage promptly a hostile threat to the security of U.S. interests or allies.
These forward deployed forces are a commitment which reassures our allies and deters
the potential aggressor. Additionally, these forces provide a capability for flexible and
timely response to other crises and contingencies. To carry out their mission within the
national strategy, naval forces are deployed as naval components of theater forces.
These forces provide the National Command Authorities (NCA) with a mechanism for
exercising U.S. power and protecting U.S. interests in conditions short of general war.
Because of the unique character of international waters, naval forces can operate in a
considerably different fashion from ground and land-based air forces. In any situation
short of actual hostilities, all nations of the world have access to international waters.
The free passage afforded all vessels on the high seas provides for greater mobility and
flexibility in the employment of naval forces. Therefore, naval forces can be positioned
in international waters in the vicinity of a crisis, ready to respond, but without having
to request overflight or landing rights, or to violate the sovereign rights of any nation.
As a prelude to hostilities, naval forces of any nation may assume a posture which will
facilitate the destruction of enemy sea commerce at the initiation of conflict or
enhance the projection of military force from the sea to targets ashore.
2.3.3.1.2 Overseas Allies. All but two of the nations with which the U.S. has formal
security arrangements are overseas. The strength of the United States is complemented
by that of other nations through participation in regional security arrangements. How-
ever, the U.S. must be able to deter or counter adventurism on the part of potential
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adversaries even when, for reasons of their own national interest, allies choose not to
support U.S. efforts with forces, material, or base rights.
Chapter 3: U.S. Navy Support of the National Military Strategy
3.1 THE U.S. NAVY MISSION
3.1.1 Defined. The mission of the U.S. Navy, as set forth in Title 10, U.S. Code, is to be
prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea in support of U.S.
national interests; in effect, to assure continued maritime superiority for the United
States. This means that the U.S. Navy must be able to defeat, in the aggregate, potential
threats to continued free use of the high seas by the United States. In its simplest terms,
defeating the maritime threat means destruction of hostile aircraft, surface ships, and
submarines which threaten the seaborne forces of the United States and its allies.
3.1.2 Implementation. The Navy carries out its mission within the framework of a
national strategy, in joint coordination with the other Services and in combined plan-
ning with U.S. allies. U.S. naval force requirements cannot be regarded in isolation
from U.S. foreign policy, domestic considerations, and the force requirements and
capabilities of the other Services and selected allies.
3.2 U.S. NAVY FUNCTIONS
In order to achieve the basic military objectives of the United States, the respective Ser-
vices are tasked with specific primary and collateral functions by Department of
Defense Directive 5100.1. The Department of the Navy is tasked:
To organize, train, and equip Navy . . . forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained
combat operations at sea, including operations of sea-based aircraft and land-based
naval air components—specifically, forces to seek out and destroy enemy naval forces,
and to suppress enemy sea commerce, to gain and maintain general naval supremacy,
to control vital sea areas and to protect vital sea lines of communication, to establish
and maintain local superiority (including air) in an area of naval operations, to seize
and defend advanced naval bases, and to conduct such land and air operations as may
be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.
Briefly, the Navy’s two basic functions are sea control and power projection. The ability
to perform these functions is a requirement if the U.S. is to utilize the seas to support
its national policies and to defeat the forces of any state that would seek to deny such
use. The functions of sea control and power projection are closely interrelated. Some
degree of sea control is necessary in the sea area from which power is to be projected,
depending on the type force to be employed. Conversely, the capability to project
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power was developed in naval forces largely as one means of achieving or supporting
sea control.
3.2.1 Sea Control. Sea control is the fundamental function of the U.S. Navy and con-
notes control of designated sea areas and the associated air space and underwater vol-
ume. It does not imply simultaneous control of all the earth’s ocean area, but is a
selective function exercised only when and where needed. Sea control is achieved by the
engagement and destruction of hostile aircraft, ships, and submarines at sea, or by the
deterrence of hostile action through the threat of destruction. Sea control is a require-
ment for most naval operations. It is required so that the U.S. Navy may have operating
areas that are secure for the projection of power, such as carrier strike or amphibious
assault, and sea lines of communications that assure buildup and resupply of allied
forces in the theater of operations, and free flow of strategic resources. Effective sea
control also enhances security for the nation’s sea-based strategic deterrent.
3.2.1.1 Prerequisite. Sea control is a prerequisite to the conduct of sustained overseas
operations by U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force general purpose forces. Modern land war-
fare generates logistic requirements of such proportions that the overwhelming
amount of material needed must be supplied by sea.
3.2.1.2 Implementation. Sea control is achieved by the destruction or neutralization of
hostile aircraft, surface ships and submarines which, by their presence, threaten U.S. or
friendly forces operating in those maritime areas which the United States must use. Sea
control can also be effected by deterring the intrusion of hostile forces into those areas.
However, deterrence is less effective than destruction in that it permits the enemy to
retain a threatening force in being.
3.2.1.3 Application. For analytical purposes sea control may be categorized as area or
local. Area sea control includes extended operations to engage and destroy hostile
forces, such as seizure or neutralization of enemy bases or denial to the enemy of access
routes to the sea. Local sea control includes close defense of U.S. and allied naval and
merchant units and of friendly forces engaged in other operations, such as amphibious
assault and mine warfare. Sea control can be achieved or supported in several ways:
1. Sea control is primarily effected by operations designed to locate and destroy hostile
naval combat units on the high seas.
2. Barrier operations are designed to deny enemy naval forces access to open oceans or
specific areas, taking advantage, where possible, of geographic choke points.
3. Sea control is also accomplished through the use of moving screens to clear the sea
area surrounding ships in transit such as military or commercial convoys and amphibi-
ous or support forces.
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4. The utilization of mines in such areas as harbor entrances and choke points is an
important means of sea control.
3.2.1.4 Power Projection as a Part of Sea Control. The use of carrier and Marine
amphibious forces in the projection of military power can be an absolute necessity to
ensure control and continued safe use of the high seas and contiguous land areas essen-
tial to control of the seas. This entails destruction of enemy naval forces at their home
bases or en route to those ocean areas which the United States desires to protect,
destroying their logistic support, or preventing the approach of enemy forces within
range from which their weapons can be employed against U.S. forces.
3.2.2 Power Projection. As an independent function, power projection is a means of
supporting land or air campaigns utilizing capabilities designed for naval tasks. Power
projection covers a broad spectrum of offensive naval operations including strategic
nuclear response by fleet ballistic missile forces, employment of carrier-based aircraft,
amphibious assault forces and naval bombardment with guns and missiles of enemy
targets ashore in support of air or land campaigns.
3.2.2.1 Sea Control as a Prerequisite for Power Projection. An essential element of
power projection is the Navy amphibious ship with Marines embarked, the nation’s
only major means of inserting U.S. ground forces into the hostile environment of an
opposed landing operation. Carrier aircraft, in the power projection function, are able
to strike land targets with a variety of weapons, conventional or nuclear. The ultimate
means of power projection is the Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) submarine force, one
element of the U.S. strategic offensive force mix. Each element of power projection
requires a measure of sea control for its effective execution, and that function can be
exercised simultaneously with the projection function, if necessary.
3.3 U.S. NAVY ROLES IN THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY
In the functional exercise of its mission responsibilities within the national military
strategy, the U.S. Navy has three main roles: strategic nuclear deterrence, to provide
overseas-deployed forces, and security of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs).
3.3.1 Strategic Nuclear Deterrence. The effectiveness of the submarine launched ballis-
tic missile combined with the virtual invulnerability of the SSBN provides the stron-
gest deterrent in our strategic nuclear forces, and thus a stabilizing factor in the
strategic nuclear balance.
3.3.2 Overseas Deployed Forces. The Navy provides operationally ready naval compo-
nents of overseas deployed U.S. forces to support allies and protect U.S. interests. These
fleet elements are deployed to locations where they can engage hostile forces at the
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outbreak of hostilities and rapidly support forward-positioned U.S. ground and air
forces, as well as U.S. allies.
3.3.3 Security of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). The success of a forward
military strategy depends upon the Navy’s ability to maintain the integrity of the sea
lines of communication between the United States and its forward deployed forces, its
allies, and those areas of the world essential for the supply of imports. The most vul-
nerable segments of these SLOCs are the overseas portions lying closest to potential
hostile bases and farthest from friendly territory where land-based air and patrol com-
batant craft can assist in the protection of shipping. The protection of these most vul-
nerable sea areas requires that U.S. Navy forces be present in sufficient strength to
defeat hostile air, surface and submarine threats. The deployment of United States
Navy sea control forces so far from United States bases and in such close proximity to
hostile bases and operating areas places one of the most demanding requirements upon
the capabilities of U.S. naval forces both in terms of individual ship characteristics and
in total force levels of multi-purpose combatant ships.
3.4 POSTURE OF U.S. NAVAL FORCES
The heavy emphasis on overseas deployed forces demanded by a forward strategy and
the vulnerability of the overseas segments of the sea lines of communication demands
that a high percentage of U.S. naval forces be committed to overseas deployment.
3.4.1 Deployed Forces. Under normal peacetime conditions, about 30 percent of the
active operating force is deployed overseas in a fully operationally ready status. An
additional 40 percent of the active forces, also operationally ready, is assigned to oper-
ating fleets based in U.S. ports, ready for immediate deployment or reinforcement of
overseas U.S. naval forces in the case of war, contingency or crisis. The remaining 30
percent of the fleet is in a reduced operational status, undergoing planned maintenance
and conducting basic training. In times of tension or crisis the percentage of the fleet
which can be deployed overseas can be increased to about 50 percent. However, this
surge posture, if maintained indefinitely without mobilization, would have a progres-
sively deleterious effect upon material readiness and personnel morale. Under condi-
tions of general war with full mobilization, up to 85 percent of the fleet can be
deployed, such as occurred during World War II.
3.4.2 Advantages of Deployed Naval Forces. In the implementation of the overseas
deployment role, the special advantages and broad options inherent in the employment
of naval forces make them uniquely valuable to the National Command Authorities.
Naval forces have the organic ability to respond to contingencies or crisis situations
worldwide with the discrete type and magnitude of forces necessary to achieve a given
objective, from classic show of force, through landing of troops, to strategic nuclear
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attack. Most overseas operations by other types of forces require the support of naval
forces. These advantages generally stem from the free use of international waters, a
principle long used by sea-faring nations, and one almost universally recognized and
accepted. Because of the international character of the sea, several benefits accrue to
naval forces that are not enjoyed by other military forces.
3.4.2.1 Political Flexibility. Naval forces may be positioned near potential trouble spots
without the political entanglement associated with the employment of land-based
forces. Naval forces, unlike land-based forces, do not have to rely on prior international
agreements before taking a position in an area of potential crisis. By loitering in the
proximity of a potential or real trouble spot, naval forces communicate a capability for
action which ground or air forces can duplicate only by landing or entering the sover-
eign air space of another nation. The latter action presumes the crisis involves a nation
with positive attitudes toward U.S. involvement and a willingness to host U.S. forces;
this is not always the case. Thus, naval forces provide decision makers the option of
influencing events without committing forces to combat, and allow a flexibility with
regard to commitment and withdrawal not available when employing other forces.
3.4.2.2 Employment Flexibility. Although bases on foreign soil are desirable, they are
not mandatory for naval forces as they are for other types of military forces. Ships are
integral units which carry much of their own support, and through mobile logistics
support, they can be maintained on forward stations for long periods of time. Naval
forces, therefore, are relatively immune to the political difficulties which can be gener-
ated by bases on foreign soil, and they do not generate the same pressures toward
involvement—the erosion of options—that occur when U.S. forces are ashore in an
area of crisis. If U.S. forces in an area are sea-based, they can provide military or logis-
tic support, or protect or evacuate U.S. citizens without becoming involved in a land
war which may be contrary to both U.S. intentions and national interests. Additionally,
sea-based forces cannot be subjected to host country employment limitations.
3.4.2.3 Mobility. Naval forces have unrestricted global mobility based on the tradi-
tional and time-honored concept of the free use of international seas. In many cases,
naval forces can perform assigned missions while remaining beyond the range of the
local enemy threat. As a minimum, the mobility of naval forces serves to seriously com-
plicate the enemy’s detection and targeting problems. It also gives the naval force the
initiative as to when or if the land force should be engaged, thereby retaining the ele-
ments of surprise and concentration of force.
3.4.2.4 Ready on Arrival. Another major advantage of naval forces is their ability to
commence combat operations immediately on reaching a crisis location. They are
ready on arrival. Other types of forces, particularly when the contingency takes place in
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a remote location, require the construction of staging areas prior to commencing com-
bat operations, or the ready and uncontested availability of such facilities. As the U.S.
military base structure overseas has diminished, the ability of naval forces to arrive in
an area fully prepared to conduct sustained combat operations has taken on added
importance.
3.4.3 Naval Presence. Naval forces are forward deployed primarily for the purpose of
being in position to engage the enemy promptly at the initiation of hostilities; to pro-
vide protection and support to friendly, allied, and U.S. forces in time of war; and to
stop the advance of the enemy as soon as possible. However, the deployment of these
naval forces far forward in sensitive areas of the globe, positioned for war fighting, also
provides a clear side benefit known as presence. The international character of the high
seas and the sovereign rights associated with men-of-war provide such overseas
deployed naval forces with a unique ability to make U.S. military presence overseas
known in crises short of conflict. This presence can be modulated to exert the degree
and kind of influence best suited to resolve the situation in a manner compatible with
U.S. interests.
3.4.3.1 Modulated Visibility. The sight of a single U.S. warship in the harbor of a
friend or ally can serve as visible evidence of U.S. close relations with or commitment
to that country. In a crisis where force may be required to protect U.S. interests or evac-
uate U.S. nationals, but where visibility could provoke the outbreak of hostilities, the
U.S. fleet can remain out of sight, over the horizon, ready to respond in a matter of
minutes. To a friendly regime which is unable to control the situation, a clearly visible
show of force by U.S. naval warships operating in international waters can serve to
restore stability.
3.4.3.2 Modulated Capabilities. U.S. naval presence can be visible or invisible, large or
small, provocative or peaceful, depending upon what best serves U.S. interests. Naval
forces do not have to request overflight authorization or diplomatic clearance before
taking a position in a crisis area. By remaining on station for indefinite periods of time,
naval forces communicate a capability for action which ground or air forces can dupli-
cate only by landing or entering the sovereign air space of another nation.
3.4.3.3 Relationship Between Presence and Capabilities. The effectiveness of naval
presence cannot be considered separately from warfighting capability. In order to
encourage friends, deter enemies, or influence neutrals, forces deployed to crisis areas
must possess a warfighting capability. They must also reflect the degree of U.S. interests
in the area relative to that of a potential enemy as demonstrated by his level of naval
forces. To be effective in the presence role, naval forces must reflect a readily perceived
combat capability for effectively carrying out the implied threats.
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Chapter 4: Required Capabilities and Characteristics of Naval Forces
4.1 NAVAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS BASED ON NATIONAL STRATEGY
The roles of the U.S. Navy within the national military strategy and the unique advan-
tages of naval ships operating in international waters influence the required capabilities
of U.S. naval forces. Certain basic general capabilities are necessary if the Navy is to be
successful in performing its primary functions.
4.1.1 Strategic Forces. Fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) must be capable of
delivering ballistic missile attacks against assigned targets. A virtually invulnerable
SSBN force with highly capable missiles and an effective and survivable command and
control system is an assured retaliatory capability which is required to provide a credi-
ble strategic nuclear deterrent. SSBNs must be maintained in sufficient numbers to
ensure that no asymmetry in overall strength is perceived by a potential foe, and they
must be capable of a full range of responses to varying political circumstances.
4.1.2 General Purpose Forces. U.S. naval general purpose forces require the following
capabilities:
4.1.2.1 Offensive Power. The offensive power to destroy or neutralize hostile forces
routinely present in the theater of operations, or which represent a threat within that
theater, is essential to maintain the credibility of stated commitments to allies and to
deter or defeat potential adversaries. More importantly, if conflict should break out,
the very survivability of U.S. naval forces and the accomplishment of their missions
depend on it. This type of offensive power is provided by sea control forces, usually
operating as an integrated unit. Such integrated forces may be geographically distant,
but their movements, sensors, and weapons are coordinated to provide maximum
mutual support and offensive capability.
4.1.2.2 Defensive Strength. The defensive strength to cope with large scale attacks by
enemy forces which can concentrate in a given theater of operations on short notice is
essential. The Navy must recognize the capability of a potential aggressor to capitalize on
the mobility inherent in sea and air forces, and to mass them quickly in a position for
launching a surprise attack. This is especially important since the advent of long range
antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) with large conventional or nuclear payloads, which
have greatly multiplied the offensive power of small surface units, submarines and air-
craft. Naval defensive capability should include long range detection systems such as air-
borne early warning (AEW), quick reacting command and control systems, and effective
defensive weapon systems. Each of these categories should exploit the full technological
potential of satellites and other space-based systems. When necessary, naval forces must
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be able to operate in a silent electromagnetic and acoustic environment so as to minimize
the probability of detection by the enemy.
4.1.2.3 Ability to Project Power Ashore. The ability to project power ashore by gunfire,
missiles, carrier-based aircraft, and amphibious landing is required to achieve and
maintain sea control and to support allied forces or U.S. land-based forces ashore. Use
of sea-based projection in defense, denial, or seizure of advanced bases is an essential
element in ensuring continued use of vital sea areas, in preventing enemy transit to
open ocean areas, and in destroying enemy base areas from which assaults against
friendly forces at sea may be launched. Perhaps more importantly, a capability to pro-
ject power ashore lends substance to U.S. political initiatives when the implied threat of
the application of military power is used in an effort to convince other nations to act in
consonance with U.S. national interests.
4.1.2.4 Logistic Independence. A high degree of logistic independence from foreign
bases, which may be temporarily denied through political decision, or which may be
seized by an enemy, dictates that U.S. naval combatant ships be able to carry large
quantities of combat consumables such as fuel and ammunition, have good sea-keeping
qualities to ride out heavy weather for long periods of time, and be able to steam long
distances without refueling stops. It also requires an underway replenishment force
which can resupply combatant ships in the combat zone.
4.1.2.4.1. Overseas Bases. Overseas bases in foreign countries are not required for the
operation of most naval forces in forward areas. However, they do allow both more
efficient and higher intensity operations by providing routine organizational and
emergency intermediate and depot level support for ships and aircraft. Overseas bases
are becoming more expensive both economically and politically, and their availability
in all contingencies cannot be guaranteed. The Navy must be prepared to augment and
rely totally on the mobile logistics support force (MLSF), in lieu of overseas bases on
foreign soil. The ability to so do will place increasing dependence on the Navy as the
service most capable of conducting sustained operations overseas without base
support.
4.1.2.4.2 Overseas Homeporting. The homeporting of fleet units in overseas forward
areas allows higher deployed force levels with fewer total assets. Overseas homeported
units also provide more on station time than CONUS based forces due to greatly
decreased transit time. There are, however, inherent risks involved in homeporting
units in a foreign country. Simply stated, political instability or conflicting national
interests in many countries cause the United States to lose a certain degree of control
over units homeported in foreign countries. In addition, overseas homeporting is
becoming more expensive, both in terms of payment demanded by host countries, and
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in terms of international and domestic political considerations. These considerations
must be carefully weighed in any overseas homeporting decisions.
4.1.2.5 Command, Control and Communications (C3). A command, control and com-
munications system which will permit the reconnaissance and surveillance of hostile
forces and the direction of U.S. forces in the conduct of naval warfare on a global basis
is required. Naval command, control and communications systems must provide for
coordinated operations of U.S. and allied forces at sea, and for coordination between
forces at sea and land-, air-, and space-based naval/national/other services command
centers and surveillance systems. Operational security demands that at-sea forces mini-
mize electromagnetic emissions in effecting this coordination. The command, control
and communications system must possess the flexibility and redundancy to permit
reconfiguration following a conventional or nuclear attack in order that surviving
forces can be reconstituted into an effective system.
4.2 NAVAL WARFARE
4.2.1 Naval Warfare Areas. Naval warfare is conflict in which at least one of the oppo-
nents is operating from the sea with surface ships, submarines, or sea-based aircraft.
The three naval warfare areas are surface, submarine, and air. Each of these areas has its
operating characteristics derived from the nature of the operating medium, and each
has its own particular strengths and limitations. The art of naval warfare is to employ
surface, submarine, and air forces in such a manner as to exploit the strengths and
minimize the weaknesses of each. This objective has led to the integrated employment
of surface, submarine, and air forces operating together, with the common objective of
gaining advantage over the enemy by enhancement of offensive capabilities and
decreasing individual vulnerabilities through mutual support. Naval forces now and in
the future must be structured to integrate all three warfare areas in the prosecution of
their tasks in order to meet a similarly multi-dimensional threat.
4.2.2 Naval Warfare Tasks. The Navy’s functions include both sea control and power
projection. Therefore, naval warfare tasks must address the accomplishment of the
Navy’s functions through the three areas of surface, submarine and air warfare, against
the opposition of similarly delineated forces. The resulting warfare tasks are classified
as fundamental tasks and supporting tasks.
4.2.2.1 Fundamental Warfare Tasks
1. Antiair Warfare (AAW)—The destruction of enemy air platforms and airborne
weapons, whether launched from air, surface, subsurface, or land platforms. It com-
prises all the measures that are employed in achieving air superiority.
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2. Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW)—The destruction or neutralization of enemy submarines.
The aim of antisubmarine warfare is to deny the enemy the effective use of his submarines.
3. Anti-Surface Ship Warfare (ASUW)—The destruction or neutralization of enemy
surface combatants and merchant ships. Its aim is to deny the enemy the effective use
of his surface warships and cargo carrying capacity.
4. Strike Warfare—The destruction or neutralization of enemy targets ashore through
the use of conventional or nuclear weapons. This includes, but is not limited to, targets
assigned to strategic nuclear forces, building yards, and operating bases from which an
enemy is capable of conducting or supporting air, surface, or subsurface operations
against U.S. or allied forces.
5. Amphibious Warfare—Attacks, launched from the sea by naval forces and by landing
forces embarked in ships or craft, designed to achieve a landing on a hostile shore. It
includes fire support of troops in contact with enemy forces through the use of close
air support or shore bombardment.
6. Mine Warfare—The use of mines and mine countermeasures. It consists of the con-
trol or denial of sea or harbor areas through the laying of minefields and countering
enemy mine warfare through the destruction or neutralization of hostile minefields.
4.2.2.2 Supporting Warfare Tasks
1. Special Warfare—Naval operations generally accepted as being non-conventional in
nature, in many cases clandestine in character. Special warfare, which often accom-
plishes fundamental warfare tasks, includes special mobile operations, unconventional
warfare, coastal and river interdiction, beach and coastal reconnaissance, and certain
tactical intelligence operations.
2. Ocean Surveillance—Ocean surveillance is the systematic observation of ocean areas
to detect, locate, and classify selected high interest aerospace, surface, and subsurface
targets and provide this information to users in a timely manner. A target may be any
hostile, neutral, or friendly platform of interest. Ocean surveillance provides the cur-
rent operational setting in which Navy commanders deploy forces to do battle. Ocean
surveillance is supportive of and dependent on C3 and intelligence, and therefore must
be integrated with both.
3. Intelligence—Intelligence is the assessment and management of information obtained
via surveillance, reconnaissance and other means to produce timely indications and
warning, location, identification, intentions, technical capabilities, and tactics of potential
enemies and other countries of interest. Current and complete intelligence, correctly
interpreted according to the task at hand, permits military decisions to be based on accu-
rate knowledge of the enemy’s forces and capabilities.
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4. Command and Control and Communications (C3)—The overall operational man-
agement of the Navy in peace and war. The Navy Command and Control System
(NCCS) provides the means to effectively exercise the authority and direction of naval
forces in the accomplishment of their mission. The objectives of NCCS are to ensure
that the National Command Authorities, unified commanders, naval component com-
manders, and subordinate naval commanders are able to discharge their individual
responsibilities by receiving sufficient, accurate and timely information on which to
base their decisions and by having available the means to communicate these decisions
to the forces involved. Effective control over its forces allows the Navy to operate on a
coordinated basis in fulfilling its worldwide operational responsibilities.
5. Electronic Warfare—The electronic support for all warfare tasks. Its primary objec-
tive is to ensure the effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum by friendly forces
while determining, exploiting, reducing or denying its use by an enemy. Electronic war-
fare assists in the detection and targeting of hostile forces while making it more diffi-
cult for the enemy to detect and target friendly forces.
6. Logistics—The resupply of combat consumables to combatant forces in the theater
of operations. It may often be a major factor in determining the success or failure of an
operation. A principal aim of naval logistics is to make the operating forces as inde-
pendent as possible of overseas bases. Most movement of supporting supplies to
engage U.S. naval forces, and to all other U.S. combatant and allied forces is by sealift.
The U.S. maritime mobility forces are composed primarily of ships of the Military
Sealift Command, various ships held in reserve for defense employment, and ships pro-
vided from the U.S. Merchant Marine.
4.3 CATEGORIZATION OF NAVAL FORCES
In recent years comparisons and net assessments of different navies have been plagued
by lack of a clear and universally accepted framework within which naval forces can be
categorized. Results of numerical analyses often have been misleading because they do
not accurately represent comparisons of force elements of equivalent warfare capabil-
ity. Furthermore, loose definitions of ship categories permit erroneous perception of
the net force balance between U.S. and potential adversary naval forces. In order to
establish a comprehensive and widely accepted framework for analysis and force level
description, the categorization set forth below has been adopted. The basic approach
divides navies into four fundamental categories: combatant ships, auxiliary ships, com-
batant craft, and support craft. These categories are further subdivided into “classifica-
tions” and “types” which can be modified additionally by hull descriptors to provide
the detail necessary to identify all fleet units. Figure I-4-1 is a block diagram of all ship/
craft categories. As an example, all combatants which form U.S. Navy battle groups are
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drawn from the “combatant ship category,” “warship classification.” The characteristics
of the principal types of ships are described in the following:
4.3.1 Strategic Nuclear Force. Fleet ballistic missile (FBM) submarines, the Navy’s stra-
tegic nuclear force, are equipped with sea-launched ballistic missiles for attack and
with torpedoes for defense. As the most survivable component of the U.S. strategic
nuclear forces, FBM submarines must be capable of executing a broad range of options
on receipt of direction from the NCA. They are highly survivable and reliable no mat-
ter how or when hostilities may be initiated. Such qualities provide the basis for the
FMB force’s significant contribution to the overall strategic balance.
4.3.2 General Purpose Forces
4.3.2.1 Aircraft Carriers. These are ships designed primarily for the purpose of con-
ducting combat operations by aircraft which engage in attacks against airborne, sur-
face, subsurface and shore targets. Aircraft carriers are able to accommodate a broad
range of conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft types which perform tasks
encompassing AAW, strike, reconnaissance, air, surface and subsurface surveillance,
ASW, electronic warfare and logistics. Aircraft carriers can also accommodate helicop-
ters and vertical-short-take-off and landing (VSTOL) aircraft. The carrier’s comple-
ment of aircraft can be adapted on short notice or on a long term basis to accomplish
the prescribed tasking.
4.3.2.2 Surface Combatants. These are large, heavily armed surface ships which are
designed primarily to engage enemy forces on the high seas. Surface combatants
include cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. Equipped with guns, missiles, torpedoes, and
advanced complex weapon systems such as light airborne multipurpose system
(LAMPS) helicopters, they conduct combat operations against submarines, aircraft,
and surface ships at sea and against targets ashore.
4.3.2.3 Attack Submarines. These include all self-propelled submersible types designed
to locate and destroy other submarines, surface combatants, and merchant ships. Their
principal armament consists of torpedoes and torpedo tube–launched missiles for
employment against enemy ships and submarines and shore targets.
4.3.2.4 Patrol Combatants. These combatants’ missions may extend beyond coastal
duties. Their characteristics include adequate endurance and sea keeping to provide a
capability for operations exceeding 48 hours on the high seas without support. They
are employed for ASUW, surveillance, and shadowing in control of narrow seas and
choke points.
4.3.2.5 Amphibious Warfare Ships. All ships having an organic capability for amphibi-
ous assault and which have characteristics enabling long duration operations on the
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high seas are included in this category. Amphibious ships transport troops and their
essential equipment to an objective area, and land forces on and over the beach.
4.3.2.6 Mine Warfare Ships. These are ships with the primary function of mine warfare
on the high seas. They are used to clear choke points, militarily important sea areas,
and amphibious objective areas.
4.3.2.7 Auxiliary Ships. As opposed to the foregoing description of ship types, this
paragraph describes a ship category. These are Navy-subordinated ships designed to
operate in the open ocean in a variety of sea states to provide underway replenishment,
direct material support, maintenance, repair and general support to deployed units,
combatant forces or shore-based establishments. They include oilers, ammunition
ships, combat stores ships, repair vessels, towing, salvage, rescue, special project, and
other such specialized non-combatant ships. In forward areas, mobile logistic forces
supply the materials of war to all other forces afloat, as well as to the bases which they
build and maintain. They are equipped to replenish combatant units underway with
fuel, ammunition, food, and spare parts. They also provide maintenance and repairs to
afloat units at forward operating bases and anchorages.
4.3.2.8 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). These are long range, high endurance, land-
based patrol aircraft. Navy MPA conduct all-weather operations in antisubmarine war-
fare, reconnaissance, ocean surveillance, aerial mining, and, when equipped with mis-
siles, antishipping. As MPA are not a ship type, they do not appear in Figure I-4-1, but
are described here for completeness.
4.4 NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE
The capabilities and characteristics required by the U.S. Navy to conduct its mission,
functions, roles, and tasks in support of the U.S. national military strategy are trans-
lated through a process of analysis and judgment (treated in Chapter 5) into the plat-
forms discussed in the preceding paragraphs and in Figure I-4-1. The prosecution of
the Navy’s warfare tasks must be carried out against opposition that ranges from lim-
ited to severe, but that always presents a multi-dimensional threat. Therefore, the force
structure of the U.S. Navy must be comprised of that proper balance of ship types
which will most effectively accomplish the required warfare tasks. Figure I-4-2 displays
individual platform capabilities to accomplish warfare tasks. It is the matching of capa-
bilities to tasks that generates the first level of naval requirements.
4.5 NAVAL TACTICAL FORCE ORGANIZATION
Naval force structure is concerned with both the proper balance of the total Navy and
the proper balance of individual forces assigned to specific roles and tasks in specific
geographic areas. The total fleet inventory is made up of the various categories, classes,
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and types of ships and craft, and units are aggregated by type in the administrative
organization of the Navy to facilitate material management. However, the grouping of
units to achieve the proper balance for specific tactical employment is the purpose of
that element of the naval force structure called tactical force organization. In the oper-
ational sense, units are tactically deployed in task organizations tailored to the intended
employment of the force. Because the sine qua non of all Navy missions is sea control,
the principal task organization[s] must be those established to meet hostile forces in
battle at sea.
4.5.1 Battle Forces. Therefore, battle forces are made up of those units designed for
combat at sea; that is, the warships, carriers, surface combatants, and submarines. Fur-
ther, each included battle group must be able to perform effectively the full spectrum
of at-sea offensive warfare tasks. Thus, as a minimum the battle group would include
within its task organization a carrier, surface warships, and submarines in direct
support.
4.5.2 Other Task Forces. Although the battle forces are formed for the specific purpose
of challenging the enemy’s main combatant force at sea, other (and particularly subse-
quent) naval tasks may require other types of ships with other capabilities. Therefore,
the underlying concept of naval tactical force organization is to aggregate units of spe-
cific warfare capabilities (as shown in Figure I-4-2) so as to form a structure whose
total capability most effectively meets the requirements of the assigned tasks. In naval
warfare, as in all combat, economy of force can be as important as sufficiency of
capability.
4.6 NAVAL WARFARE TECHNOLOGY
4.6.1 Tactical Nuclear Weapons. In order to gain and maintain control of sea areas and
sea lines of communication vital to the nation’s forward strategy, the U.S. Navy requires
sufficient offensive power and defensive strength to maintain maritime superiority
with conventional weapons. However, since a potential enemy of the United States is
capable of employing tactical nuclear weapons at sea, the impact of their employment
must be assessed.
1. If both the U.S. and its adversaries are restricted to conventional weapons in the war
at sea, the U.S. Navy can prevail.
2. If both sides employ tactical nuclear weapons in the war at sea, the U.S. Navy will
probably prevail, but with a thinner margin of confidence of success, and with substan-
tially greater losses at conflict termination.
3. If adversary maritime forces employ nuclear weapons and U.S. naval forces have only
a conventional weapon capability, the U.S. Navy will lose. Therefore, it is essential that
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FIGURE I-4-1
Categorization of Naval Ships and Craft
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FIGURE I-4-1
Categorization of Naval Ships and Craft (Cont.)
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FIGURE I-4-2
Platform Type Capabilities for Warfare Tasks
the U.S. Navy maintain a capability to use nuclear weapons if the U.S. is to be able to
fight and win at sea.
4.6.2 Nuclear Propulsion. The advantages of nuclear propulsion in providing naval
ships with the capability to steam virtually unlimited distances at high speed are clearly
useful and important to the United States Navy with its global responsibilities, forward
deployed posture, and limited availability of forward bases. In addition, it reduces the
Navy’s dependence on oil as an energy source. On an individual ship basis, the addition
of nuclear propulsion results in a ship significantly superior to one with similar mili-
tary characteristics, but having conventional propulsion. However, nuclear propulsion
does add to both the acquisition and life cycle costs of a ship, so the numbers of nuclear-
powered ships in a finite budget must be constrained. Therefore, the advantages of a
limited application of nuclear propulsion technology can best be realized under the
following approach:
4.6.2.1 Submarines. All submarines should be nuclear-powered, because with nuclear
power the submarine attains the ultimate capabilities of the true submersible.
4.6.2.2 Surface Ships. Carriers and cruisers are the only warships of the U.S. Navy large
enough to accommodate nuclear propulsion. Because the Navy today consists of both
conventionally and nuclear-powered ships, new construction of nuclear-powered ships
should be pursued with the objective of forming all-nuclear-powered battle groups,
since that is the principal way in which the advantages of nuclear propulsion in surface
ships can be realized, and the offensive capabilities of surface combatants fully utilized.
Each nuclear-powered battle group consists of one carrier, two to three cruisers, and
one to three submarines. There should be enough of these nuclear-powered battle
groups to constitute a strategically significant segment of the fleet. These nuclear-
powered battle groups have the ability to steam unlimited distances at high speeds
without refueling and to arrive at a crisis point fully ready to conduct combat opera-
tions until the crisis is resolved or conventional forces with logistics support can arrive.
Three of these battle groups in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, for example, would
permit one to be deployed overseas at all times, one to be combat-ready operating out
of continental U.S. ports, and the third to be in maintenance status. The Navy’s build-
up toward this nuclear-powered battle group capability should continue in an orderly
and balanced nuclear ship construction program.
4.6.3 Organic Air Power. Because U.S. naval forces routinely deploy to areas well
beyond the range of U.S. land-based air cover where they may be exposed to attack by
potential adversary land-based air, and because the manned aircraft presently provides
the most capable and sophisticated weapon system available to counter enemy manned
aircraft and establish and maintain local air superiority in areas of U.S. naval operations,
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it is essential that U.S. naval battle forces and groups include organic tactical air power at
certain times and places. This capability is currently exemplified by the large-deck multi-
purpose aircraft carrier. Further, the United States Navy is investigating the future poten-
tial advanced VSTOL technology both to permit wider latitude in the design and size of
aircraft carriers and to expand the operation of high performance tactical aircraft to
more air capable ships, with the end objectives of achieving improved warfighting ability,
and operational responsiveness and flexibility for sea-based forces.
4.6.4 Cruise Missiles. Cruise missile technology has important applications in naval
warfare. They will permit long-range stand-off attacks against geographically fixed
land targets and against surface ships at sea. Cruise missiles may be categorized by
launch platform (aircraft, surface, ship or submarine), by function (land attack or
antiship), by warhead (nuclear or conventional). Cruise missile employment policies
will be largely governed by their basic characteristics: high accuracies and kill probabil-
ities against surface ship targets, lesser accuracy against land targets (with potential for
improvement under some circumstances) and relatively high cost per unit. Current
state of cruise missile technology optimizes conventionally armed cruise missiles
against land targets. Improvements in guidance systems should expand the tactical
employment of long-range cruise missiles from sea-based forces against high value
identifiable geographically fixed targets on land.
4.6.4.1 Cruise Missile Targeting. As cruise missile ranges increase, more targets will be
within range of a single launch platform and more launch platforms will be capable of
attacking the same target. Therefore, antiship cruise missile engagements must be man-
aged at a command level which permits the designation of priorities and the assign-
ment of missiles in such a manner as to avoid omission or overkill of targets. To
accomplish this, the Navy is approaching the over-the-horizon targeting (OTH-T) con-
cept by establishing a sensor-coordination center/launch platform system which will
operate according to the following procedures:
1. Target detected by one or more sensors;
2. Additional sensors cued to acquire the target using information from original
contact;
3. Target data transmitted to coordination centers (ship and shore) for identification,
localization, and threat analysis;
4. Using the facilities of his coordination center, the operational commander evaluates
the threat, his capabilities to counter it, and then designates the target to the appropri-
ate launch platform under his command;
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5. Assigned launch platform attacks designated target with a weapon suitable to the
desired level of target damage.
Chapter 5: Navy Program Development
5.1 TRANSLATION OF REQUIREMENTS TO PROGRAMS
Three primary factors determine naval force requirements: strategy, threat and risk.
U.S. national military strategy is characterized by forward defense, and requires naval
forces able to meet a broad spectrum of contingencies from peacetime deployment and
crisis management to the most demanding case of a major war. The threat reflects
probable force levels and capabilities of potential foes. Risk is the degree of assurance
that U.S. naval forces could satisfactorily carry out the strategy when opposed by the
potential threat.
5.1.1 Force Structure Assessment. To assess the risk and ensure that programmed
forces will have the numbers, balance and platform capabilities required to execute the
Navy’s mission at an acceptable level of risk, an annual force structure assessment of
naval capabilities is conducted. The methodology of this process is shown in Figure 5-1.
The assessment starts with the current force structure; i.e., the ships, aircraft and
weapon systems presently in the fleet. Current forces are then projected ten years into
the future, adding units under construction or programmed to enter service during
this period and deleting those forces which will reach the end of their expected service
lives. The resulting future force structure is then used as a basis for assessing the capa-
bilities of naval forces to support national strategy requirements when opposed by the
expected threat. The actual assessment is a complex series of analyses which considers
various strategies by the U.S. and its potential enemies in several planning scenarios.
The result is a net qualitative assessment of the maritime balance in each fundamental
warfare task (AAW, ASW, etc.), identifying deficiencies in future forces and indicating
the level of risk inherent in current programs. This annual net assessment serves as the
basis for formulating changes to the programmed forces. This appraisal process leads
to the decisions which will eventually reallocate funds among Navy programs within
fiscal guidelines, correcting deficiencies and making incremental changes to ship, air-
craft and weapon procurement programs. The revised programs are then used as the
basis for future naval force structure.
5.1.2 Future Force Capabilities. The composition of naval forces can be projected ten
years into the future using current force levels as a base. Added to this are those units
expected to enter service in the next ten years. This includes ships already under con-
struction as well as those units authorized by the Congress or included in the Depart-
ment of Defense Five Year Defense Program (FYDP). The impact of force aging is
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accounted for by dropping units as they reach the end of their expected service lives. In
the same manner, new weapon and sensor developments may be projected using pro-
grammed operational dates and procurement figures. The possible contributions of
allies are factored into this process.
5.2 THREAT ASSESSMENT
In assessing the threat, all capabilities which might operate to prevent the U.S. Navy
from fully supporting the national military strategy must be considered. Ideally, U.S.
forces would be planned to combat successfully the capabilities of all potential ene-
mies; however, constraints on national resources which can be applied to defense
require that there be an evaluation of intentions to allow priority assignment of avail-
able resources. This is a delicate task. Intentions as to the employment of a capability
may change very quickly. Narrow threat assessments which limit flexibility of response
must be avoided. The threat assessment must include the primary considerations of a
potential enemy’s military strategy, available weapon systems and technology, current
and projected military strength, and specific employment capabilities.
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FIGURE 5-1
Force Structure Assessment of Naval Capabilities
5.2.1 Potential Enemy Military Strategy. Assessment of a potential enemy’s strategy
requires continued updating as world events evolve. There are many approaches to the
examination of a potential enemy’s military strategy, but each approach should include
an examination of the historical context which has fostered strategic perceptions, polit-
ical ideologies, diplomatic initiatives, internal politico-economic factors, technological
development, and military force structure trends. This approach, when combined with
an examination of current projected force strength and capabilities, enables deduction
of possible roles of naval forces in support of military strategy. Through this process,
possible directions of potential enemy military strategy may be projected. The para-
mount consideration throughout the process of force derivation, however, must be
given to enemy capabilities.
5.2.2 Weapon Systems and Technology. Assessment of a potential enemy’s weapon sys-
tems and technology involves an examination of the technological trends in such major
weapon systems as submarines, aircraft and surface ships, and in significant capabilities
such as cruise missiles and surveillance systems. It also entails investigation of enemy
research and development efforts so as to estimate accurately the potential for major
technological breakthroughs which might quickly and drastically alter the military
balance.
5.2.3 Current and Projected Order of Battle. Assessment of a potential enemy’s mili-
tary force strength includes the current and projected number and type of nuclear and
conventional forces in all major warfare areas. Total force strength is not indicated by
numbers alone, but requires detailed knowledge of individual unit capabilities, and
training and readiness levels. The numbers of units by type, their total firepower and
technological sophistication, and knowledge about platform combat maneuverability
and endurance all combine to produce a total force capability assessment. Current and
projected naval construction, modernization efforts, and construction capacity must
be considered in projecting the future naval force strength of potential adversaries. It is
on this projected threat that the planning process must focus.
5.2.4 Contribution of Allies of Potential Adversaries. Just as the U.S. must consider the
possible contributions of its allies, a comprehensive threat assessment should also
include the contribution of the allies of potential adversaries and the potential for
transfer of modern weapon systems to client states of such adversaries. High perfor-
mance weapon systems in the hands of such nations could present a significant threat
to U.S. Navy forces in crisis or limited war situations.
5.2.5 Maritime Threat Characteristics. Hostile naval forces can be expected to be
encountered in all three of the warfare areas: surface, submarine and air. They will pos-
sess the general characteristics, advantages, and vulnerabilities of similar U.S. weapon
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systems. Consideration of the unique capabilities and limitations inherent in each
naval warfare area of a potential enemy is important in determining requirements for
U.S. naval forces both in types and numbers of ships and aircraft.
5.2.5.1 Cruise Missiles. The addition of cruise missiles, whether launched from air, sur-
face or subsurface platforms, to the capabilities of potential adversaries further intensi-
fies the threat by making it necessary to destroy not only enemy platforms but enemy
missiles as well.
5.2.5.2 Surveillance Systems. Until recent years the ability of naval forces to remain
undetected prior to engagement was a significant tactical advantage. However, modern
technology is giving some potential adversaries increasing ability to locate and track
naval units in many weather conditions and across broad areas of the world’s oceans.
Using undersea and overhead surveillance systems, an enemy may achieve advance
warning of naval force dispositions. This capability is a significant factor in planning
for appropriate employment of U.S. naval forces.
5.3 ANALYSES
5.3.1 Net Assessment. The Navy believes that it is the balance of capabilities achieved
and the innate flexibility of naval forces that weigh most heavily in any assessment.
Therefore, in its net assessments it examines the missions of the United States and
potential adversary navies and estimates the capability of each Navy to carry out its
mission in the face of determined opposition by the other. Numerous analyses are used
to conduct the net assessment of U.S. naval power relative to that of potential adversar-
ies. Some of these examine the performance of individual ships, aircraft, and weapon
systems. Others measure trends in force structure and the ability of the forces of each
side to carry out their respective missions. Still others, such as campaign analyses, are
used to estimate the probable outcome of interactions between forces. Any analysis is
highly dependent upon its foundation or assumptions, most of which are uncertain.
Nevertheless, by employing good judgment on a broad range of analyses drawn from
the lessons of experience, grave miscalculations can be avoided.
5.3.2 Risks. Risk can be measured in several ways. First among these is the degree of
confidence that U.S. Navy forces can fulfill their mission; i.e., that they can win in a
given scenario. This type of assessment is used to generate the minimum risk and pru-
dent risk forces, to weigh the level of risk inherent in programmed force objectives, or
to calculate the degree of attrition which is expected or accepted for convoys or naval
forces in various scenarios. A second form of risk assessment examines rapidity of suc-
cess and indicates the time required to achieve sea control or accomplish a specific mis-
sion. A third measurement of risk focuses on simultaneity of execution, which is
governed by geographic priorities. This method of risk assessment shows strategic
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flexibility and implies that, within fixed forces levels, increasing capabilities in one area
must come at the price of reduced capabilities in other regions.
5.3.3 Deficiencies. In addition to the identification of various levels and types of risk,
the annual assessments of the naval balance expose specific deficiencies in programmed
forces. These relate to various fundamental warfare tasks and address force level defi-
ciencies for individual ship types or aircraft, imbalances in force structure, or vulnera-
bility to certain threats. Identification of specific quantitative or qualitative deficiencies
serves as a point of departure for optimizing future naval forces.
5.4 ALTERNATIVE FORCE LEVELS ASSOCIATED WITH LEVELS OF RISK
Several identifiable force levels are generally understood to be associated with levels of
risk and provide convenient terms of reference. These force levels are: Force Planning
Estimate, Objective Force, Immediate Force Goal, and Programmed Force. These are
discussed below in descending order of size.
5.4.1 Force Planning Estimate. The force planning estimate is the level of military force
that is required to counter the threat, worldwide, in simultaneous operations irrespec-
tive of the strategy which a potential enemy has the capability to pursue. It provides the
highest assurance of worldwide naval superiority at a minimum level of risk. Force
planning estimates are developed for each of the force planning cases unconstrained by
fiscal, manpower, logistic or other limitations.
5.4.2 Objective Force. The objective force is the naval force level required within a
definite time frame and resource level to accomplish approved military objectives,
missions or tasks. It is a Navy which is capable of providing reasonable assurance of
success in the primary areas of national interest in both Atlantic and Pacific Oceans
at a prudent level of risk. Recommended objective force levels are derived from the
force planning estimates through acceptance of prudent risk and in consideration of
reasonable attainability. The force is not fiscally constrained but its derivation is fis-
cally responsible.
5.4.3 Immediate Force Goal. The immediate force goal is a balanced, flexible force, fis-
cally constrained but with most qualitative deficiencies in the programmed force cor-
rected, capable of fulfilling the national strategy against the projected threat. It is a
Navy which can maintain fully capable forces forward deployed. An acceptable risk
force, with mobilization warning and redeployment it can prevail in the primary theater,
and simultaneously provide selective thrusts in a secondary theater.
5.4.4 Programmed Force. The programmed force is that contained in the currently
approved Five Year Defense Plan as well as the Extended Planning Annex (ten year pro-
jections). This force is fiscally constrained and provides variable capability in fulfilling
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critical elements of the national strategy depending upon the extent of this fiscal con-
straint. The programmed force should be a balanced Navy able to maintain representa-
tive forces forward deployed. At its lowest level, it is a marginally acceptable risk force
which could prevail with heavy losses in a major conflict with mobilization warning
and extensive redeployment. Simultaneously with a major overseas conflict it would be
able to protect vital maritime interests in the Western Hemisphere. With lessening of
fiscal constraints the programmed force could progress to one of acceptable risk or
even prudent risk allowing for the time involved from budget authorizations to forces
in being.
5.5 RISK ASSESSMENT IN PROGRAM DECISIONS
Naval force structure is derived from consideration of strategy, threat, and risk. The
importance of risk assessments is that they determine the level of risk, and thereby
indicate the degree to which the projected force structure is adequate to carry out the
strategy in the face of the threat. By pointing out strengths and weaknesses in the force
structure, risk assessments highlight areas requiring attention in Navy programming
actions.
The process by which future naval force requirements are determined is both simple in
concept and complex in execution. Starting with national military strategy, forces which
have been approved and will reach the fleet within the time period under consideration
are added, and those units which will reach the end of their useful service lines are
deleted in order to estimate future force structure. The capabilities of these forces are
evaluated against the expected threat, and the ability of the U.S. Navy to carry out its
functions of sea control and power projection is assessed in various scenarios. Significant
uncertainties and judgmental factors are an integral part of this continuing process. The
final and most difficult step is to determine the number, type, and mix of ships and air-
craft needed to correct deficiencies in our forces and minimize risks, keeping in mind the
requirement to maintain balanced force levels and fiscal realism. If the proper strategy is
projected, the threat correctly assessed, and risks accurately identified, uncertainty can be
minimized and naval requirements can be established.
Part II: Planning, Employment and Readiness Doctrine for Naval Operating Forces
Chapter 1: Planning Concepts
1.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of this doctrine is to establish, at the Chief of Naval Operations’ level, a
basic system for the employment planning of the operating forces of the U.S. Navy on
both a short and long-term basis. The doctrine defines standard concepts and terms for
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execution of current operations, and for the derivation of operational planning factors
which are required for the formulation of programs and the analysis of readiness.
1.2 TOTAL FORCE
For the purpose of assessing the full range of U.S. naval capabilities, the total force
must be considered. The total force of the U.S. Navy includes:
1.2.1 Operating Forces. The operating forces of the U.S. Navy consist of ships, aircraft
squadrons, units, and staffs, assigned to the Fleet Commanders in Chief (FLTCINCs).
These forces include both active and reserve commissioned units and ships of the
Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force.
1.2.2 Shore Establishment. The shore establishment consists of all activities ashore
assigned to support the operating forces in terms of personnel, material, supply, and
fiscal procurement; training; maintenance; and planning and operational guidance.
1.2.3 Reserve Forces
1.2.3.1 U.S. Naval Reserve. The Naval Reserve is the reserve component of the Navy,
and includes those personnel who may augment the regular force, either individually
or in units, to support and expand the Navy under full or partial mobilization.
Included within the Naval Reserve is the Naval Reserve Force (NRF), the equipment
component of the Naval Reserve—organized into operational commands of ships, air-
craft squadrons, construction battalions and coastal riverine squadrons.
1.2.3.2 Inactive Reserve Fleet. The Inactive Reserve Fleet consists of ships and aircraft
retired from operational status but retained under preservation for activation, includ-
ing industrial refurbishment and modernization, in contingency situations.
1.2.4 Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force. Military Sealift Command (MSC) provides ships to
the Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force. In general, these are mobile logistics type and support
type ships (e.g., TAO, TATF, TAP) which operate under operational control (OPCON)
of the FLTCINCs and are manned with civilian crews.
1.3 FLEET CONTROL OF FORCES
All of the fleet operating forces of the U.S. Navy, consisting of staffs and commissioned
ships and aircraft squadrons, are administratively assigned by the Chief of Naval Oper-
ations to the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Commanders in Chief (FLTCINCs).
1.3.1 Administrative Control (ADCON). Administrative control (ADCON) of individual
commands is normally further delegated from the Atlantic and Pacific FLTCINCs to the
Type Commanders (TYCOMs). A Type Command is an administrative subdivision of a
fleet into ships or units of the same type, as differentiated from a tactical subdivision.
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1.3.2 Operational Control (OPCON). Operational control of the naval operating forces
is exercised by the Commanders of the Unified Commands (CINCs: CINCLANT,
CINCPAC, and CINCEUR), under the Unified Command Plan (UCP). The responsi-
bility for OPCON is normally delegated through the Naval Component Commanders
(CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, and CINCUSNAVEUR) to the Type Commander or to
an Operational Fleet Commander (OPFLT).
1.4 OPERATIONAL STATUS
All units in the operating forces are categorized as being Command Operationally
Ready (COR) or Command Not Operationally Ready (CNOR). The FLTCINC moni-
tors the status of the ships, including the assigned aviation detachments of air capable
ships, and land-based aircraft squadrons through review and quality assurance of all
pertinent data including the following reports: Navy Forces Status (NAVFORSTAT),
Casualty (CASREP), Movement (MOVREP) and Employment Schedule (EMPSKD).
The relationship between C-ratings as reported in NAVFORSTAT and COR/CNOR sta-
tus is that the overall C-ratings of C-1, C-2, and C-3 correspond to COR, and C-4 cor-
responds to CNOR. C-ratings are described in detail in Section 2.4.1.1 and 2.4.1.2. In
the context of command operational readiness, Marine units embarked in amphibious
ships should not be reported as part of the ship’s readiness.
1.4.1 Command Operationally Ready (COR). When COR, the unit is capable of con-
ducting underway operations in support of general war plans. The determination of
operational status must be flexible enough to accommodate differences in design capa-
bilities within types, and to recognize that ships with material casualties or personnel
shortages, which reduce but do not eliminate required mission capabilities (C-2 and C-3),
can still carry out operational tasks which contribute to the effective accomplishment
of the FLTCINC’s responsibilities.
1.4.1.1 Assignment and Readiness. COR units must be reporting an overall C-rating of
C-1, C-2, or C-3 and, based on FLTCINC judgment, able to support their mission as
required by the general war plans. Maintenance on units reporting C-1, C-2, or C-3
which requires more than 96 hours to complete may be scheduled and the units remain
C-1, C-2, or C-3 provided that the personnel can be recalled in time to have the unit
RFS in 96 hours.
1.4.2 Command Not Operationally Ready (CNOR). A unit is CNOR when it does not
meet the requirements to be COR.
1.4.2.1 Assignment and Readiness. Commands CNOR are normally assigned to the
OPCON of the Type Commander who is responsible for conducting the training and
maintenance required for the unit to attain COR status.
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1.4.3 Training. Basic training is that required to attain the level of basic mission
capability necessary to achieve COR status. It includes fast cruises, sea trials, shake-
down, work up, and type training as required. Type training is included in basic train-
ing but is also conducted by operationally ready ships as required to maintain basic
proficiencies.
Chapter 2: Readiness
2.1 UNIT READINESS
Operational readiness in specific terms of naval usage derived from JCS Pub 1 is the
capability of a unit or ship to perform the missions or functions for which it was orga-
nized or designed. The term may be used in a general sense or to express a level or
degree of readiness.
2.2 FLEET READINESS
In its broadest sense, fleet readiness is the degree to which the force is ready to carry
out its mission to wage prompt and sustained combat at sea. Supporting military strat-
egy involves not only having units properly manned, trained, equipped and supported,
but also deployed to positions from which they may be able to best support U.S. inter-
ests and rapidly engage potential enemies, if required. The U.S. Navy’s ability to
respond to national tasking is reflected in the percentages of the fleet that are deployed,
immediately available for deployment, and subsequently available for deployment
upon the completion of scheduled maintenance and training. The gradations of the
factors affecting readiness (discussed below) are the essential determinants for measur-
ing individual unit, and in turn, composite fleet preparedness for combat, regardless of
deployed status.
2.3 READINESS FACTORS
Fleet readiness is comprised of personnel readiness, material readiness and training
readiness.
2.3.1 Personnel Readiness. This factor refers to having the quantity of people to man
the ships, squadrons, and support activities to full allowance; the quality in terms of
skills required to operate and maintain the ships, aircraft, facilities and installed equip-
ment, and the experience to provide organizational leadership and morale. Crew
morale is considered an important part of personnel readiness as it impacts on the
individual and group quality of effort, and the sustainability of that effort.
2.3.2 Material Readiness. This factor refers to maintenance, both scheduled and
unscheduled, and logistic support.
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2.3.2.1 Maintenance. Maintenance is accomplished at three levels: organizational,
intermediate, and depot.
1. Organizational Maintenance—Accomplished by the crews of units when operational
or, in the case of major propulsion machinery which must be non-operating for main-
tenance, during periods of upkeep when units are not operational. Necessary spare
parts are maintained aboard ships and air stations for this purpose.
2. Intermediate Level Maintenance—Usually accomplished when the ship is not under-
way. It is conducted by intermediate maintenance activities, such as tenders or Shore
Intermediate Maintenance Activities (SIMAs).
3. Depot Maintenance—Accomplished by shipyards. The ship may be in the shipyard,
or not in the shipyard but with the shipyard workers and equipment onboard.
2.3.2.2 Logistic Support. This part of material readiness refers to furnishing spare parts
for ships and aircraft to be installed at any of the three maintenance levels. Also, logis-
tic support in the context of material readiness includes the availability of combat
consumables, fuel, and ammunition carried in the ship’s hull.
2.3.3 Training Readiness. Training readiness is the combining of personnel and equip-
ment in the operation of the ship and its embarked weapons system. It is mainly
achieved through operations at sea or flying hours for aircraft crews either from the
ships themselves or from temporary land basing at naval air stations. The ultimate in
training readiness is achieved by realistic exercises which approximate as closely as pos-
sible combat situations. Advanced exercises usually require special facilities such as
ranges for impact measurement, live firing, air combat maneuvering, and services of
electronics countermeasures, targets, drones, and submarines, ships and aircraft for
tracking.
2.4 READINESS MEASUREMENT
The two levels of readiness measurement are unit readiness and composite readiness.
2.4.1 Unit Readiness. Unit readiness is the degree to which an individual ship or air-
craft squadron is able to accomplish its primary mission. Unit readiness measurement
has two functions. First, it is the basic building block upon which further levels of
composite readiness are developed. Second, through identification of deficiencies, unit
readiness becomes a measure used for resource management by indicating the qualita-
tive and quantitative requirements for the correction of those deficiencies in order to
achieve readiness improvement. This function of resource management is primarily for
internal naval purposes.
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2.4.1.1 Navy Forces Status Report (NAVFORSTAT). The NAVFORSTAT is a compo-
nent of the JCS Readiness Reporting System, and a basic means for analyzing unit
readiness. In addition, the NAVFORSTAT provides information of particular interest to
Navy commanders and managers. The NAVRFORSTAT has three main parts: the mis-
sion area or M-rating which measures the capability of the unit to perform in each of
its primary mission areas; the resource area or C-rating measuring the resource areas of
personnel equipment, equipment and supplies on hand, and training; and an evaluation
of the overall readiness of the ship which is made from a synthesis of the M and C-rating
analyses into an overall C-rating, which is used to determine COR/CNOR status.
2.4.1.2 Overall Readiness Ratings. Overall readiness C-ratings are C-1, Fully Ready;
C-2, Substantially Ready; C-3, Marginally Ready; and C-4, Not Ready. These C-ratings
and the descriptive terms are standard for all Services through the JCS Readiness
Reporting System. The amplifying terms, such as for the descriptor “Substantially
Ready,” described as minor deficiencies which are insufficient to cause the loss of any
primary mission areas, were written by the Navy explicitly for naval forces. The degrees
of readiness, C-1 through C-4, identify those units which are ready through those
which are not ready and, therefore, which need the application of additional effort
and/or resources, or to complete scheduled maintenance or training.
2.4.2 Composite Readiness. Composite readiness describes the ability of an organized
force to carry out its missions and tasks. Composite readiness may be described in
terms of a geographic area: naval readiness in the Indian Ocean. It may be described in
terms of a force readiness: readiness of the fleet ballistic missile submarine force. In the
aggregate, the composite readiness of all units in the force will give an accurate picture
of the active force readiness of the U.S. Navy, which is essential for strategic and opera-
tional decision making at the theater, JCS, or National Command Authorities (NCA)
level. The means for displaying composite readiness is the Fleet Readiness Status Report.
2.4.2.1 Reporting System. NAVFORSTAT information, along with MOVREP, EMPSKD
and CASREP data serve as the basis for the analysis of unit and composite readiness. Data
from these reports comprise the Naval Status of Forces (NSOF) data base which is used
in the Fleet Readiness Status Report. NSOF data are computerized and available automat-
ically in several different formats. This system is called the Readiness Information Service.
In determining composite readiness, senior operating commanders are mainly interested
in the numbers, types and locations of ships which are ready or not ready. COR and
CNOR are the two primary readiness status indicators established for this purpose and
are presented by type, command and location in the Fleet Readiness Status Report.
2.4.2.2 Fleet Readiness Status Report. Based on data received from the FLTCINCs and
subordinate commands, the Fleet Readiness Status Report is compiled in OPNAV (OP-64)
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and distributed daily. The purpose of the Fleet Readiness Status Report is to present a
broad overview of fleet readiness.
2.4.2.2.1 Breakdown of Ready Units. The National Command Authorities and senior
level operational commanders are interested in the number of ships which are opera-
tionally ready. Further, if a crisis is developing, the National Command Authorities are
particularly concerned with which operationally ready units are in the geographic area
of the crisis. Therefore, the first half of this report is designed to show a breakdown of
ready units, by type, in geographic areas.
a. Command Operationally Ready (COR) Ships. COR ships are normally assigned to
the OPCON of an operational commander. COR submarines are assigned OPCON to
their TYCOM.
b. Deployed Ships. Included in the COR category are deployed ships which are normally
assigned to the OPCON of COMSIXTHFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, or COMIDEASTFOR.
The length and frequency of deployment for an individual ship are limited by require-
ments for training, intermediate and depot level maintenance, and more practically, by
crew morale considerations driven by the percentage of time out of homeport.
2.4.2.2.2 Time-Phased Deployment Availability. The second item of interest on the
part of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be how soon addi-
tional forces could be made ready in the case of a growing crisis. Therefore, the time-
phased deployment availability is presented in the second half of this report.
a. Ships Available for Time-Phased Deployments
1. Active Forces. All active ships in the operating forces are available for phased deploy-
ment. Active ships not operationally ready can be deployed when COR status is attained.
2. Naval Reserve Forces. When mobilized and COR, Naval Reserve Force (NRF) ships can
be deployed within 96 hours. NRF ships may also be temporarily assigned to an OPFLT
commander during training (with reservists aboard) or with reduced manning (active
duty complement) for assignments not requiring full command operational readiness.
b. Time-Phased Deployments. Time-phased deployments are further categorized into
ships which can be operationally ready in: 96 hours; one month; six months; one year.
2.5 READINESS REQUIREMENTS
The attainment of a high state of readiness requires both funding and a balanced fleet
employment program.
2.5.1 Funding. The funding associated with readiness is found principally in the O&M
accounts where fuel, repairs, overhauls, aircraft rework, spares, fleet training, steaming
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days and flying hours are financed; and the MPN account which provides for man-
power levels, TAD funding for schools, and rank and rate structure.
2.5.2 Balanced Employment. A properly balanced employment schedule is essential to
attain high states of readiness, because the individual requirements for maintenance,
training, and morale are frequently in competition with each other.
2.5.2.1 Maintenance Requirements. While some preventive maintenance can be done
at sea, intermediate and depot maintenance are normally done in port.
2.5.2.2 Training Requirements. Realistic training requires a ship to be operating at sea.
Some training is available ashore using simulators; however, ships must be operating in
order to take advantage of the specialized ranges for live firing, electronic warfare, and
other available target services, and to participate in multi-ship training exercises.
2.5.2.3 Personnel Requirements. Morale is an extremely important aspect of readiness;
morale has a significant impact on personnel readiness through the quality of individ-
ual and group effort, and retention levels. In a steady state, peacetime operating condi-
tion, it is necessary that a ship spend at least 40 to 50 percent of its total time in its
homeport. With a ship in homeport 40 percent of the time, a sailor standing one watch
in four will be able to go home to his family in the evening after work only 30 percent
of his total days during a 4-year sea tour.
2.5.2.4 Requirement for Overseas Deployment. Despite the need for time in U.S. ports
for basic training, some types of maintenance, and morale enhancement, a unit must
not only be operationally ready, but also must be deployed to reach its highest state of
readiness to react in a particular area. A primary advantage of deployments is that
units are in better positions to respond rapidly to NCA tasking in time of need.
Chapter 3: Employment Cycle
3.1 EMPLOYMENT CYCLE DEFINED
The planning baseline for operating forces is the employment cycle. For ships, this
cycle extends from the completion of one regular overhaul, or upon commissioning in
the case of new ships, through the completion of the subsequent regular overhaul. This
employment cycle is measured in months and is repetitive over the life of the ship.
3.2 SHIPS’ EMPLOYMENT CYCLE
The employment cycle for ships encompasses four distinct phases: The new construc-
tion phase, the operational phase, the refit phase, and the regular overhaul phase. Phases
are further subdivided into periods.
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3.2.1 New Construction/Conversion Phase. This is the initial phase of a ship’s employment,
and includes the precommissioning, shakedown, and post shakedown availability periods.
3.2.1.1 Precommissioning Period. During this period, the ship is under construction
and has not yet been commissioned. Personnel may be assigned, and the ship is admin-
istratively assigned to a Type Commander (TYCOM). The ship has not yet commenced
an employment cycle.
3.2.1.2 Shakedown Period. During the shakedown period, the ship is in commission
after new construction or conversion but not yet operationally ready, due principally to
training deficiencies. The command is undergoing basic training under the OPCON of
the TYCOM.
3.2.1.3 Post Shakedown Availability Period. In this period, the newly commissioned
ship is normally undergoing depot level maintenance and is not able to carry out its
mission due to the nature of the repair work. The command remains under the
OPCON of the TYCOM and is CNOR.
3.2.2 Operational Phase. The operational phase initially follows the new construction
phase and subsequently recurs between regular overhaul or refit phases. It includes the
ready, preparation for overseas movement (POM), deployed, and post deployment
leave periods.
3.2.2.1 Ready Period. In the ready period, the ship is normally COR, and assigned to
the OPCON of the SECOND or THIRD Fleet Commander. Submarines and other
selected units (AD, AR, ARS, ATF, NRF, etc.) are assigned to their TYCOM for OPCON.
The ship is conducting intertype fleet operations and type training, primarily operat-
ing out of U.S. bases in local operating areas.
3.2.2.2 Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) Period. During the POM period,
the ship is COR and assigned to the OPCON of the SECOND or THIRD Fleet Com-
mander. (Submarines remain assigned to their TYCOM.) The ship is in homeport,
pierside, loading out and preparing for deployment. Although the ship maintains 96-
hour ready-for-sea status, the ship is scheduled primarily in port to fulfill POM
requirements.
3.2.2.3 Deployed Period. A ship is considered deployed when it is homeported over-
seas, when it is operating out of homeport for more than eight weeks, when specified
as deployed by the FLTCINC or CINCUSNAVEUR, or when assigned to the opera-
tional control of COMSIXTHFLT, COMSEVENTHFLT, or COMIDEASTFOR. (Note:
Although a unit must be COR to deploy, casualties or planned maintenance (in the case
of overseas homeported ships) which prevent a deployed ship from getting underway
in 96 hours will result in a status of deployed/CNOR.)
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3.2.2.4 Post Deployment Leave Period. Post deployment leave may be granted upon
return to homeport. The ship is in homeport with minimum scheduled activity and up to
50 percent of the crew may be on leave. The ship may remain COR under OPFLT OPCON
if members of the crew on leave are available for recall to meet the 96 hour RFS require-
ment. Crew members not on leave during this period perform their normal duties.
3.2.3 Refit Phase. The refit phase of the employment cycle follows the operational
phase, normally after the deployed period. It includes the post deployment availability
period, refresher training period and may include the post deployment leave period.
3.2.3.1 Leave Period. When a post deployment leave period is not scheduled in the
operational phase, or is less than four weeks in duration, the initial part of the refit
phase may be a scheduled leave period of two to four weeks duration. Up to 50 percent
of the crew may be on leave.
3.2.3.2 Post Deployment Availability Period. In this period, the ship is normally in
homeport for a maintenance availability. During the availability, the ship would proba-
bly be CNOR and under the OPCON of the TYCOM.
3.2.3.3 Refresher Training (RFT) Period. When a ship completes a post deployment
availability and refresher training, it commences a new operational phase. The
refresher training period consists of basic training and upkeep. In this period, the
TYCOM’s goal is early attainment of COR status in order that the ship may be assigned
to OPFLT OPCON (except in the case of submarines) for intertype training and
deployment.
3.2.4 Regular Overhaul (ROH) Phase. The ROH phase follows an operational phase,
and consists of a regular overhaul period and a refresher training period. The ship is
CNOR under the OPCON of the TYCOM.
3.2.4.1 Regular Overhaul (ROH) Period. In the ROH period, the ship is in a shipyard,
naval or civilian, undergoing depot level maintenance. Whenever possible, the location
of the ROH is scheduled in a shipyard in the vicinity of the ship’s regular homeport.
When ROHs are scheduled in shipyards other than regular homeports and the dura-
tion of the ROH is six months or more, the homeport may be changed to the location
of the ROH shipyard. The crew is employed in ship material improvement, mainte-
nance and training, with some training being accomplished at schools ashore.
3.2.4.2 Refresher Training (RFT) Period. When a ship completes ROH, it commences
refresher training. The refresher training period consists of basic training and upkeep.
In this period, the TYCOM’s goal is early attainment of COR status in order that the
ship may be assigned to OPFLT OPCON (except in the case of submarines) for inter-
type training and deployment.
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3.2.5 Deployment Cycle. The deployment cycle is that period of time from the com-
mencement of one deployment to the commencement of the next deployment. This
cycle incorporates both the operational and refit phases, and is an important planning
factor in the preparation of operational schedules.
3.2.5.1 Turn Around Time. Turn around time is that period beginning upon the con-
clusion of one deployment and ending upon commencement of the next deployment.
Under normal circumstances, this period will include the entire refit phase, and the
ready and POM periods of the operational phase. It is an important consideration in
analyzing the feasibility of operational schedules.
3.2.6 Employment Cycle Pattern. The employment cycle would typically commence
with the new construction phase, followed by the operational phase, then the refit
phase. Operational and refit phases would alternate until the ship enters the regular
overhaul phase to complete the first employment cycle. Subsequent cycles would run
from overhaul to overhaul, alternating operational and refit phases. The length of the
employment cycle is established for each class of ship, based upon the depot mainte-
nance requirements for that class of ship. The FLTCINCs have, for each class ship, a
peacetime employment cycle (model) which puts into optimum balance the require-
ments for maintenance, morale and training in order to maximize the fleet’s potential
for wartime operations. Normally, peacetime operations/deployments should not be
scheduled which degrade the fleet’s readiness to conduct sustained combat operations
at sea. The optimized peacetime employment schedule which has as its objective maxi-
mizing combat readiness should always be the goal and guide.
3.3 AIRCRAFT EMPLOYMENT CYCLES
Aircraft employment cycles are similar to, and often parallel, the employment cycles
used by ships.
3.3.1 Ship-Based Aircraft
3.3.1.1 Carrier Air Squadrons. In general, the employment cycles of carrier air wings
and their integral squadrons parallel the cycle of the aircraft carrier to which they are
assigned. Upon completion of the refit phase leave period, emphasis is placed on indi-
vidual squadron training, including the assimilation of recently reported aircrews and
aviation maintenance personnel. After approximately three months of shore-based
operations as individual squadrons, coordinated carrier air wing operations are con-
ducted during a period of concentrated weapons flights at an advanced training base.
The carrier air wing is then ready to rejoin its ship at sea for the refresher training
period, followed by the operational phase. During extended periods ashore, such as
when an air wing’s assigned aircraft carrier is in overhaul, the longer cycle is normally
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phased coincident to squadron transition to new aircraft, in order to complete the
extensive training required in the new model aircraft.
3.3.1.2 Detachments. Other aviation units deploying aboard ship are helicopter detach-
ments: LAMPS (Light Airborne Multipurpose System) units for antisubmarine war-
fare/electronic surveillance from surface combatants, and utility detachments aboard
mobile logistic and support type ships for underway vertical replenishment. Their
employment cycles parallel those of the ships on which they deploy; their training cycle
is similar to that of other sea-going aircraft described in the preceding paragraph.
3.3.2 Land-Based Squadrons. The employment cycle for maritime patrol squadrons
normally consists of a 12-month ready phase followed by a six-month deployment
phase. While both operational and training evolutions are flown throughout the entire
18-month cycle, the emphasis is on training during the ready phase.
Chapter 4: Reports
4.1 COMPOSITE READINESS REPORTING
The proper implementation of this employment doctrine and the evaluation of fleet readi-
ness resulting from that implementation require a system for the measurement and report-
ing of basic parameters. The data are required for operational planning, operations analysis,
formulating readiness goals, and the measurement of progress toward readiness objectives.
The particular data requirements listed below have been selected as some of those necessary
to provide the Chief of Naval Operations with current information needed to realistically
express to the JCS, OSD, and other high level civilian authorities the readiness level of the
fleet. At this time, the data refer primarily to active commissioned ships.
4.1.1 Fleet Readiness Status Report. The information in Figure II-4-1 for the unit cate-
gories of Figure II-4-2 will be compiled daily from data received from the fleet through
the Navy Worldwide Command and Control System and computer-generated as the
Fleet Readiness Status Report. The automated report will be sent via secure facsimile to
the FLTCINCs for review, verification and correction, if necessary, to ensure that each
unit’s reported readiness is accurate and compatible with the FLTCINC plans to use
that unit in support of the general war plans. Verification, error corrections, and prob-
lems which would impact on execution of the general war plans should be reported to
the Navy Department Duty Captain within 12 hours after receipt of the report.
4.1.2 Fleet Employment Planning Operational Data Report (FER). The information in
Figure II-4-3 for PACFLT and LANTFLT by unit categories in Figure II-4-2 will be
extracted from the WWMCCS data base (Source: Employment Schedule data received
from the FLTCINCs) and promulgated monthly for use in planning and analysis. Simi-
lar data for individual ships are available on request.
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4.1.2.1 Employment Schedule Model. FLTCINCs keep a current employment schedule
model for each type ship. The employment schedule model covers normal peacetime
operations and puts into optimum balance the requirements of maintenance, morale
and training in order to maximize the readiness of the fleet to conduct combat opera-
tions at sea. Commitments for deployed forces are not considered in the development
of the model.
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Operationally Ready (COR):
East Coast, U.S. (including Caribbean waters)
North Atlantic (Europe)
South American and African waters
Mediterranean
Eastern Pacific—PACOM waters east of 140 degrees west
Mid Pacific—between 140 degrees west and the THIRDFLT/
SEVENTHFLT chop line
Western Pacific—west of chop line
Indian Ocean
Total COR/CNOR Deployed
Deployment Availability
Deployable in 96 hours
Deployable in one month
Deployable in six months
Deployable in one year
FIGURE II-4-1
Information Compiled Daily from Fleet Readiness Status Report
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Total Active Ships Assigned
Aircraft carriers (CV, CVN)
Cruisers (CG, CGN)
Destroyers (DD, DDG)
Frigates (FF, FFG)
Attack Submarines (SS, SSN)
*Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN)
Patrol Combatants (PG, PHM)
Amphibious Warfare (LCC, LHA, LKA, LPA, LPD, LSD, LST)
Mine Warfare (MSO)
Mobile Logistics (AD, AE, AF, AFS, AO, AOE, AOR, AR, AS)
Support (AG, AGDS, AGEH, AFG, AGFF, AGSS, ARS, ASR, ATA, ATF, ATS, AVM)
Land-Based Air Squadrons (VP)
*Some data on Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) will not be included in this report.
FIGURE II-4-2
Unit Categories (data shown in Figure II-4-1 is maintained by unit categories
shown in this figure)
UNDERWAY - Percentage of days underway at sea.
TNGANCH - Percentage of days spent on miscellaneous training at anchorage/anchor.
INPORT - Percentage of days inport.
INHOMEPORT - Percentage of days in assigned homeport.
UPKEEP - Percentage of days in upkeep.
DEPLOYED - Number of months (to nearest tenth) deployed.
TOTAL SHIPS
Average Months Deployed Per Ship
FIGURE II-4-3
Information for Planning and Analysis
SEA PLAN 2000
In January 1977 President Jimmy Carter took office, with Harold Brown as secretary of
defense along with W. Graham Claytor, Jr., as Secretary of the Navy and R. James
Woolsey as Under Secretary of the Navy. As the new administration’s defense policy took
shape, Claytor and Woolsey soon found it difficult to accept the naval portions of the
defense policy that had been promulgated in Presidential Review Memorandum 10
(PRM-10). This policy of building up U.S. Army and Air Force strength in Western
Europe, in the face of the Soviet Union’s apparent supremacy in land forces on the inner
German border, clearly envisioned a continental war and gave relatively little thought
for the employment for naval forces. Claytor and Woolsey wanted a new study that could
demonstrate the strategies and missions that naval forces could contribute in a range of
situations, including peacetime presence, crisis management, and major warfare involv-
ing NATO forces. In mid-July 1977, Secretaries Claytor and Wolsey jointly requested that
the Defense Department give the Navy responsibility for such a study. The Under Secre-
tary of Defense approved that request on 1 August 1977 and directed the Navy to under-
take a force-planning study on the most probable range of tasks for the Navy and Marine
Corps during the remainder of the twentieth century.*
In the autumn of 1977, Under Secretary of the Navy Woolsey visited the Naval War Col-
lege, along with a Navy Department consultant, John F. Lehman, Jr. Over a meal at the
Black Pearl Restaurant in Newport, Woolsey and Francis J. “Bing” West, Jr., sketched out
an alternative strategy. On Woolsey’s return to Washington, Claytor appointed West to
head the study group. The study group under West included eleven naval officers and
two Marines, with technical support by Presearch Incorporated.† As the study group’s
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* See Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986, Newport Paper
19 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004), pp. 13–17.
† The study team comprised F. J. West, Jr., as director, and members Captain P. K. Fitzwilliam,
USN; Captain R. A. Gallotta, USN; Colonel J. J. Grace, USMC; Colonel C. A. Jorgenson, USMC;
Captain P. Skarlatos, USN; Commander J. J. Dittrick, USN; Commander W. G. Lange, USN;
Commander J. H. Rixse III, USN; Commander R. D. Tucker, USN; Lieutenant Commander D. D.
Geismar, USN; Lieutenant Commander G. P. Lauzon, USN; Lieutenant Commander James D.
Stark, USN; and Lieutenant Commander Kenneth McGruther, USN, who was succeeded by Lieu-
tenant Commander Jay Rixse as West’s deputy. Technical advisers were L. P. Gollobin (president
of Presearch Incorporated), J. R. Penny, G. C. Grapas, and J. D. Conley.
work progressed, Admiral Robert Long, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, became the
key point of contact within the Navy for the study and became closely engaged with the
development of its arguments. The study took as its starting point the work that was
being done by Admiral Thomas Hayward, then Commander, Pacific Fleet, in his Project
SEA STRIKE, and then added other frames of reference to broaden the criteria for sizing
the Navy’s force structure.* As West recalls, “The essence of Plan 2000 was the assertion
that any assault across the inner German border would result in a global, not continental
war. Naval forces provided strike capabilities that could be marshaled anywhere, while
protecting the sea lanes. The redoubtable Soviet CNO, Admiral Gorshkov, had enunci-
ated a strategy of protecting his ballistic missile submarines in northern bastions. SEA
PLAN 2000 advocated naval-based offensive strikes against the Kola Peninsula and
against Soviet attack and missile submarines worldwide.”†
In the process of the study, Lieutenant Commander James Stark made a singular contri-
bution by calculating the force-level requirements of all the key groups involved—
Marine Corps, amphibious forces, submarines, aviation, surface, logistics—and built a
spreadsheet that related the numbers of ships and ship types to missions and funding lev-
els projected over the coming decades. He came up with a total target number slightly less
than six hundred ships, including fifteen carriers;‡ this confirmed the general figures that
the Ford administration had put forward in its 1976 National Security Study Memoran-
dum 246.§ West brought this calculation to Secretary of the Navy Claytor and Admiral
Long and also provided the information to Admiral Hayward, by then scheduled to be
the next Chief of Naval Operations. Long, Claytor, and Woolsey rounded the number up
to six hundred ships. When Secretary of Defense Harold Brown reviewed that number,
he did not dispute it but warned that in his view it was not financially possible.** Others
carried the six-hundred-ship figure into the next decade. The final study was completed
during the winter of 1977–78. Secretary Claytor forwarded the completed two-volume
work to Secretary Brown on 20 March 1978; the Secretary of the Navy’s office distributed
volume 1 to key offices within the Navy on 4 April 1978 and volume 2 on 31 May 1978.
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* Kenneth McGruther, e-mail to Hattendorf, 5 August 2007; Rear Adm. James D. Stark, USN (Ret.),
telephone conversation with Hattendorf, 17 August 2007. For Project SEA STRIKE, see Hattendorf,
Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, pp. 17–20.
† F. J. West, Jr., e-mail to Peter Swartz, 1 August 2007.
‡ West, e-mail to Hattendorf, 10 August 2007; Stark, telephone conversation with Hattendorf, 17
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The following document is the unclassified executive summary prepared by the study
group for wide circulation and released on 28 March 1978. It differs from the classified
executive summary and the analysis in the study itself in that it stresses views that Under
Secretary Woolsey, West, and the Department of the Navy wished to convey about the
breadth of suitable Navy roles in support of a NATO war in Europe and in many other
circumstances worldwide.*
INTRODUCTION
SEA PLAN 2000 explores the rationale for general purpose naval forces. It addresses
two sets of questions. First, what can a policymaker expect of naval forces? How do
they contribute to U.S. interests? What is the connection between naval missions and
U.S. national security objectives? Second, how capable are our naval forces of carrying
out their missions? In assessing naval capabilities, three time frames were used: 1978,
the late 1980s, and the 1990s.
The Difficulty of Naval Planning
It can take up to ten years for a new ship to go through the planning process, be autho-
rized by Congress and built before it is introduced into the fleet. Further, ships remain
in the fleet for 20 to 30 years unless they undergo service life extension programs in
lieu of new procurement, in which case another ten years can be added to their useful
service life. The naval forces serving this Administration exist today in the fleet or are
already under construction. The ships that are procured—or not procured—will affect
the latitude available to policymakers and thus American security interests decades
hence. Force elements with shorter lead times or shorter lifetimes can be planned to
accommodate a specific scenario or an immediately pressing problem. But a near-term
planning horizon is inappropriate for naval forces.
For a variety of reasons it is necessary now to develop long range naval plans: this
Administration is interested in and has a sense of responsibility with regard to the future;
even in the near term, U.S. longer range policy planning has an important politico-
military impact on allies, on potential aggressors and on the U.S. public; and finally,
there is, in a real sense, a continuity between the present and the future. Recognizing
these realities this Administration has directed that a study be undertaken of U.S. naval
posture for the year 2000 and beyond. It is to that directive that this study responds. It
does so by relating naval forces to national security objectives on the one hand and to
military capabilities on the other.
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SEA PLAN 2000, through a series of policy and feasibility analyses, seeks to provide the
policymaker with a framework for understanding the utility of naval forces. With this
framework in hand, program decisions regarding the size and structure of the Navy can
be made with more confidence and surety.
Past Uses of Naval Forces
The traditional naval functions of control of the seas and projection of power ashore
have in the past included a broad range of actual missions. Judging from historical use,
a primary mission, or “business,” of naval force is the projection of American influence
in situations where military means are appropriate. A second ‘‘business’’ is emerging,
where the past is not prologue: that of countering Soviet influence which seriously
threatens U.S. interests. A third “business” of naval forces is in support of land forces in
a major war. Table A illustrates some past uses of naval forces in those businesses.
The point is that, given past uses of naval forces and the uncertainty of the future envi-
ronment, naval planning should focus upon capabilities, not scenarios, and upon a
range of measures, not a dominant force sizing criterion.
There is no reason to believe that in the future the basic American security objectives
will be substantially modified. A primary goal is the deterrence of nuclear threats or
war against the U.S. and its allies. This study addresses the relationship between general
purpose naval forces and three primary national security objectives:
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Projecting Influence
• Reassuring friends and allies (6th/7th Fleets)
• Lebanon (1958)
• Vietnam (Linebacker, etc.)
• Jordanian crisis (1970)
• Indo-Pakistani war (1971)
• Resupply of Israel (1973)
• Mayaguez (1975)
Countering Soviet Projection
• Cuban missile crisis (1962)
• Cienfuegos (1970)
• Mideast war (1973)
Supporting Land-Based Ground Power
• World War II: Battle of the North Atlantic/Pacific
• Korea (1950–53): Inchon
• Vietnam (supply lines, etc.)
TABLE A
How U.S. Naval Forces Have Been Used
• The maintenance of stability. Routine forward deployments are intended to reassure
allies and strategic friends. Further, this use of naval forces serves to deter crises and
constrain potential Soviet adventurism.
• The containment of crises. Critical to this is the ability to deal not only with low
order crises, but also with those where the Soviets may choose to challenge U.S.
capability and resolve.
• The deterrence of major war. The main elements of naval contribution to this
deterrence include: a survivable SSBN force; protection for any SLOC in support of
land campaigns; supporting allies, even if in proximity to the USSR; the capability
to operate in forward areas and increase the risks for Soviet naval forces and
capabilities; the capability to open a second front, especially in the Pacific; and
possessing sufficient combat potential to hedge against the uncertainty of where
and how a war of this magnitude would occur.
During the course of this study, a series of measures of naval capabilities were identi-
fied. They should enable the policymaker to judge the worth of naval forces as mea-
sured against those three basic U.S. security objectives. The measures take into account
the past uses, or “businesses” of naval forces. They are shown in Table B.
THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
In evaluating the worth of naval forces in meeting national security objectives, it was
necessary to determine the environment in which they would operate.
Overall, the trends do not indicate that the world will be more receptive toward Ameri-
can interests. The awesome American economic and military power which undergirded
the stability of the democratic West in the first two decades after World War II has
waned. The dollar is frequently under pressure on world money markets. The tragedy
U . S . N A V A L S T R A T E G Y I N T H E 1 9 7 0 S 1 0 7
Maintain Stability
• Forward deployments
• Perceptions of naval power
Contain Crises
• Capability to affect outcome ashore
• Superiority at sea versus Soviets
Deter Global War
• Protection of sea lanes
• Reinforce allies
• Pressure upon the Soviets
• Hedges against uncertainties
TABLE B
Policy-Related Measures of Naval Capabilities
of Southeast Asia raised questions about the extent of U.S. military power, wisdom and
foreign policy consensus.
The Soviet Union has emerged as the world’s second superpower whose international
influence is basically derived from its steady and determined increase in nuclear and
conventional military power, to which it continues to devote an unprecedented level of
resources despite the inadequacies of its economic structure.
The most certain aspect of the environment will be its uncertainty and volatility. There
is no reason to believe that ethnic or national rivalries or irredentist claims, many of
which predate this country’s existence, will be amicably resolved in the next 20–30
years. The acquisition by Third World nations of sophisticated military capability
(including nuclear technology) is not encouraging. Nor is the expanding world popula-
tion and increasing demand on scarce resources needed for survival and national
development.
As the world has become more interdependent, the distinction between U.S. “vital”
interests and “peripheral” interests has blurred. The period when the U.S. was self-
sufficient in natural resources and protected by a 3,000 mile wide moat has long since
passed. Its economic, political and military interests are, for better or for worse, inti-
mately related to what happens elsewhere in the world. What happens in one region
affects another. The West may choose to ignore Soviet or other disruptive actions on
other continents; but the consequences of those actions cannot be avoided.
The military capabilities of nations in areas where the West has both vital and periph-
eral interests are growing. As regards naval forces alone, antiship precision-guided
munitions (PGMs) are in the hands of 30 nations, excluding NATO and the Warsaw
Pact. The main threat, the USSR, continues its steady naval growth in terms of blue
water (at-sea sustainability) capabilities, ocean surveillance, and antiship missile
improvements. The projections are that, over the next two decades, the Soviets will
largely increase their nuclear attack submarine fleet, greatly improve their naval air
strike force and deploy more aircraft carriers.
In doctrinal terms, the Soviets have been a sea-denial force whose maritime strategy
centered around checking the nuclear-delivery potential of the carrier and the SSBN.
Increasing Soviet involvement in crises worldwide, however, indicates that their doc-
trine accommodates to ambitions and capabilities. Today Soviet maritime strategy
includes the concept of force projection, although not in mirror-image fashion to U.S.
projection capabilities.
While the Soviets are manifesting a more ambitious worldwide involvement, the U.S. is
no longer able to offset Soviet adventurism by reliance on nuclear superiority.
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The central national security problem for the future will be effectively to control Soviet
expansion of influence, hopefully without engaging in hostilities. To accomplish this
will require a mix of political, economic and military means, one important portion of
which will be our naval capabilities.
The future will not be more secure for U.S. interests than the past.
BASIC STUDY FINDINGS AND TRENDS
What does the future promise in terms of U.S. naval capabilities? Basically, in terms of
technology U.S. naval capabilities should improve relative to the projected threat. Naval
science is dependent upon areas of expertise—microelectronics, computers, nuclear
physics, etc.—where the United States holds considerable relative advantages over
potential adversaries. Several points deserve mention.
World Environment and Military Capabilities
Given an unstable world environment extending well into the future, the U.S. will
require a variety of military capabilities. Trends indicate the world environment will
not be more stable or more secure for U.S. interests in the future than in the past. The
U.S. will face adversaries overseas, great and small; the U.S. must keep secure links to
overseas allies (NATO, Japan, and others) and secure access to resources (e.g., Persian
Gulf oil). The U.S. will require substantial military capabilities to maintain stability,
contain crises and deter worldwide war. Because uncertainty increases as we look fur-
ther into the future, military capabilities must be balanced and flexible to deal with a
range of possible world environments. Primary among these capabilities will be versa-
tile naval forces, the centerpiece of which will continue to be carriers because they con-
tribute heavily both to control of the seas in high threat areas and to the outcome of
battles ashore.
Aside from force projection, other naval missions of high priority will involve the pro-
jection of U.S. influence to reassure friends and allies and counter Soviet influence projec-
tion, the latter likely to be a growing threat.
Soviet Missile Threat
Soviet missiles, launched from either bombers, submarines or surface combatants, are a
principal threat to U.S. surface forces operating either during a serious crisis such as
the 1973 Mideast War or during a major war. The Soviets currently have about 100
submarines and surface ships equipped with antiship missiles. These forces and anti-
ship missile equipped Backfire bombers are projected to increase substantially in this
period.
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U.S. naval forces must be able to cope successfully with that threat. National security is
based on a forward strategy which links the U.S. with allies on both flanks of the Soviet
Union. Contrary to popular opinion, properly employed carrier task forces are not
highly vulnerable. They can, of course, be damaged. But they are not easy to put out of
action and are even more difficult to sink.
Technology has not made U.S. surface forces the horse cavalry of the 1980s. This trend
is due to a combination of fighter aircraft protection, area and point antimissile
defenses (especially the new AEGIS air defense system), electronic warfare plus cover
and deception tactics.
Major Warfighting Capabilities
While a worldwide war is extremely unlikely, the massive Soviet buildup of strategic,
theater nuclear and general purpose forces will require a high level of U.S.
preparedness.
Antisubmarine Warfare/SLOC Defense. In antisubmarine warfare (ASW), systems of
proven capability are entering the fleet today. The analysis in this study indicates the
defense of SLOCs (sea lanes of communication), especially in the North Atlantic, ap-
pears to be improving markedly. This is in part due to the new ASW systems.
Further, SLOC protection is aided by allied naval capabilities to operate offensively in a
major war, thereby forcing the Soviets to allocate to defense a substantial portion of
their forces.
Exerting Pressure on the Soviets. Naval forces may have unique capabilities for assist-
ing the flanks of NATO.
Forward strike operations may prove highly valuable in tying down large Soviet forces
which might otherwise be employed.
The threat of opening a second front would help relieve pressure against the SLOC,
complicate Soviet planning and give the Soviets pause before the initiation of hostili-
ties. The policy worthy of such operations probably resides more in their effects upon
Soviet behavior in crises and upon the equilibrium of the worldwide power balance
than in their employment in the remote possibility of a global war.
In any major war, the destruction of the Soviet fleet and denial to the Soviets of access
to any ocean is a basic objective. This requires the close coordination of surface, sub-
marine and sea-based air assets in an aggressive naval campaign. The ability to achieve
this objective has a significant impact on the attainment of other important objectives,
e.g., maintenance of important SLOCs and support for allies.
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Thus, naval capabilities, in conjunction with allies and land-based air, provide for the
maintenance of maritime superiority in relation to the most powerful potential adver-
sary, the Soviet Union—a fleet which can prevail over Soviet naval forces in the key
strategic areas of the world. Forward naval operations can have a decisive effect on the
outcome of a land war in Europe by ensuring firmness of NATO flank states; relieving
pressure on the SLOCs; ensuring reinforcement and stiffening the will to resist of various
NATO states; facing the Soviets with the real possibility of truly unacceptable losses.
Dealing with Crises
Most likely, however, serious military challenges to U.S. interests will come not in the indus-
trialized heartland of the West but in other geographic areas where, despite U.S. preference,
military force and violence are frequently the primary means of resolving policy disputes.
Should the U.S. draw down its forward deployments, this could leave the USSR as the
dominant naval power in the vacated region. As the Soviets perfect their V/STOL carri-
ers, their ability to influence events ashore, psychologically as well as physically, will
increase. It can be expected they will use this influence and gradually shed their image
of a reactive navy and an autarkic, continental power.
Criticality of Fleet Size
Even with favorable technological trends, the overall fleet size is threatening to decline
below the threshold of critical mass necessary for the containment of serious crises and
the retention of flexible options for the deterrence of major war. Numbers are impor-
tant. U.S. naval forward deployments are stretched taut. Further reduction in U.S. capi-
tal ships, when contrasted with the growing numbers of Soviet antiship missile
combatants, is a matter for concern.
As part of the deterrent to a major war, the credibility of naval force options to reinforce
allies on the Soviet flanks or to hem in Soviet naval forces again depends upon massing
sufficient numbers.
Major reductions in carrier levels, the heart of U.S. naval capabilities, will reduce the
ability of a President to respond rapidly to crises. Further, reduction of forward
deployment posture is liable to have high political costs.
Choices for the Future
The costs, on the other hand, to maintain a balanced naval capability, one which can
project U.S. influence, counter Soviet influence and, if required, fight and prevail in
worldwide war, can be met within a 3% real budgetary growth. New technologies will
affect the naval capabilities on both sides but there is no basis to conclude that in
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balance they adversely affect U.S. interests. To the contrary, the potential of the cruise
missile, V/STOL, AEGIS, etc., if vigorously pursued, should open new opportunities for
retaining U.S. dominance of the seas.
Summary
So, for naval force planning, the future offers both an opportunity and a challenge. The
opportunity relates to the positive trends in technology. The challenge relates to the
negative trends in the numerical size and the mission flexibility of the fleet. The issue is
how to exploit the promise of technology and to procure the numbers of platforms at
an affordable cost.
U.S. SECURITY OBJECTIVES: GENERAL
A primary goal is and will be the deterrence of nuclear threats or war against the U.S.
and its allies. This study does not address forces for nuclear warfighting. It does, how-
ever, address the relationship between general purpose naval forces and the three pri-
mary national security objectives described earlier:
• Maintain stability
• Contain crises
• Deter worldwide war.
Since World War II, the U.S. has actively pursued the goal of worldwide stability. A
principal means has been a forward strategy, linking U.S. forces and security to those of
friends and allies across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. A second objective has been
the containment of crises, even in regions not in themselves vital to U.S. interests. The
purpose has been to avoid the unraveling of stability—a disintegrating process which
would impact critical U.S. interests. A third objective has been the deterrence of
another world war in this century. This goal requires not just strong allies, strong forces
in place in Europe and the assurance of timely reinforcement. It also demands skill in
containing crises and supporting orderly global change, for a world war would most
likely stem from the failure of the West to respond appropriately to lesser conflict.
SECURITY OBJECTIVE: MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY
Forward Deployments
A stable world order in which the nation states favor international cooperation rather
than conflict is a reasonable national security objective. Naval forward deployments in
sensitive areas are intended, as is U.S. troop commitment in Europe, to maintain stabil-
ity and to deter serious conflicts in sensitive areas from arising.
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Since 1945, policymakers in successive Administrations have seized upon sea-based
power as a means of affecting the behavior of decision-makers in other nations. On a
daily basis, this influence is projected by naval forward deployments whose presence in
a region is intended to reassure allies, deter enemies, ensure quick response, and dem-
onstrate U.S. interest and resolve in the region. In a phrase: to undergird stability and
to foster relationships favorable to U.S. interests.
Except in war, the tempo of naval operations is driven by the pattern of forward
deployments. These deployments center on the amphibious ships and the carriers, for
they represent the ability of America to influence events ashore.
The Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, with its two battle groups,* and one Marine
Amphibious Unit (MAU), is not only the pivotal power reassuring U.S. allies on the
Southern Flank. The Sixth Fleet is the single most powerful entity, American or other-
wise, in a maritime region of 17 nations and 300 million people. Many of those states,
while not within the NATO alliance, look to the United States for reassurance and
support—states such as Spain, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, Egypt and Jordan. The Sixth
Fleet symbolizes American steadfastness in that region of the globe where the Soviets
keep most of their forward deployed naval power. In the face of the improving Soviet
Navy, it would be difficult to withdraw one of the two U.S. battle groups and believe
the stability and the power balance of the region would not be affected.
On the other side of the globe, geography renders the vast Pacific a naval region. One
battle group operates in the area of Japan, the PRC and the Soviet Far East. Another
battle group operates sometimes in joint support near Korea, sometimes in the South
China Sea, sometimes in the Indian Ocean.
In recognition of the fact that friends and potential adversaries alike are watching U.S.
actions in the Pacific following the announced withdrawal from Korea, the President
has directed that there be no further force reductions. The Seventh Fleet remains the
most significant manifestation of U.S. presence.
Current force levels are such that any further reduction would probably result in the
withdrawal, for at least part of each year, of one of the four carriers currently forward
deployed. Since U.S. national security rests upon a forward strategy which links our
forces to those of allies around the globe, the question is not whether a reduction in
forward deployments would affect our foreign policy; but rather, how much.
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* A battle group presently contains a carrier, surface combatants, SSNs, and an underway replenish-
ment ship.
General Perceptions of the U.S.-Soviet Naval Balance
A second and equally important measure of the naval contribution to peacetime stabil-
ity is the perception of the Soviet-U.S. naval balance. Forward deployments are visible
reminders that in a crisis or a major war, U.S. naval power will assure sea control and
contribute to the outcome ashore. Were those forward deployments to be discounted
either as too vulnerable or too few, their contribution to regional stability would be
severely curtailed. The trend in the public literature has emphasized Soviet gains at sea
as well as elsewhere.
It is not inevitable that the U.S. concede to the Soviets parity in all military capabilities.
The forward strategy linking the U.S. to other continents requires use of the seas, while
the perception that the Soviets could deny the U.S. control of the seas is particularly
damaging. Such perception is not warranted by the projected trends in technology.
Whether it will be warranted by a steady reduction in the size of the American fleet and
the amount of forward deployment remains to be seen.
SECURITY OBJECTIVE: CONTAINMENT OF CRISES
Background
In some crises a President may wish to commit U.S. troops immediately to preempt
certain potential moves by an adversary or to rectify a time-urgent problem, such as
evacuating Americans in jeopardy. Or he may wish to ferry quickly supplies to one side
in a conflict, either to provide critical resources or to display American commitment.
The quick response of airlift provides the President with a valuable tool. But airlift has
limitations such as base availabilities or cargo size and weight restrictions. In some
cases airlift may be the preferred implement, but in others it may not provide the flexi-
bility demanded by a President.
In many crises, naval forces are a preferred means of leverage for a policymaker. For-
ward deployed naval forces can be employed without being committed to battle and
without committing allies. Such demonstrations manifest both U.S. concern and capa-
bilities. In over 200 crises since 1945 in which the U.S. was involved, U.S. Navy and
Marine forces were deliberately employed in 177 cases, while U.S. land-based air or
ground forces alone were demonstrated in fewer than 90 cases.
The reasons are obvious. From a domestic standpoint, naval forces may be the most
acceptable form of responsive action by the U.S. in crisis situations. They can convey, if
the policymaker chooses, calculated ambiguity and a calibrated response capability.
Their presence does not irrevocably commit the United States to a given course of
action. They do, however, seriously complicate the calculations of opposing parties in
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assessing the consequences of their potential counteractions. The deployed naval force
can be tailored to the mission and through its force components convey a clear mes-
sage. If further steps are to be taken, U.S. fighting forces can be assembled for action
without using bases in other nations. If the crisis is resolved satisfactorily, naval forces
can be withdrawn with limited fanfare. Land-based troops and aircraft tend to become
locked into longer-term commitments.
In sum, naval forces provide a policymaker with vitally needed flexibility and a tool for
orchestrating events.
The Calibrated Use of Force against the Shore
This mission applies basically to Marines and carrier air. Most crises do not peak over-
night. The National Command Authority (NCA) will have sufficient warning time to
deploy naval forces near the scene. This is frequently done with our amphibious forces.
In 30 serious crises since World War II, Marines were deployed on 21 occasions.
Each of the three Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs) constantly deployed can land over
1,000 troops, most by helicopters to avoid or to envelop some fixed defenses. In a crisis
setting, where the objective is to settle matters without escalation to major war, a thou-
sand heliborne Marines who can range far from their logistics base at sea represent a
substantial, self-contained fighting package. The presence of such a capability sends a
clear signal to the other side (e.g., Lebanon, 1976).
In regard to air, the striking power of a carrier force is a powerful weapon. One carrier,
for instance, holds more and better aircraft than the combined Ethiopian, Soviet and
Cuban aircraft currently involved in the Horn of Africa. The ordnance delivery capabil-
ity per carrier is increasing, and given “smart” weapons the per carrier increase in
effectiveness is even more dramatic.
A primary use of naval forces—because they have the power to influence decisively the
outcome—is to contain conflicts and so to prevent the outbreak of major conflict.
Concern about such crises is not unwarranted. That naval forces can be brought to the
scene in the time of crises reduces the risk of conflict escalation.
U.S. Superiority at Sea in a Crisis Setting
A second mission related to the containment of crises reflects the new use, or business,
of U.S. naval forces: how to counter Soviet influence adverse to U.S. interests. In the
past, the knowledge that a President faced with a crisis could deploy a superior force
enabled him to tolerate a period of tension. The question is how to maintain the bene-
fits of that advantage for the future, given Soviet naval programs. The benefit of naval
superiority was that it signaled to the Soviets and others that their adventurism
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overseas took place against the backdrop of superior, yet appropriate, U.S. power. This
facilitated the U.S. use of diplomatic or economic leverage, confident that the Soviets
could not credibly counter with a military option. Regardless of whether the U.S. chose
to deploy its applicable naval superiority, its existence enabled policymakers to main-
tain a stance of calculated ambiguity.
However, the net effect of the Soviet and U.S. trends in naval forces is that the next
decade will not look like this current one in terms of crisis management.
The Soviets are building a sufficient number of submarines and surface combatants to
challenge American seapower in key regions of the Eastern Hemisphere.
A comparison of U.S./Soviet force deployment postures and transit times for represen-
tative crises in the Eastern Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia, and Northeast
Asia shows that the potential for regional maritime confrontation exists in all areas of
interest. Neither side holds a large edge in expected response/reinforcement time. Nor
do the Soviets have to threaten the employment of bombers flying from their home-
land to challenge U.S. naval forces deployed to the scene of a regional crisis. Confi-
dence that U.S. naval forces on scene would survive and that Soviet naval forces would
not is essential to the avoidance of a Cuban missile crisis in reverse. By this measure of
survivability, technology now in hand and programmed for the fleet will reduce U.S.
surface ship vulnerability to missiles, be they fired from a submarine, bomber or sur-
face combatant.
Moreover, Soviet ships and submarines run grave risks today in such a conflict, due to
U.S. carrier air and submarines. Those risks will become even larger as antiship missiles
are installed on U.S. combatants throughout the fleet.
Summary
In past crises the U.S. has tended to dispatch carriers because their air power could be
applied against the shore and also constituted the prime naval weapon for sinking
Soviet surface combatants. However, in serious crises, carriers must be massed to pro-
vide around-the-clock operations and to hedge against Soviet opposition. As long as
American naval power appropriate to crisis management remains concentrated in car-
rier battle groups, there are very finite limits to our response capabilities and further
reductions in U.S. naval forces require careful consideration of the consequence.
Given the growth in Soviet naval power, in a serious crisis in the next decade (com-
parable to Cuba in 1962, Jordan in 1970, or the 1973 Mideast War), American
policymakers will have to take into account the effect of their actions or inactions
upon regions of the world far removed from the scene of the crisis. To withdraw from
one set of commitments, because of unduly constrained naval resources, or upset one
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power equilibrium to rectify another, would impact adversely upon the post-crisis
position in the United States.
SECURITY OBJECTIVE: DETERRENCE OF GLOBAL WAR
Background
A conventional worldwide war is unlikely. If Western Europe were attacked, the risk of
nuclear war might be great. Such a war could only stem from the most profound shift
in Soviet calculation about the steadfastness and the strength of the West in general
and of the United States in particular. Such calculation in turn could only stem from
American failure in a series of crises and tests beyond the boundaries of NATO.
If the U.S. becomes involved in a conventional worldwide war, both land-based and
naval forces will be absolutely essential. The contribution of naval forces to the deter-
rence of a global war should be assessed first in terms of the containment of crises and
the maintenance of stability. It should be assessed secondarily in terms of four missions
related to the deterrence of worldwide war.
SLOC Defense
Little more than a decade ago, there was considerable pessimism about the North
Atlantic SLOC, given the hundreds of Soviet submarines and the poor state of ASW in
the West. Today, there is guarded optimism.
However, there is no optimum set of forces for ensuring security of the sea lanes
against submarines. SLOC interdiction is guerrilla war at sea. The forces directly appli-
cable to SLOC defense are the land-based P-3 aircraft, attack submarines, and surface
escorts of the frigate class. The battle groups and nuclear attack submarines used for
area ASW indirectly aid the SLOC by keeping Soviet forces on the defensive.
The Backfire bomber represents a significant threat against our battle groups. But it is
equally capable of striking convoys supporting/reinforcing friends and allies
worldwide.
Reinforcement of Allies
In addition to ensuring that supplies can move from America to Europe, naval forces
contribute to deterrence of a global war by a clear demonstration of an ability to sup-
port allies or strategic friends on the flanks of the Soviet Union.
In the Atlantic, it may be necessary to reinforce or regain territory, a very difficult task
in the face of Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) and one which would be approached with
careful tactics and strong land-based air support. Ideally, no allied surface naval
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movement would be made into certain areas until the Soviet submarine and Soviet
Naval Aviation (SNA) threat has been attrited. Unfortunately, it is by no means clear
that land-based air could, as a practical matter, provide such support. Necessary bases
are not now available nor is it likely for political reasons that they will be during
peacetime.
Moreover, the U.S. has not programmed either the major expenditures necessary to
develop such land bases nor to provide the aircraft for such bases. Until, and unless,
such problems can be solved, carrier air remains the mainstay of credible reinforce-
ment. Aside from its military importance, it carries high political and psychological
value.
While the U.S. may well wish to explore land-based air as a long term alternative, nei-
ther political nor military analysis to date suggest this as a high probability solution.
Fortunately carriers, while clearly vulnerable to some attrition, are believed capable of
carrying out major military actions despite the air and submarine threat.
Allied control of the Eastern Mediterranean in the face of SNA will require multiple
(depending on the availability of USAF assets) battle groups. Clearly, before war’s end,
the West must control the Eastern Mediterranean. Extensive analysis of forward opera-
tions to reinforce those highly exposed allies demonstrates that while difficult, carrier
air can provide a reasonable degree of protection. Specifically, even assuming heavy
land-based air assistance from allies and the U.S. Air Force, the analysis shows a group-
ing of carriers is needed to attrite the Backfire bomber force without grave damage to
the naval strike force. The battle group thereafter is at liberty to perform strike mis-
sions. This is a shift in the trend of surface force survivability as significant as that
which has led to the ASW advantage enjoyed by the West.
The carrier can be offered reasonable assurance not just of surviving but of carrying
out its mission in protection of allies and in attacks against Soviet capability. There is
no reason to believe that U.S. carrier aircraft cannot engage and destroy Soviet Naval
Aviation before such saturation attacks can be launched.
Pressure upon the Soviets
The possibility of offensive options would help relieve pressure against the SLOC, com-
plicate Soviet planning and give the Soviets pause before the initiation of hostilities.
The policy worthy of such options probably resides more in their effect upon Soviet
behavior in crises and upon the equilibrium of the worldwide power balance than in
their employment in the remote possibility of a global war. Two offensive options sug-
gest themselves.
The first is the threat to open up a second front in the event of Soviet attack in Europe.
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Combined land-based and sea-based air threat against Soviets could destroy a portion
of the SNA and other important military facilities. It would pose an implicit threat to
the U.S.S.R., tying down major Soviet assets, since the results in the Pacific could not
be foretold. It would help to insure that the sea link to Japan and Korea was main-
tained. Above all, knowledge that in this troubled time U.S. military planners felt
strong enough in their Pacific forces to contemplate a second front should help to allay
concerns about the correlation of forces in the Pacific.
The second option is the destruction of the Soviet fleet and the denial to the Soviets of
access to the ocean. This can be done by an aggressive and coordinated use of all naval
forces, surface, air and submarine.
Hedge against Uncertainty
In planning for the long term, hedges against what is not known cannot be neglected.
Four particulars (although a contradiction in terms) bear mention. First, an assump-
tion of some losses on D-day is prudent. So, too, is recognition that some naval forces
may continue to be tied down at the scene of the original crisis after the global war has
begun.
Consequently, this study looked at the potential advantages of organizing non-carrier
Surface Action Groups (SAGs). The SAGs would consist of an AEGIS antimissile ship,
several surface combatants with antiship missiles, some SSNs and no carriers. They
would be designed to destroy Soviet surface ships and submarines. U.S. SAGs would
increase the flexibility of the policymaker and permit him to retain a visible presence in
several sensitive areas around the globe. SAGs might be useful in crises where the U.S.
desires to send a muted signal (i.e., not threaten areas ashore), but to have a credible
seafighting force (for protection of SIGINT collection, blockade, counterblockade, etc.).
Second, the Persian Gulf region cannot be ignored. It may be a dormant theater. But it
may erupt.
Third, before the end of this century the Soviets may acquire one or more overseas
bases. These would have to be dealt with in a global war, or the host nations dissuaded
from permitting Soviet usage. In the future, the capability for an amphibious assault on
a Soviet overseas base could become an additional role.
Fourth, naval air support could be called upon for the major land battle.
In summary, a worldwide war is extremely unlikely, fraught as it is with danger of
nuclear war. If it ever occurred, it would most likely evolve slowly, following from a
complete unraveling of stability as the U.S. failed to contain crises and keep the West
together.
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SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND NAVAL MISSIONS: A SUMMARY
Naval forces contribute to national security objectives across a broad spectrum of mis-
sions. Prominent among them are:
No priority among the missions is advocated. The maintenance of stability, the con-
tainment of crises and the deterrence of global war are as tightly interwoven as are the
international politics and economics of today’s world. It is imperative that the U.S. nei-
ther lose control of events at the crisis level nor give the appearance of losing control.
The unraveling of stability just prior to World War I is an example of the consequences
when nations lose control of events. The flexibility of U.S. naval forces enables the
President to contain crises outside the Eurasian land mass which threaten to shatter the
international equilibrium. And, so far as Europe itself is concerned, clearly the area of
first importance to U.S. interests, the ability to support allies separated by a vast ocean
remains of vital importance.
That other nations believe the U.S. has appropriate controlled power, with a will to use
it if required, is equally important. World War II stemmed from small aggressions
which the West had neither the will nor the capability to resist. In the final analysis this
led to a major world war, an experience we would repeat at our own peril.
In order not to neglect any of the seven missions set forth in this section, all three
major options for a long term naval force goal presented in the next section keep a bal-
ance among their force types.
FORCE/FUNDING OPTIONS
SEA PLAN 2000 suggests that a policymaker should have in mind a long-term plan for
naval forces—their direction and purpose—before becoming immersed in program
and shipbuilding details. This report tries to develop the framework for such a plan.
U.S. naval force capabilities are examined in terms of their contribution toward three
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Security Objective Naval Mission
• Maintenance of Stability • Forward deployments
• Containment of Crises • Calibrated use of force against the shore
• Superiority at sea in a crisis setting
• Deterrence of a Global War • SLOC defense
• Reinforcement of allies
• Pressure upon the Soviets
• Hedge against uncertainties of the distant future
TABLE C
Objectives and Missions
basic national security goals: maintenance of stability; containment of crises; and
deterrence of war.
To assess the naval missions explained in the preceding section, the quantitative and
operational analyses of the study used a naval force assumed to have 3% real growth in
the mid-80s and mid-90s time frames. This starting point stemmed from President
Carter’s decision that the overall resources for national security required about 3% a
year real growth, given the trends in the threat. Two other force levels are also evalu-
ated: a decremented force of little or no real growth; and an incremented force of
about 4% per year real growth. These force options are shown in Table D. This study
concentrated upon the capabilities of naval forces to carry out different missions. The
column on type of ships is not intended to substitute for specific program tradeoffs:
i.e., for CV one can substitute CVV, or VSS, etc.; for SSNs, the 637 class or a SSN-X
may be preferable for a given amount of dollars to more 688s, etc.
These options represent long term planning goals. All three options keep a balance
among their force elements. None advocates a sudden, radical force change. The situa-
tion with naval forces and new technologies is analogous to the maintenance of a trust
fund for one’s heirs. A balanced portfolio provides the optimum insurance against
uncertainty. Blue chip stocks that have demonstrated a good return on investment are
not divested without the reasonable certainty of a better investment. New issues are
sampled as possible blue chips of the future (new technologies). The most exciting
technologies relate not so much to platforms as to weapon systems. AEGIS-type
antimissile defenses and electronic warfare show special promise in the near term.
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Type
Option 1
1%
Option 2
3%
Option 3
4%
CV* 10 12 14
AEGIS ship 10 24 28
Cruiser/Destroyer 74 100 114
Frigate 136 152 158
SSN 80 94 98
SSBN 25 25 25
Amphibious ships 52 66 78
UNREP ships 38 46 55
Support ships 49 60 61
Total ships 474 579 631
MSC/NRF -35 -44 -46
Total active ships 439 535 585
*CV levels do not include a carrier in SLEP. (Service Life Extension Program.) Thus, total carriers would be 11, 13 and 15 in the
three options.
TABLE D
Illustrative Alternative Force Levels
ASSESSMENT OF SEA PLAN 2000 FORCE ALTERNATIVES
Option 1 is judged to be a high risk option with a low degree of flexibility, with mini-
mal capability across the range of naval tasks.
Option 2 hovers at the threshold of naval capability across the spectrum of possible
uses, given the risks associated with technical and tactical uncertainties.
Option 3 provides a high degree of versatility in the form of a wider range of military
and political actions at a moderate increase in cost over Option 2.
This assessment is summarized in Table E below.
FISCAL ASSUMPTIONS
Certain fiscal assumptions have been made with regard to the three force level options
for an FY 2000 Navy. The key assumptions, applied to all options, include the
following:
• The current operating to investment allocation of DON dollars will remain at about
the current ratio.
• Historical trends in shipbuilding real cost growth due to technology will continue
into the future.
• Historical trends of real cost growth in shipbuilding due to increase in ship size can
be arrested by better management as attested to by recent constraints on ship size.
1 2 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
Measure Option 1 Option 2 Option 3
Maintain
Stability
• Relax current forward
deployment
• Reduced U.S. visibility
• Maintain current
deployment
• Resolve versus Soviet
growth
• Current deployment
at objective rotation
• Enhanced
perception
Contain
Crises
• Crisis/deployment
tradeoff
• High D-day shootout
loss
• Sustain forward de-
ployments during a
crisis
• Create SAGs
• Sustain forward de-
ployments during
crises
• Significant residuals
Deter
Global War
• Some SLOCs
• No forward ops
• At best, defensive
• Protects SLOCs
• Enables 2–4 forward
ops
• Second front option
• All-around
superiority
Risk
Assessment
• High risk; minimal ca-
pability; not flexible
• Minimum acceptable
risk; maintains selec-
tive superiority vs.
Soviets
• Lower risk; provides
hedge and options
TABLE E
Comparison of SEA PLAN 2000 Force Options
Using these assumptions it has been determined that some real growth in DON fund-
ing will be necessary to attain each of the levels examined.
Clearly any variance in these assumptions can have a significant effect on the
attainability of any force level. If the operating to investment ratio increases, then one
of two decisions must be made:
• Hold constant the number of ships needed and increase funding; or
• Hold constant the percent of real growth and accept the risk of operating a smaller force.
Figure A is an example of what happens to the force level, holding constant the 3% real
growth in DON funding, but varying the assumptions. The shaded area indicates the
range of uncertainty associated with this funding.
Future Shipbuilding Plans
Since all three options propose the procurement of ships, the number of alternative
shipbuilding plans is huge. The opportunities are also numerous for a series of cost
and managerial efficiencies which would increase the mission effectiveness of each
option or unbalance the force and run an increased risk in one mission area to reduce
the risk in another.
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FIGURE A
Active USN Ship Inventory for Various Funding Options
Dealing with SCN at 3% real growth has certain problems as well as benefits. Obvi-
ously, such a funding profile would be considerably smaller in the near term and
would, due to compound growth, increase in the outyears. To maintain a stable ship-
building industry and interim military capabilities, however, a smoother growth could
be desirable. It was assumed that programming action by SCN experts within the Navy
and OSD could smooth shipbuilding and overall top line costs to achieve a reasonable
3% real growth budgetary target.
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Option 1 2 3
Average annual SCN
dollar costs in constant
FY79 dollars $6.29B $8.8B $9.5B
Total number of new
construction ships in
program 290 395 447
This Table Illustrates the Magnitude of the Shipbuilding Program for Each of the
Options through the Year 2000
The Future of U.S. Sea Power
On 1 July 1978, at the midpoint in the administration of President Carter and the tenure
of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and Secretary of the Navy W. Graham Claytor, Jr.,
Admiral Thomas Hayward took office as the Chief of Naval Operations. A naval aviator,
Hayward had previously served as Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet, in 1976–77, and
Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 1977–78. In these positions, he had developed some of
his ideas about a new approach to naval and U.S. Pacific Command strategy, which he
developed in Project SEA STRIKE.* The study laid out a rationale for the offensive use of
naval forces in the Pacific for the purpose, in the event of war, of weakening a Soviet
invasion of Europe. These thoughts became a key starting point in U.S. naval strategy in
the 1980s. Hayward’s concept in SEA STRIKE drove Pacific Command planning under
Admiral Robert Long, who had been primed for it earlier as Vice Chief of Naval Opera-
tions and when overseeing work on SEA PLAN 2000.
Hayward wanted to shift the terms of discussion to strategic issues, away from the bud-
getary and force-planning issues that had come to dominate. As a first step in this pro-
cess, Hayward and his executive assistant, Captain William A. Cockell, began to develop
an outline for a worldwide maritime strategy for the U.S. Navy. Cockell, an expert on the
Soviet Navy, had served as director of the CNO Executive Panel under Admiral Zumwalt
and had been familiar with Zumwalt’s “Project SIXTY” effort. Hayward and Cockell
completed the first phase of their work over a four-month period ending in early January
1979. The first product was a document entitled “CNO Strategic Concepts.” Circulated
as a classified memorandum to flag officers in February 1979, it formulated seventeen
major points as the bases for thinking about strategy.† Hayward used this document as
the basis for discussions about naval strategy that he initiated with flag officers through-
out the Navy. Reinforced by these discussions, Hayward and Cockell developed them as
the basis for Hayward’s briefings to Congress, the Joint Chiefs, the CNO Executive Panel,
and other groups, as well as in the Navy’s annual posture statements.
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* On Project SEA STRIKE, see Hattendorf, The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–
1986, Newport Paper 19 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 2004), pp. 17–20.
† See ibid., pp. 38–39, for a summary of the memorandum and its seventeen points. No surviving
copy of the original classified document has been located.
On 15 February 1979, Hayward testified before the Subcommittee on Seapower and
Strategic and Critical Materials of the House Armed Services Committee;* his remarks
were published three months later in revised form as an article in the annual “Naval
Review” issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings in May 1979.† Captain Cockell drafted
the article on the basis of Hayward’s congressional testimony and his classified memo-
randum on strategic concepts. The article, reproduced below, lacked the depth and
sophistication of the classified memorandum but expressed Hayward’s basic approach to
thinking about naval force in strategic terms.‡
The Chief of Naval Operations talked before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Stra-
tegic and Critical Materials of the House Armed Services Committee on 15 February
1979 on the questions of “Why do we need a navy?” and “What kind of navy should it
be, anyway?”
Because it deals with the central issue of the naval profession, and because it does so
concisely and clearly, the Editorial Board of the Naval Institute obtained permission to
publish this text in Naval Review.
I would like to lead off with a broad examination of the responsibilities facing the
Navy, in order to provide a baseline from which we might judge the adequacy of our
naval forces to meet our national needs—and from which we might come to grips with
the questions nagging the analysts these days, such as, “Why do we need a Navy?” and
“What kind of Navy should it be, anyway?”
An excellent starting point is a discussion of the U.S. requirement for “maritime supe-
riority.” I wish to emphasize this point of maritime superiority because it is a concept
that has been given insufficient recognition in recent years, yet it is one which must
form the basis for the planning of all our naval forces. It provides a clear and unambig-
uous yardstick against which to measure the adequacy of our naval forces—present
and prospective. Its opposite is “maritime parity,” or worse, “inferiority”—both of
which are anathema to me, and which are wholly inconsistent with this country’s most
essential national interests.
1 2 6 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
* House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 1872 [H.R. 4040] and
H.R. 2575 [S. 429], Part 4. Feb. 14–16, 21, 28, Mar. 6, 9, 14, 21–23, 29, Apr. 5, 9, 10, 1979. Continu-
ation of Hearings on Military Posture and DoD Authorization Request for FY80 and Supplemental
Authorization Request for FY79 . . . before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical
Materials, testimony of Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 15 February 1979, pp.
37–109.
† Adm. Thomas B. Hayward, USN, “The Future of U.S. Sea Power,” Naval Institute Proceedings 105,
no. 5 (May 1979), pp. 66–71.
‡ Hattendorf, Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, pp. 42–43.
The requirement for maritime superiority recognizes the strategic realities of our geo-
graphic position as an island nation connected to overseas allies by two broad oceans,
and confronting a great land power which has chosen, for reasons of its own, to chal-
lenge our traditional supremacy on the seas. It is not surprising that the Soviets see
benefit in doing so, for they recognize, as we must, that control of the seas is absolutely
essential for the survival of the United States as a viable economic entity—as it is to
any island nation which wishes to preserve its independence and freedom of action. I
personally regard maritime superiority as the “first principle” of our national strategy—
indeed, the foundation upon which all other aspects of it rest.
Maritime superiority does not mean that we must control all the ocean expanses
simultaneously. It does mean that we must control those areas which we need to use in
peace and war, against whatever forces may challenge that control. These essential sea
areas include the strategically critical waters around the Eurasian periphery, and the
economically vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through the Atlantic, Pacific
and Indian Oceans on which the advanced industrial economies of the United States,
Western Europe, and Japan so heavily depend. In controlling the seas we must look to
our allies and sister services for important support. But in the final analysis, the United
States must have the clear ability to prevail over any maritime adversary if it is to pro-
tect its interests worldwide, and to deter actions which could lead to a major war.
That, in a nutshell, is what maritime superiority is all about, in my judgment. Without
it, we can neither prevail in war nor protect our essential interests in peace.
In the NATO area I believe it is almost universally understood today that the U.S. Navy
would play a critical role in the reinforcement and resupply of allied forces in the Cen-
tral Region, if the war lasts more than a few days. It is similarly recognized that the
Navy is uniquely suited to play a key—some would say the predominant—role in the
defense and support of NATO’s flanks which, washed by the Mediterranean and Nor-
wegian Seas, are theaters with very heavy maritime overtones.
What is less clearly recognized, on occasion, is the importance of the role our Navy
would play in the Pacific and Indian Oceans during a NATO war, although I must con-
fess that with the unsettling effects caused by the recent turmoil in Afghanistan, Iran,
and elsewhere in the Mideast, people are beginning to understand what I have been
trying to impress upon them—that there is a direct linkage between our security objec-
tives in central Europe and stability in the Persian Gulf. We should never forget that in
war the U.S. Navy would confront substantial Soviet naval and air forces in these
regions, and we would have the predominant responsibility, not only for assuring allied
access to oil from the Persian Gulf, but for supporting U.S. forces and allies throughout
the Western Pacific—which is one of the Soviets’ most important strategic frontiers.
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The consequences of our letting this vital region go by default would be incalculable,
and would directly impact on the outcome of a NATO-Pact War and the post-conflict
global balance of power.
In peacetime, our Seventh Fleet, operating in the Western Pacific—and backed by the
full strength of the U.S. Pacific Fleet—gives credence to our oft-repeated statement that
we are, and intend to remain, a Pacific power. It is the visible manifestation of our
commitment to Japan; and clearly signals to the PRC, and the other nations of the
Pacific, that the United States has the capability and will to defend its interests, to
maintain stability and balance, and to support its friends and allies in that part of the
world. Our routine deployments in the Indian Ocean, which include periodic augmen-
tation by a carrier battle group from the Western Pacific, clearly demonstrate our capa-
bility to control the oil SLOCs which are vital to the industrialized world in general,
and to our European and Japanese allies in particular.
One would hope that the capability to control the SLOCs would never have to be dem-
onstrated in combat. It is obvious that so long as we possess a clear margin of maritime
superiority, the incentive to challenge our capability will be greatly diminished. But if
that margin becomes tenuous, not only do we invite challenge, but in a more subtle
way we undermine the faith which our friends and allies have in our ability to meet our
commitments, and risk setting in motion profound political realignments that would
be wholly inconsistent with our most basic national interests.
For these reasons, I believe it is essential for the U.S. Navy not only to possess the abil-
ity to prevail over any maritime challenger, but to be perceived by the rest of the world
as possessing such capability. A thin margin of superiority puts both of these objectives
at risk. Indeed, there are so many subjective measurements involved in calculating rela-
tive maritime power that a thin margin is really no margin at all. For that reason I per-
sonally prefer the term “maritime supremacy” to characterize the naval posture which
our country’s interests require, as I believe it connotes a margin of superiority substan-
tial enough to leave little doubt as to the likely outcome should U.S. naval forces be
challenged. A posture of maritime supremacy strongly enhances deterrence, while
assuring an outcome favorable to our interests should deterrence fail.
Looking at the requirements levied on our forces in peace and war, there are several
basic principles which I believe must guide the structuring and employment of those
forces. The familiar concepts of Sea Control and Power Projection, which have had
some utility in the analytical world, do not serve us well in understanding the real
world. Indeed, they have the potential to confuse the issue by suggesting that Sea Con-
trol and Power Projection are discrete categories when, in fact, they are closely inter-
twined. Projecting power against the sources of Soviet naval strength may well be the
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most rapid and efficient way to gain control of the seas (as contrasted with the simplis-
tic concept held by many that Sea Control simply means escorting convoys to Europe
and little else).
So I would like to discuss with you several fundamental principles which I believe are
essential to a more complete understanding of naval supremacy as I have outlined it.
The first of these principles is the premise that any conflict between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact will inevitably be worldwide in scope. This principle is consistent with
Soviet doctrine, and with the geopolitical realities of Soviet and Western interests
which, in war, would come into conflict at a number of points around the Eurasian
periphery. At sea, a NATO-Pact war would be a multiocean conflict, since our critical
SLOCs pass through the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, as well as the Mediterra-
nean and Norwegian seas. Additionally, it is clearly in our interest to maintain a world-
wide naval strike capability which threatens potential enemies from a variety of
directions, tying down defensive forces, greatly complicating the enemy’s strategic cal-
culations and force deployments, and inhibiting his freedom of action.
The second principle is that U.S. Navy forces must be offensively capable. The geo-
graphic range of the Navy’s responsibilities is too broad, and its forces far too small, to
adopt a defensive, reactive posture in a worldwide conflict with the Soviet Union. I
can’t believe any Americans would want their navy to be one that is only reactive to
Soviet initiative, that doesn’t have the capability to be sent wherever necessary, under
whatever conditions, and to be able to survive and win that battle. We must fight on
the terms which are most advantageous to us. This requires taking the war to the
enemy’s naval forces with the objective of achieving the earliest possible destruction of
his capability to interfere with our use of sea areas essential for support of our own
forces and allies. As I suggested earlier, under most circumstances the prompt destruc-
tion of opposing naval forces represents the most economical and effective means to
assure control of those sea areas required for successful prosecution of the war and
support of the U.S. and allied war economies. Our current offensive naval capabilities,
centered on the carrier battle forces, are optimally suited for execution of this strategy.
The third principle relates to the fact that the U.S. Navy is outnumbered by our princi-
pal adversary and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Our sea-based tacti-
cal air superiority, our general technological superiority, and the at-sea sustainability of
the U.S. fleet compensate for this significant deficiency and currently provide the criti-
cal margin over the Soviet Navy. It is essential that we retain this competitive edge
while continuing to place heavy emphasis on maintaining technological superiority
across the board.
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The fourth principle stresses that we must exploit Soviet geographic disadvantages and
continue to deploy naval forces in locales which provide us strategic advantage. It is
important that we make the Soviets understand that in war there will be no sanctuaries
for their forces. Keeping the Soviets preoccupied with defensive concerns locks up
Soviet naval forces in areas close to the USSR, limiting their availability for campaigns
against the SLOCs, or for operations in support of offensive thrusts on the flanks of
NATO or elsewhere, such as in the Middle East or in Asia.
The fifth principle recognizes that the current narrow margin of U.S. Navy advantage
requires that every effort be made to integrate relevant capabilities of the other U.S. ser-
vices and U.S. allies into the campaign to defeat the Soviet and Warsaw Pact navies. In
this respect the trends suggest a continuation of the existing division of labor under
which the U.S. Navy provides the bulk of offensively capable forces while the allies com-
plement our effort with forces for convoy escort, mine clearance, and port protection.
The sixth principle is that we will fight a major war with essentially what we have at its
outset, augmented by the Naval Reserve, which will enhance our capabilities in certain
specialized warfare areas and provide some unit and personnel augmentation for active
forces. As General Haig says, it will be a “come as you are war.” Given the long lead time
for production of today’s complex ships and aircraft, neither side will have a substantial
opportunity to reconstitute major naval units, even if the war is relatively protracted.
Every major engagement must, therefore be regarded as potentially decisive in terms of
its impact on the naval balance; and every U.S. naval unit must have the maximum offen-
sive capability we can build into it consistent with its mission. It also means that our total
force structure in peacetime, including the important supplement represented by the
Naval Reserve, must be sufficient in size, capability, and readiness to prevail in war. There
will be little opportunity to expand it significantly once war has begun.
The seventh principle is that U.S. naval commanders must be governed by the concept
of calculated risk. That is, in war they must select engagement opportunities which
promise attrition ratios clearly favorable to the U.S. side. This is a critically important
point for any navy that lacks the numbers needed to assure a reliable margin of superi-
ority. It was the principle, you may recall, which Admiral Nimitz enjoined Admiral
Spruance to follow at the Battle of Midway—which Spruance then translated into a
brilliant tactical victory, which proved the turning point of the naval campaign in the
Pacific. Given the nature of the U.S.-Soviet naval balance and our essential inability to
reconstitute battle losses, achievement of distinctly favorable attrition ratios offers the
only prospect of progressively defeating the Soviet Navy in a worldwide war at sea.
Even a one-to-one exchange ratio is a strategy for defeat.
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The final principle relates to the adequacy of our residual forces. Though often overlooked
in planning, the force balance existing at the end of a NATO–Warsaw Pact conflict would be
of critical importance in determining not only the terms of settlement, but in protecting
U.S. vital interests in what would undoubtedly be a highly unsettled and conflict-prone
world. The inherent mobility of naval forces, and their relative lack of need for land bases,
would make them particularly useful in this kind of a post-conflict environment.
I have not thus far addressed the question of Soviet naval capabilities. I know you are
familiar with the trends in that area, and their very unsettling implications—particu-
larly when measured against the projected U.S. Navy posture post-1985. The trend line
projected by the current five-year shipbuilding plan forecasts an inevitable decline in
the size of the Navy, commencing in the mid-1980s. The Soviet Union, at the same
time, is embarked on an aggressive program to expand the quality and quantity of its
high seas naval forces (including naval aviation), to extend their reach and sustain-
ability, and to optimize their combatant capabilities against the U.S. Navy. The picture
is one of a dynamic program to increase Soviet capabilities for offensive operations
worldwide. This effort is sustained by an expanding submarine and aircraft construc-
tion base, and a heavily financed naval investment program. As might be expected,
given the Soviet aim of reversing the naval balance, the trend in Soviet ship construc-
tion is very much towards larger, more complex, more expensive, and more capable
units, with the 25- to 30-thousand-ton nuclear-powered cruiser we believe to be under
construction in the Baltic (about twice the size of our own CGNs), the Ivan Rogov
amphibious assault ship, the Kiev class carrier, the Berezina class underway replenish-
ment ship, and the Delta III SSBNs being prime examples—all pointing to the kinds of
priority which Admiral Gorshkov has determined best suits his Navy.
Looking at the implications of all this for our own naval posture, I think several general
conclusions follow.
First, addressing the threat realistically compels us to seek sophistication in our own
naval forces. There is no cheap or easy way out of the situation the Soviets have put us
in. To put it simply, there is no free lunch in this maritime superiority business. We
must control the seas to survive. The Soviets do not need to; but gaining control would
give them immeasurable strategic advantage—a fact they clearly recognize. They have
made—and are continuing to make—a massive investment in highly capable forces
designed to wrest control from us. We must respond with forces capable of defeating
that threat. We have no control over the size or sophistication of the Soviet Navy; we
can only sit back and watch it grow. At the same time we have no alternative but to
respond to the threat it poses with forces that clearly have the requisite capability—
hence, sophistication—and probably, expense.
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The second conclusion is that in all likelihood quality cannot be traded off in any sig-
nificant way for quantity, at least not at today’s fiscal levels. We can easily substantiate a
requirement for greater numbers of ships; but attaining quantity at the expense of
quality (which is another name for capability) simply invites the piecemeal defeat of
units which are incapable, either individually or collectively, of coping with the threat.
Unfortunately, this conclusion runs immediately afoul of the attractive proposition
that the future force posture of the U.S. Navy should rely on many more ships, much
cheaper and smaller and less capable.
The third conclusion is that twelve carrier battle groups represent the absolute mini-
mum in capability needed to discharge our missions—in both peace and war. Our pres-
ent forces, and the sailors who man them, are severely stressed to meet peacetime
commitments. They would be very heavily taxed to discharge their global responsibili-
ties in war. We would, in fact, have to rely on sequential campaigns to attrit the threat
and successively gain control of essential sea areas, with all the risk and uncertainty
such an approach implies. While our numbers of ships will go up in the near term as
previously funded forces come into inventory, the trend projected by the building level
contained in this and last year’s budgets forecasts an inevitable decline in total ship
numbers when the momentum of past years’ investments will run out of steam.
The fourth conclusion is that we must encourage our allies to make a greater naval
contribution in those areas I previously described, where their capabilities effectively
complement our own. This can help alleviate some of the overall numbers shortfall,
and add capability in specialized areas (such as mine warfare); but we should realisti-
cally recognize it will add only marginally to our capability for offensive action against
the main battle forces of the Soviet Navy.
The fifth conclusion is that we must make attainment of substantially greater standoff
capability in our weapons systems a major objective, over the longer term, in order to
destroy the increasingly capable Soviet launch platforms before they attain strike range
of our own forces. At the same time, we should strive to distribute our own offensive
capability among a greater number of platforms, to the extent we can do this within
resources available and—most importantly—without diluting the total strike capabil-
ity of our battle groups.
The final conclusion, which clearly flows from all the rest, is that any major changes in
our naval force structure will be evolutionary in nature. Our primary aim must be to
preserve the essential capability of our 12 battle groups and keep them responsive to
the threat. The fiscal margin for development and deployment of radically new plat-
forms and systems will be small indeed, severely limiting our ability to innovate in
major ways. This means we must carefully select those initiatives which appear to offer
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significant payoff—such as non-CTOL aircraft—and pursue them in a deliberate and
carefully structured way so as to maximize the potential technological payoff from our
investment.
In summary, we must continue to put sophistication and highly capable systems into
our ships and aircraft to meet a rapidly increasing threat. We cannot turn our backs on
a realistic assessment of Soviet capabilities. Units which are incapable of meeting the
threat are, in a sense, worse than none, because they give some a false sense of our total
capabilities vis-a-vis the Soviets. This means that quality cannot generally be traded off
for quantity. At the same time, quantity does matter and there is clearly an absolute
minimum in numbers of combatant units below which we cannot safely go. In my
judgment, at twelve battle groups we have reached that limit. Allies can—and must—
complement our capabilities in important areas—but the fact of life is they are unlikely
to add significantly to our capability to deal with the main striking forces of the Soviet
Navy. Looking to the future, it is clear that we must stress greater standoff capability,
and rigorously explore the potential of non-CTOL aviation, so we can identify and cap-
italize on the most promising technological avenues for the improvement of our force
structure. Change, however, will inevitably come slowly.
The essential question is, what must we do to ensure that we retain a clear margin of
superiority over a very vigorous and dedicated competitor who fully understands the
importance of sea power in the global strategic balance?
I hope that the foregoing thoughts provide some useful insights into the principal con-
siderations which I believe must guide our future decisions on naval force structure.
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